RALPH E. ROBERSON AND IMOGENE V. ROBERSON, HUSBAND AND WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
NOOTER CORPORATION, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1984-11-28
No. AX-255
WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.
459 So. 2d 1156 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1984) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

Roberson appealed the dismissal of his negligence complaint against his employer Monsanto following a workplace explosion, arguing alternative theories of parent company liability and dual-capacity liability. The court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Roberson's exclusive remedy is workers' compensation under Florida law.


Holding

Monsanto's liability as Roberson's employer is limited to that imposed under Chapter 440 (workers' compensation). The dual-capacity theory is inapplicable because Monsanto did not manufacture the CP22 primarily for sale to the general public and did not incidentally use it in its other activities.


Headnotes

[1] An employer's obligation to provide workers' compensation benefits generally serves as the exclusive remedy for an employee injured during the course of employment, barri…

[2] A parent company may be liable for injuries to an employee of a subsidiary if a parent and subsidiary relationship exists at the time of the injury.

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Key Quotes

“Absent such a relationship, Monsanto's liability as Roberson's employer at the time of his industrial accident would be limited to that imposed under Chapter 440.”

Establishes that absent a valid parent-subsidiary relationship at the time of injury, the employer's liability is limited to workers' compensation.

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Facts & Procedural History

Roberson was injured in an explosion of a continuous polymerization finisher (CP22) while inspecting it in the course of his employment with Monsanto.…

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Opinion of the Court
JOANOS, Judge.

JOANOS, Judge.

This appeal is from the trial court’s dismissal of Roberson’s complaint against Monsanto Textiles Company (Monsanto) based upon a finding that Roberson’s exclusive remedy is under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. We agree and affirm.

In an amended complaint, Roberson alleged injuries and damages suffered as a result of an explosion of a continuous polymerization finisher # 22 (CP22) which he was inspecting in the course of his employment with Monsanto. Monsanto moved to dismiss the complaint, citing its obligation to provide workers’ compensation benefits, its compliance with the obligation and its immunity from suit under Chapter 440.

Roberson argues that Monsanto is liable as a parent company of Chemstrand, a subsidiary or separate entity which installed the CP22 in 1957 and subsequently merged with Monsanto. Roberson cites Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Wilkerson, 420 So. 2d 587 (Fla.1982), to show the viability of his theory of parent company liability. We are unable to find any allegation of a parent and subsidiary relationship at the time of Roberson’s injury which would allow recovery as in Wilkerson. Absent such a relationship, Monsanto’s liability as Roberson’s employer at the time of his industrial accident would be limited to that imposed under Chapter 440. Roberson advances a theory of “dual-capacity” which has been recognized most notably in Douglas v. Gallo Winery, 9 Cal.App.3d 103, 137 Cal.Rptr. 797 (Cal.App.1977). Under this theory an employee who is injured by a product manufactured by the employer primarily for sale to the general public may state a cause of action against the employer. The dual capacity theory is based upon the manufacturer’s assuming a liability toward its employee as it would assume toward the general public who buys the product and for whom the product is primarily manufactured. Even the California courts, however, have upheld the exclusive remedy of workers’ compensation when the employer manufactures a product for its own use. Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal.App.3d 978, 129 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1st Dist.1976). The Florida courts have yet to express whether the “dual capacity” theory would extend the employer’s liability beyond Chap. 440.

We need not determine the viability of the “dual capacity” theory as we find it would not be applicable where, as here, the employer, Monsanto, did not manufacture the CP22 primarily for sale to the general public and did not only incidentally use it in its other activities. Douglas, 63 Cal.App. at 113, 137 Cal.Rptr. 797.

Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal of Monsanto from this cause is AFFIRMED.

WIGGINTON and BARFIELD, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …§ 440.11, Fla.Stat. (1989). . The first district has rejected the dual capacity doctrine by which an injured employee seeks tort recovery against the employer on the grounds that the employer acts in different capacities. Roberson v. Nooter Corp., 459 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (employer sued as manufacturer of product that caused injury; no corporate merger involved); Warwick v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Co., 303 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (employer sued, as provider of medical services, for negligent tr…
  • Caraccioli v. KFC Mfg. Corp., 761 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
    …Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (Ala.1987), 516 So.2d 570; Hills v. Salt River Project Assn. (App.1985), 144 Ariz. 421, 698 P.2d 216; Campbell v. Black Mountain Spruce, Inc. (Colo.App.1983), 677 P.2d 379; Roberson v. Nooter Corp. (Fla.App.1984), 459 So.2d 1156; Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553; Needham v. Fred’s Frozen Foods, Inc. (1977), 171 Ind.App. 671, 359 N.E.2d 544; Baker v. Armco, Inc. (Mo.App.1984), 684 S.W.2d 81; Stewart v. CMI Corp. (Utah…
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