JOHN M. POTTER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1984-12-05
No. 84-629
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
459 So. 2d 1170 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1984) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The court reviewed a final order terminating a school board attorney's membership in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) retroactive to July 1, 1979, and determined the termination could not be retroactive.


Holding

The court held that the Division of Retirement could not terminate the attorney's FRS membership retroactively to July 1, 1979, due to the Division's delay in questioning his status and the attorney's reliance on his membership.


Headnotes

[1] An administrative rule defining "consultant or other professional person" is a valid exercise of rulemaking authority when it outlines criteria such as lack of employer c…

[2] An individual's enrollment in a retirement system may be terminated if they do not meet the statutory or administrative criteria for membership.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

A school board attorney was enrolled in FRS since 1971. In 1983, the Division of Retirement questioned his employment status and later decided to term…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
DANAHY, Judge.

DANAHY, Judge.

A school board attorney challenges a final order of the Division of Retirement (the Division) which terminated the attorney’s membership in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) retroactive to July 1, 1979.

The appellant was hired as school board attorney for the Glades County School District effective September 1, 1970. As of January 31, 1971, the appellant was enrolled in FRS, which had been created as of December 1, 1970. The final order under review says this respecting the appellant’s enrollment:

Since January 31, 1971, [the appellant] has been enrolled in the FRS. This was accomplished by his filling out a prescribed form which the School Board then filed with the Division. The Board then began reporting him on its employee rolls. There is no evidence that the initial FRS entry form, filed with the Division, described [the appellant’s] work duties or the nature of his employment with the School Board. Both the Board and the Division enrolled him in the FRS, believing that he was eligible for membership. The Division through its auditor questioned [the appellant’s] employment status in 1981.

We note, in connection with the “prescribed form” which the school board filed with the Division, that section 121.051(4) provides that the employer shall furnish the administrator with such information as he may request for the proper enrollment of officers and employees in the system. We can only conclude that the “prescribed form” which the school board filed with the Division was not designed to furnish the Division with sufficient information to determine whether the appellant was qualified for enrollment in FRS.

As far as qualification for enrollment is concerned, section 121.021, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that “member” means “any officer or employee who is covered or who becomes covered under this system in accordance with this chapter.” In an effort to describe persons who are not employees, and thus not eligible for membership, the Division adopted administrative rule 22B-6.01(12), Florida Administrative Code (the Rule), effective July 1, 1979. The Rule provides:

CONSULTANT OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL PERSON — Means an individual who: agrees to provide certain services; works according to his own methods; is not subject to control of his employer, except as to the results of his work; and does not enjoy the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consultant or other professional person usually: is compensated from another salaries and wages account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently do a majority of his work in his own office rather than on the employer’s premises.

In 1983 the Division sent the Glades County School Board a questionnaire regarding the appellant, which the Board duly answered.

On May 2, 1983, the Division sent the appellant a letter announcing its decision to terminate the appellant’s continued membership in FRS and to make the termination retroactive to July 1, 1979. The appellant challenged that action by a petition for formal hearing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 120. An evidentiary hearing was then conducted by a hearing officer from the Department of Administrative Hearings. The hearing officer entered a recommended order determining that the Division’s action in removing the appellant from FRS membership retroactive to July 1, 1979, was appropriate under the subject administrative rules, statutory law, case law and facts adduced at the hearing. The Division adopted the recommended order of the hearing officer with the exception of an amendment to a finding of fact and another as to a conclusion of law. The appellant has brought that order to us for review.

The appellant vigorously argues that he is not a consultant or professional person within the meaning of the Rule. On that issue, we find no basis for overturning the Division’s decision. Nor do we agree with the appellant that the Rule is an invalid exercise of the Division’s rulemaking authority under section 121.031, Florida Statutes (1983). We do agree with the appellant that the Division improperly terminated the appellant’s FRS membership retroactive to July 1, 1979.

Thus, although we uphold the Division’s determination that the appellant is not eligible for FRS membership and was properly removed from the system, we reverse the Division’s decision to terminate that enrollment retroactive to July 1, 1979. The Division chose that date because it felt that the Rule effective that date put the appellant on actual or constructive notice that he was not qualified for enrollment in FRS. The Division apparently felt that fairness dictated that its decision should not apply retroactively beyond July 1, 1979.

We agree with the Division that fairness should apply here; but we take the Division’s notion of fairness one step further and find that disenrollment retroactive to any date before May 2, 1983, would be inequitable under the facts and circumstances of this case.

During the twelve years and four months before the Division’s letter of May 2, 1983, the Division failed to investigate the appellant’s eligibility and treated him in all respects as if he were a properly participating member of FRS. Relying on the recognition of his continued membership, the appellant was forced to forego other retirement alternatives during the period in question. He cannot now go back and re store those alternatives. The result we reach here is in accord with the result reached in Henry v. State Dept. of Administration, 431 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

We reject the Division’s argument that the Henry case is distinguishable. It is true that the state auditor questioned the appellant’s employment status in 1981.

However, two years passed without any word to the appellant from the Division. The Division’s continued inaction was, at the least, unfair to the appellant.

Accordingly, we modify the order under review to provide that the appellant’s disen-rollment shall be effective May 2, 1983. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • McCARTHY v. Dep't of Ins. & Treas., 479 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …fire safety inspectors, until November 21, 1983. See § 633.081(2), Fla.Stat. (1981). Nothing in Rule 4A-39 purports to give it retroactive effect; therefore, it cannot be applied retroactively to McCarthy. See Potter v. Department of Administration, 459 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). [*137] The Department counters McCarthy’s argument by defending the imposition of its requirements in the October 16, 1981, memorandum issued by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. The memorandum, it urges, was an interim…
  • Jordan v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 522 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
    …e Services v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 496 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (error not to apply revised rule adopted during pendency of administrative proceeding to applicant’s case) and conversely Potter v. State, Dept. of Admin., 459 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (error to apply rule establishing attorney’s ineligibility prior to date attorney notified of agency’s decision to terminate his membership in retirement system). However, we find no circumstances in the case before us which would…
  • Browning v. State, 471 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …s after so many years in FRS. No special circumstance not present in Henry v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 431 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and Potter v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 459 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), appears in this record. In each of these cases, an attorney challenged the Division’s authority to terminate his membership in FRS after many years of participation. Each of the cited cases held that the attorney was ineligible f…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw