STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
RICKY EVERETT JOYNER, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the trial court's order granting Joyner's motion to discharge based on violation of his constitutional right to speedy trial. The appellate court reverses, holding that although a 20-month delay triggered a presumption of prejudice, the state's negligent delay coupled with Joyner's failure to demonstrate actual prejudice did not violate his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment.
The delay, while sufficient to trigger a presumption of prejudice, did not violate Joyner's constitutional speedy trial right because the state's negligent delay (as opposed to deliberate delay) weighs less heavily, and Joyner failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, having suffered no oppressive pretrial incarceration or undue anxiety.
[1] A delay of twenty months between the filing of an information and the return of a defendant for trial, while triggering a presumption of prejudice, is insufficient on its…
[2] Negligent delay by the state in bringing a defendant to trial weighs less heavily against the state than deliberate delay when assessing a speedy trial claim.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the delay of twenty months between the filing of the information and issuance of capias and the return of Joyner from the Department of Corrections was sufficient to trigger a presumption of prejudice, requiring consideration of other factors, it was insufficient in itself to find a violation of Joyner's constitutional speedy trial right.”
Establishes that presumption of prejudice does not automatically result in a speedy trial violation; other Barker factors must be weighed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThere was a 20-month delay between the filing of the information against Joyner and the issuance of a capias and his return from the Department of Cor…
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POWELL, R., Associate Judge.
The state appeals an order granting Joyner’s motion for discharge on the ground that his constitutional right to speedy trial1 was violated. We reverse. This court recently addressed such an issue in Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The controlling principles are fully set forth in that opinion and need not be repeated here.
While the delay of twenty months between the filing of the information and issuance of capias and the return of Joyner from the Department of Corrections was sufficient to trigger a presumption of prejudice, requiring consideration of other factors, it was insufficient in itself to find a violation of Joyner’s constitutional speedy trial right. The delay by the state in ascertaining Joyner’s whereabouts and returning him for trial was negligent delay, which weighs less heavily against the state than deliberate delay. Of utmost importance, however, is that Joyner has failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the delay. There was no oppressive pretrial incarceration because Joyner was serving a lengthy state prison sentence, norr was there undue anxiety and concern since he was unaware of the pending charge. His assertion that his defense was impaired by the intervening death of a potential alibi witness was just that — a mere assertion, lacking in substance or particulars.2
After considering all of the Barker3 factors, as expressed in Vela, we conclude that Joyner’s constitutional right to speedy trial was not violated. Consequently, the trial court’s order discharging him was in error and is hereby reversed.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ORFINGER and COWART, JJ., concur. . This case does not involve a claim that Joyner’s right to speedy trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 was violated.
. The only showing made of an impaired defense was counsel’s argument at the hearing that one Willie Bozeman, a former employer, had died on October 19, 1983 (his death certificate was produced) and that although counsel had never spoken with Bozeman, "it’s our contention that there could very well have been an alibi.” Speculative allegations of an impaired defense are unpersuasive. United States v. Jenkins, 701 F. 2d 850 (10th Cir.1983).
. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (18 total)
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State v. Jenkins, 899 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…hs later on June 22, 2002. Other courts have found similar delays to be presumptively prejudicial. See Howell, supra, (fourteen and one-half months); see also State v. Roundtree, 438 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (twenty-one months); State v. Joyner, 460 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (twenty months); State v. Union, 469 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (fifteen months). We find the delay in this case is also presumptively prejudicial. The second factor is the reason for the delay. Courts have traditionally clas…
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Seymour v. State, 738 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…examined this factor and found lesser delays also presumptively prejudicial. See Roundtree (21½ months); State v. Union, 469 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (15 months); Hallman v. State, 462 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (31 months); State v. Joyner, 460 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (20 months). As to factor (2), the State did not dispute at the hearing that it had never tried to execute the outstanding arrest warrant on Mr. Seymour, even though he was living in the Tampa Bay area at all relevant times and…
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Fletcher v. State, 143 So. 3d 469 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…eshold “triggering mechanism.” The court need not inquire into the other factors unless there has been a delay of such length as to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Id. Here, the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial. See State v. Joyner, 460 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (delay of twenty months between filing of information and issuance of capias and return of defendant from prison was sufficient to trigger presumption of prejudice). As to the second element, the trial court correctly found…
Previewing 3 of 18 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972)
- United States v. Jenkins, 701 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1983)
- Vela v. State, 450 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)