DAVID M. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1984-12-17
No. BA-454
MILLS and WENTWORTH, JJ„ concur.
461 So. 2d 991 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1984) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

David Smith appealed the trial court's summary denial of his Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, raising several grounds including ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his guilty plea to armed robbery. The appellate court affirmed the denial of most claims but reversed and remanded the trial court's summary denial regarding whether counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate a voluntary intoxication defense.


Holding

The court affirmed the trial court's summary denial of claims regarding the single psychological evaluation and the presentence investigation report, and affirmed the rejection of the insanity defense ineffectiveness claim. However, the court reversed the summary denial regarding the voluntary intoxication defense claim because the motion allegations and Dr. Larson's report raised genuine questions about counsel's effectiveness that precluded summary denial.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's summary denial of a post-conviction relief motion must be accompanied by attachments of the file or record that conclusively show the movant is not entitl…

[2] Allegations concerning matters that preceded and were wholly unrelated to the entry of a guilty plea are foreclosed by the plea.

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Key Quotes

“defense counsel was not obligated to seek additional expert opinion in the hope of fabricating an insanity defense”

Establishes that counsel has no duty to pursue defenses unsupported by available evidence

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Facts & Procedural History

Smith pleaded guilty to armed robbery. In his post-conviction motion, he alleged that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not adequatel…

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Opinion of the Court
SHIVERS, Judge.

SHIVERS, Judge.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of his RCrP 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. In his motion, appellant alleged several grounds in support of relief. The trial court summarily denied appellant’s motion, without attaching to its order any portions of the file or record in this case. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

First, we find that the trial court properly summarily denied appellant’s claims that the trial judge erred in ordering only one psychological evaluation of appellant to determine if appellant was temporarily insane at the time of the offense and that the trial judge erred in not ordering a presentence investigation report. See, respectively, Brown v. State, 418 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (that court stating that the defendant’s allegations concerning matters which preceded and were wholly unrelated to the entry of his plea were foreclosed by virtue of the defendant’s plea, citing Robinson v. State, 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla.1979)) and Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla.1981) (the Florida Supreme Court stating that a presentence investigation report is discretionary with the trial court, citing Hargrave v. State, 366 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 239, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979)).

Next, we find to be without merit appellant’s allegation that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising appellant to plead guilty to armed robbery without adequately investigating the possibility of raising an insanity defense. Here, appellant attached to his 3.850 motion a report by Dr. James L. Larson, a psychiatrist, wherein Dr. Larson opined that appellant “is competent to stand trial and at the time of the offense he should be considered legally responsible.” In light of this report, defense counsel was not obligated to seek additional expert opinion in the hope of fabricating an insanity defense. See Holmes v. State, 429 So. 2d 297, 300 (Fla.1983).

Finally, appellant alleged in his motion, somewhat inarticulately, that defense counsel was ineffective in allowing appellant to plead guilty in light of a possible defense of lack of intent. Voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific intent crimes, Presley v. State, 388 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), and robbery is a specific intent crime, Bell v. State, 394 So. 2d 979 (Fla.1981).

See also Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla.1984) (the Florida Supreme Court stating that when specific intent is an element of the crime charged, evidence of voluntary intoxication, or for that matter, evidence of any condition relating to the accused’s ability to form a specific intent, is relevant).

Here, appellant averred in his motion that he did not have the intent to commit robbery because of his ingestion of numerous quaalude tablets and an excessive quantity of beer prior to committing the offense.

Moreover, in Dr. Larson’s report, mentioned above, Dr. Larson opined that appellant “was suffering from an alcoholic blackout spell during the time of commission of the alleged offense.” In light of appellant’s allegations and Dr. Larson’s report, we cannot say that appellant’s motion conclusively shows that he is entitled to no relief as to this alleged deficiency on the part of defense counsel in allegedly not adequately investigating and/or advising appellant of this possible defense prior to appellant entering his plea of guilty.

Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court’s order summarily denies relief with respect to appellant’s claim on this point, it is hereby reversed and this cause remanded to the trial court to either again summarily deny appellant’s motion as to this claim and attach to its order those portions of the record that conclusively show that appellant is not entitled to relief, or hold an evidentiary hearing and then rule on this claim by appellant. The order is affirmed in all other respects.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED with directions.

MILLS and WENTWORTH, JJ„ concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Smith v. State, 489 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
    …NIMMONS, Judge. Smith filed a Fla.R.Cr.P. 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court summarily denied the motion. This court, in Smith v. State, 461 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), affirmed in part but reversed and remanded on the ineffective assistance of counsel ground. That ground pertained to counsel’s alleged failure to adequately investigate and/or advise the defendant, prior to entry of his guilty p…
  • Johnson v. State, 606 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
    …rsal; however, grounds (3) and (6), in my view, do not justify summary denial. Grounds (3) and (6) appear legally sufficient and are not refuted by the record attachments. See McCoy v. State, 598 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and Smith v. State, 461 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). I conclude the matter should be remanded to the trial court for either attachment of portions of the record conclusively showing that appellant is not entitled to relief on these claims, or for an evidentiary hearing.…
  • Blanco v. State, 502 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …ific intent. Robbery and attempted first degree murder, the crimes for which Blanco was convicted, require specific intent and evidence tending to show a lack of capacity to form such intent may have been vital to Blanco’s defense. Smith v. State, 461 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Cirack v. State, 201 So. 2d 706, 709 (Fla.1967); see also Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla.1985). If Blanco’s allegations are true he may have satisfied the requirements of Knight and Strickland in order to show…

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