CITY OF TREASURE ISLAND, FLORIDA, SITTING AS THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT AND APPEALS, PETITIONER,
v.
EDWARD P. LANDT, RESPONDENT
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A Florida appellate court reversed a circuit court's decision that had overturned a city board's denial of a permit to install a vinyl awning on boat davits. The court held that the circuit court applied an improper standard of review by substituting its judgment for the board's on undisputed facts, when it should have applied a limited certiorari standard.
The circuit court must review the Board's action using certiorari review, examining only whether the Board afforded procedural due process, whether its decision was supported by substantial competent evidence, and whether it observed the essential requirements of law. The circuit court improperly substituted its judgment for the Board's on undisputed facts and clear ordinance provisions, departing from the essential requirements of law.
[1] A circuit court reviewing a local board's administrative decision acts in a certiorari capacity, not a trial de novo.
[2] The scope of certiorari review of a local board's administrative decision is limited to whether procedural due process was afforded, the decision was supported by substan…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court below simply substituted its judgment for that of the Board of Adjustment on undisputed facts and ordinance provisions that are clear and unambiguous. That is an improper standard of review by the lower court.”
Establishes the primary error: the circuit court used the wrong standard of review by acting as if it were conducting a trial de novo rather than certiorari review.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondent Landt applied for a permit to permanently affix a vinyl awning or cover to the davits and lifts supporting his sixteen-foot boat over water…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Petitioner, City of Treasure Island, petitions for review of an order and opinion of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Pinellas County. We have jurisdiction. Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(a)(2)(B); City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla.1982).
The court below was acting in its review capacity in regard to a decision of the City of Treasure Island’s Board of Adjustment and Appeals. Respondent had appealed to the Board of Adjustment an administrative decision of petitioner which denied his application for a permit to construct a vinyl awning or cover to be permanently affixed to the boat davits and lifts attached to his dock at his residence. The Board of Adjustment denied his appeal on the basis that to grant the permit would violate sections 6-18.1 and 706.01 of the Treasure Island Code of Ordinances.
The court below reversed the decision of the Board of Adjustment by finding that the awning respondent applied for would not violate either ordinance provision. It appears that the court below simply substituted its judgment for that of the Board of Adjustment on undisputed facts and ordinance provisions that are clear and unambiguous. That is an improper standard of review by the lower court.
The lower court was reviewing the action of the Board of Adjustment not on a trial de novo, but by review in the nature of certiorari review. Thus, the scope of review of the court below was whether the action of the Board of Adjustment afforded procedural due process, was supported by substantial competent evidence and whether it observed the essential requirements of law. City of Deerfield Beach; Bell v. City of Sarasota, 371 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); City of Ormond Beach v. State ex rel. Del Marco, 426 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Cherokee Crushed Stone v. City of Miramar, 421 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
The respondent applied for a permit to permanently affix a vinyl awning or cover to the davits and lifts by which his sixteen-foot boat was supported over water. Section 706.01 of the petitioner’s Code of Ordinances provides that “no structures shall be erected or constructed beyond the established bulkhead or bulkhead line of any body of water except docks, davits and/or lifts.” Section 6-81.1 of the code provides that “no dock or wharf, pier or other structure ... shall be enclosed or covered by any means, either permanent or temporary.”
Since the court below applied an improper standard of review of the action of the Board of Adjustment, it thereby departed from the essential requirements of law. Accordingly, we grant certiorari and quash the order of the circuit court.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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City OF Clearwater v. Studebaker's Dance Club & Lawrence H. Liebling, 516 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ant to the determination of whether the ordinance was violated. Because the circuit court applied an incorrect standard of review of the CCRB’s action, it thereby departed from the essential requirements of law. See City of Treasure Island v. Landt, 462 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Finally, we note that Studebaker’s vague attempts, in its response to Liebling’s petition, to challenge section 99.-11(a) as being overly broad are not properly raised for the first time in this court. Accordingly, we quash the…
Authorities Cited
- City OF Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982)
- Cherokee Crushed Stone, Inc. v. City OF Miramar, 421 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- Bell v. City OF Sarasota, 371 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- City OF Ormond Beach v. State of Fla. upon the relation of Charles J. DEL Marco, 426 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)