STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
BRUCE HAYES MUNRO, APPELLEE
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Florida appealed the dismissal of a conspiracy charge based on collateral estoppel after the defendant was acquitted of the underlying trafficking charge on an entrapment defense. The court held that entrapment to the trafficking offense does not collaterally estop prosecution of the separate conspiracy charge, as conspiracy is a distinct offense requiring separate proof and defenses.
The trial court erred in dismissing the conspiracy charge. Although the entrapment defense necessarily admits the existence of the trafficking offense, conspiracy is a legally distinct offense from the underlying crime, and an entrapment finding as to trafficking does not necessarily establish entrapment as to the conspiracy charge. Collateral estoppel does not apply because the conspiracy defense was not litigated or decided in the trafficking trial.
[1] Collateral estoppel does not bar prosecution for conspiracy to commit a crime when the defendant was acquitted of the underlying crime based on the affirmative defense of…
[2] The defense of entrapment, when successfully asserted as to a substantive offense, does not automatically encompass a separate charge of conspiracy to commit that offense…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the plea of entrapment is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance and necessarily admits the existence of the offense charged, the trial court was eminently correct in concluding that the jury acquitted defendant of the trafficking charge on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to guilt created by the assertion of the defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment.”
Establishes that entrapment is a confession and avoidance defense that admits the offense while raising reasonable doubt
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State charged the defendant with trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to commit trafficking in cocaine in separate informations. The trafficking …
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COWART, Judge.
This case involves two criminal charges and the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The State charged the defendant in one information with trafficking in cocaine (§ 893.135(l)(b)(3), Fla.Stat.) and in another information with conspiracy to commit the offense of trafficking in cocaine (§§ 777.-011, 777.04, 893.135(l)(b)(3), Fla.Stat.). The trafficking offense was tried first and in that trial the defendant successfully asserted the defense of entrapment. After being acquitted on the trafficking offense the defendant moved to dismiss the conspiracy charge on the basis of collateral estoppel. The trial court dismissed the conspiracy information citing Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 83, 78 L.Ed.2d 93 (1983), which cited and followed Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), and the State appeals.
Because the plea of entrapment is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance and necessarily admits the existence of the offense charged, the trial court was eminently correct in concluding that the jury acquitted defendant of the trafficking charge on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to guilt created by the assertion of the defendant’s affirmative defense of entrapment.
However, the trial court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, logic or fact, the defense of entrapment, successfully asserted as to the trafficking charge, necessarily encompassed both the trafficking charge and the charge of conspiracy. The offense of conspiracy is legally separate and distinctly different from the criminal offense which constitutes the alleged subject matter of the alleged conspiracy. One may be guilty of both offenses, guilty of one and not guilty of the other, or not guilty of either. Each is a separate offense and may or may not be subject to one specific defense. A particular affirmative defense may be applicable to either, or neither, or both of the particular charges relating to both offenses.
Accordingly, the jury finding that the defendant was entrapped as to the trafficking offense does not mean that the jury in that trial necessarily found that the defendant was also entrapped as to the conspiracy charge which was not then being tried.1 Not only was such a finding unnecessary to a determination of the trafficking charge but testimony, if any, as to entrapment as to the conspiracy charge was legally immaterial and irrelevant to the issues tried in the trial of the trafficking charge. The defendant may or may not have also been entrapped as to the conspiracy charge but that defense should be asserted in the trial of the conspiracy charge. That issue was not decided against the State in the trial of the trafficking charge.
The order dismissing the conspiracy charge is
REVERSED and the cause REMANDED.
ORFINGER, J., and POWELL, R.W., Associate Judge, concur. . See Morris v. State, 456 So. 2d 471, 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
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Diosdado Nacher v. State, 465 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…Since, as Ashe says, see also Gragg v. State, supra, the jury therefore rationally “could”9 have reached its verdict on a basis which did not include the finding that Nacher was insane on May 29th, his contention cannot prevail. See State v. Munro, 462 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). This conclusion is supported by several cases in which it has been held that when, as here, there is an evidentiary basis to separate the two, a determination that the defendant was insane during a later crime does not foreclos…
Authorities Cited
- Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1970)
- Von Dee Gragg v. State, 429 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1983)
- Witley v. State, 456 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)