VINCENT P. MIRAGLIA, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
EILEEN MIRAGLIA, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT
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In a custody dispute arising from dissolution proceedings, the trial court awarded primary custody of three children to the mother, partly to help her resolve emotional problems. The appellate court reversed this reasoning, holding that children cannot be used as instruments to stabilize a parent's mental health, and remanded for reconsideration in light of the mother's suicide attempt and other evidence.
The court reversed the trial court's custody decision and remanded for reconsideration because children cannot be used as substitutes for formal psychiatric treatment, the best interests of the children must take precedence, and the record suggested the mother's suicide attempt and other circumstances indicated those best interests were not served. The court also held that the psychiatrist's testimony should be admitted upon remand because the wife's mental health became vital to determining permanent custody in light of unfolding events.
[1] Children should not be used as a substitute for formal psychiatric treatment to resolve parental emotional problems.
[2] The best interests of children must take precedence over the interests of their parents in custody determinations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Children should never be used as a substitute for formal psychiatric treatment in order to help transform an unstable and unhappy home into a stable, happy one.”
Establishes the core principle that children cannot be instrumental in resolving parental emotional problems in custody determinations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFather and mother sought primary custody of three children in a dissolution proceeding. The trial court awarded primary custody to the mother. During …
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LETTS, Judge.
Pursuant to a dissolution proceeding, both mother and father seek “primary” custody of three children. The trial court declared the mother the victor, in part to help her resolve admitted emotional problems. We disagree with that declaration and remand for further proceedings.
Children should never be used as a substitute for formal psychiatric treatment in order to help transform an unstable and unhappy home into a stable, happy one. Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); and see Sherrod v. Sherrod, 448 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Ashleman v. Ashleman, 381 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). In this regard, the best interests of the children must take precedence over those of their parent or parents. The record before us is replete with testimony that life with mother was difficult. For instance, during the pendency of a requested rehearing on the final judgment the mother attempted suicide and, arising therefrom, “temporary” custody was awarded to the husband, a transfer which for aught we know still pertains.
The attempted suicide raises another aspect of this cause. The final judgment gave primary custody to the mother, yet, as we have noted, the court understandably switched that custody to the father upon learning, by way of emergency motion, of the mother’s attempt on her own life. Notwithstanding, the same court, one week after the ordered switch, denied the petition for rehearing, thereby in effect reaffirming the primary custody in the wife.
We can all agree that the polestar in these matters is exclusively the welfare of the children, but that star is obscured here by events which cloud the record and strongly suggest those best interests were not served. However, we stop short of outright reversal. This trial judge was on the firing line which we were not. We, therefore, content ourselves with asking him to reconsider the matter in the light of this opinion and receive such further evidence as he deems appropriate.
Another point we consider is the court’s refusal to admit the testimony of the wife’s long-time psychiatrist, based on the privilege enunciated in Section 90.-503(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1983). The father argues that by alleging her fitness to have custody, the wife introduced her mental condition and waived the privilege. At the time the trial judge rejected this contention, he was faced with a situation on all fours with the one existing in Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), and his ruling was correct. However, subsequent to this ruling, unfolding events reflected the suicide attempt which we believe caused the wife’s mental health to be “vital to a proper determination of permanent custody.” See Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, we direct this testimony be admitted upon remand.
To insure that the best interests of the children are given due consideration, we urge the trial court on remand to appoint for the children a guardian ad litem who has been trained pursuant to the guardian ad litem program promulgated by the Office of State Courts Administrator. REMANDED FOR A FURTHER EVI-DENTIARY HEARING. IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE CHILD SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS IF CUSTODY IS TRANSFERRED.
GLICKSTEIN, J., and SCOTT, ROBERT C., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (15 total)
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Attorney AD Litem FOR D.K. v. The Parents OF D.K., 780 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…s where calamitous events such as an attempted suicide occur during a pending custody dispute have courts found that the mental health of the parent is sufficiently at issue to warrant finding no statutory privilege exists. See Miraglia v. Miraglia, 462 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Otherwise, the courts have instructed that the more appropriate method of securing the necessary information regarding the parent’s psychological state to aid in determi…
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Leonard v. Leonard, 673 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…tal infirmity.” Peisach v. Antuna, 539 So. 2d at 546. A parent’s implicit waiver of confidentiality as to his or her mental health becomes relevant with respect to a custody dispute, in circumstances such as those described in Miraglia v. Miraglia, 462 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), and Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In Miraglia, after being awarded custody of the children, and during the pendency of a request for rehearing, the mother attempted suicide. The court held this event…
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O'Neill v. O'Neill, 823 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…to a proper determination of permanent custody.” Therefore, the court concluded that the then existing statutory patient-psychiatrist privilege could not be invoked under the facts of that child custody case. Id. Similarly, in Miraglia v. Miraglia, 462 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), one parent’s suicide attempt was found sufficient to vitiate the privilege. These cases have been found to create an implicit waiver of confidentiality because the parent’s mental health became relevant to a custody dispute…
Previewing 3 of 15 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bienvenu v. Bienvenu, 380 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Critchlow v. Critchlow, 347 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Thellie S. Roper v. Roper, 336 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Ashleman v. Ashleman, 381 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Sherrod v. Sherrod, 448 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)