JOE YARBROUGH, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF PERRY; BYRUM WHITFIELD, THOMAS DEMPS, JOE NOLA AND T. ANDERSON BOWDOIN, CONSTITUTING THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF PERRY, FLORIDA, APPELLANTS,
v.
EARL W. YOUNG, W.H. BOLTON, VINCENT DIRUBBIO, RALPH CLARK, J. HERSCHEL MCCLELLAN, JERRY D. DICKERT, JOHN E. LOUGHRIDGE, BISHOP CLARK, JACOB M. SANHEIN, ROBERT D. SAYERS, JOE R. ROBERTS AND D.L. FRITH, APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1985-01-03
No. AY-182
MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
462 So. 2d 515 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

The City of Perry's Council approved a utility improvement plan at an October 28, 1983 public meeting, but residents challenged the approval as violating Florida's Sunshine Law because a newspaper article published the day before stated an outdated 1.3 million dollar cost, while the Council actually approved an 8.8 million dollar plan. The appellate court reversed the trial court's invalidation of the Council's actions, finding no Sunshine Law violation.


Holding

The court held that the City provided reasonable public notice of the October 28 meeting and its agenda, no Sunshine Law violation occurred, and the Council's actions were not invalidated. The court reasoned that an inaccurate press report, which was not part of the City's official notice, does not obligate a public body to postpone deliberations, and the Council's actions at the duly noticed public meeting were valid.


Headnotes

[1] A public body's official actions taken at a duly noticed public meeting are not invalidated by an inaccurate press report concerning the subject matter of the meeting.

[2] The Sunshine Law does not require a public body to postpone deliberations on a topic, despite reasonable public notice, due to an inaccurate press report.

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Key Quotes

“The Law does not expressly require reasonable public notice for a City Council to hold a 'public meeting'. The better view, however, is that reasonable notice is mandatory, although a posted agenda is unnecessary.”

Establishes the standard for Sunshine Law compliance regarding notice requirements.

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Facts & Procedural History

The City of Perry considered utility system improvements over several months, initially with a 1.3 million dollar estimate. The City posted an agenda …

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Opinion of the Court
ERVIN, Chief Judge.

ERVIN, Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from an order finding that certain actions of the Perry City Council (Council) violated Florida’s “Sunshine Law”. Section 286.011, Florida Statutes. We reverse.

For several months before October 1983, the City of Perry (City) considered renovating and upgrading certain aspects of its utility system. The City contracted with a private engineering firm to make a preliminary report and recommendations. The report’s first draft recommended a utility improvement program costing 1.3 million dollars. Several drafts and months later, the City gave public notice — a posted agenda outside of city hall — of a regular Council meeting to be held on October 25, 1983. The posted agenda included an update by the City Manager on the revenue bond issue to finance the proposed utility system improvements. At the October 25th Council meeting, however, the City Manager stated that his update was not ready. The mayor then announced that the update would be placed on the agenda of a special Council meeting to be held on October 28, 1983. At the October 25th Council meeting, no Council member or city official mentioned any dollar amount regarding the utility system improvements.

Immediately after the October 25th Council meeting, the mayor announced the upcoming October 28th Council meeting’s agenda on a local radio station. Also, on October 26, 1983, the City posted the agenda for the October 28th meeting outside of city hall, which stated that one of the three items to be covered included “Council review and approval of agreement between the City of Perry and bond underwriters and bond counsel for revenue utility bond issue.” The agenda stated no dollar amount. Additionally, the City hand delivered copies of the agenda to local media.

On October 27, 1983, the Taco Times, Perry’s twice-weekly newspaper, published an article regarding the October 28th special meeting, wherein it was twice stated that the utility system improvements to be discussed were worth 1.3 million dollars. The article’s reporter had attended the October 25th meeting. During the final hearing below, the reporter testified that she had used the 1.3 million-dollar amount since it was the sum she believed had been stated in previous engineering reports. The City Manager never told the reporter an amount for the utility system improvements other than 1.3 million dollars. There was no evidence adduced that the Council or City Manager misled the reporter.

On October 27, 1983, the engineering firm submitted a 40-page updated draft — at least the eighth update — of its preliminary report to the Council. The updated report recommended that the City formally adopt the report as the City’s master plan for utility system improvement, and set the total cost at 8.8 million dollars. The City Manager testified below that inflation and the combination of other utility system projects contemplated since 1981 caused the increase to the 8.8 million figure. Prior to October 28, 1983, the mayor had discussed the 8.8 million-dollar amount in private meetings with the City Manager, the City Attorney, the City Engineer and a banker. Also, the City Manager admitted to discussing the larger amount with the City’s professional staff before October 25, 1983.

On October 28, 1983, the Council met as scheduled with all commissioners except one. The city staff and two reporters were also present. After the private engineers reviewed the updated preliminary report, the Council unanimously adopted the report as the City’s master plan for utilities improvement. Following discussion, the Council also authorized the City Manager to sign an agreement between the City, bond underwriters and bond counsel. The Council planned a revenue bond issue of 8.8 million dollars for financing the utility system improvements. The October 28th meeting was the first time that the 8.8 million-dollar amount was mentioned at a public meeting. At a later meeting, the Council adopted a utility bond ordinance, providing for the issuance of 8.8 million dollars of capital improvement revenue bonds. The adoption of that ordinance is not at issue in this appeal.

Appellees filed suit, claiming that the Council’s actions, regarding the utility system improvements, during the October 28, 1983 meeting, violated the Sunshine Law. The trial court agreed and declared that the Council’s approval of the utilities improvement master plan and the contracts between the City, bond counsel and underwriters were not binding. Despite finding that the public had notice of the October 28th meeting and its agenda, the trial court reasoned that since the 1.3 million-dollar amount stated in the newspaper article was so disparate from the amount the Council approved, the Council should have postponed deliberations until the public could have received accurate information. We find no violation of the Sunshine Law.

The Law does not expressly require reasonable public notice for a City Council to hold a “public meeting”. The better view, however, is that reasonable notice is mandatory, although a posted agenda is unnecessary. Hough v. Stem-bridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). The record in the instant ease reflects that the City gave reasonable notice. The presence at the October 28th meeting of all but one commissioner (the absent commissioner did receive notice), city staff and two members of the local media indicates the effectiveness of the City’s notice.

The order on appeal concentrates on the difference between the 8.8 million-dollar amount actually approved by the Council and the 1.3 million-dollar amount mentioned in the October 27th newspaper article. That article, however, was not part of the City’s official notice efforts. Moreover, the City had no duty to give notice by paid advertisements of its intention to act on the utility improvements.1 We believe that forcing a public body to postpone deliberations on a given topic, despite the giving of reasonable public notice, because of an inaccurate press report, is not only unnecessary under the Sunshine Law, but also unreasonable.

Although the actions at issue suggest that there was at least one secret Council meeting, there is nothing in the record revealing that an official act of the Council preceded the October 28, 1983 meeting, or that the Council members privately met to reach a final decision. The Council’s apparently limited review and discussion of the updated engineering report at the October 28th meeting does not by itself indicate a Sunshine Law violation. Occidental Chemical Company v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336, 341-42 (Fla.1977).

In fact, the record reflects that the Council had reviewed several prior drafts of the engineering report during the previous two years. Even if there had been a prior secret meeting, such a technical violation would not invalidate the Council’s actions at the duly noticed and public October 28th meeting. Tolar v. School Board of Liberty County, 398 So. 2d 427, 429 (Fla.1981).

Without evidence that the formal actions taken at the October 28th meeting were a “perfunctory ratification of secret decisions”, Tolar, 398 So. 2d at 429, we cannot sustain the invalidation of the Council’s actions. See B.M.Z. Corp. v. City of Oakland Park, 415 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).

REVERSED.

MILLS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . The legislature has required such notice for certain subjects. See, e.g., Section 166.04 l(3)(c), Florida Statutes.


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  • Grapski v. City OF Alachua, 31 So. 3d 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    …blic body be listed in advance of the meeting on an agenda. That is, the City was not required to post an agenda for the meeting where the minutes of its canvassing board were to be approved. This conclusion followed the law. See Yarbrough v. Young, 462 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Hough, 278 So. 2d at 290-91. “[Wjhile Florida courts have recognized that notice of public meetings is a mandatory requirement of the Government in the Sunshine Law, the preparation of an agenda that reflects every issue th…
  • Monroe Cnty. v. Pigeon KEY Historical Park, Inc., 647 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …level of public importance. Tolar’s standard of remediation by independent final action in the sunshine applies regardless of whether a case concerns a City Council’s approval of an $8.8 million dollar utility system improvement. Yarbrough v. Young, 462 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), or a School Board’s abolition of an administrator’s position, Tolar, 398 So. 2d at 427. [*869] In conclusion, the Sunshine Law equally binds all members of governmental bodies, be they advisory committee members or elected offic…
  • TSI Se., Inc. v. Royals, 588 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
    …iven. As the trial court ruled, the fact that the affidavit recites that the meetings were of “general knowledge” is insufficient to create a material issue of fact, as reasonable public notice is clearly required. See generally, Yarbrough v. Young, 462 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), citing Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Counter-affidavits filed for purposes of avoiding summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge and must set forth the facts upon which the affiant relies. Ru…

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