BETTY SUE PREVATT, APPELLANT,
v.
JIMMY CARROLL PREVATT, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the appellate court reversed the trial court's award of $200 per month rehabilitative alimony to the wife, finding it was an abuse of discretion given the husband's income and the wife's documented mental health condition and need for psychiatric care. The court remanded for a new hearing with instructions to award no less than $400 monthly, while affirming the $500 attorney's fee award.
The court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding the inadequate sum of $200 monthly alimony given the husband's ability to pay and the wife's financial needs, but properly awarded $500 for partial attorney's fees where no evidence of actual services was presented. The case was remanded for a new hearing requiring an alimony award of no less than $400 monthly.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion in awarding rehabilitative alimony when the amount awarded is insufficient given the parties' financial circumstances and the needs of…
[2] A trial court may award rehabilitative alimony to a spouse with a history of mental illness, even if the illness is in remission, if there is evidence suggesting difficul…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding the wife such a paltry sum of money”
Establishes the core holding that the $200 monthly alimony award was an abuse of discretion
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe wife suffered from schizophrenia, paranoid type, currently in remission. Her psychiatrist testified she would have difficulty maintaining employme…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Ability To Pay cases and more on FLexlaw
RYDER, Chief Judge.
The respondent wife in this dissolution proceeding appeals the final judgment awarding her $200.00 per month for thirty-six months as rehabilitative alimony. She also appeals the award of $500.00 for partial payment of her attorney’s fees and costs. We hold that the court abused its discretion in determining the amount of the alimony but affirm in all other respects.
The evidence adduced at the dissolution hearing was that the wife had suffered from mental illness — schizophrenia, paranoid type — which is currently in remission. Her psychiatrist testified that she would have difficulty holding a job because she might not show up for work or would resign. He did not say, however, that the wife is totally incapable of working, but that she could possibly undertake minimal and sheltered work with a benevolent employer who would allow her to miss work on occasion. The psychiatrist’s testimony strongly suggests that the wife will not be successful in finding and holding employment, but this court cannot substitute its judgment for the trial court’s and reweigh the evidence considered by the finder of fact. Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla.1977); Strawgate v. Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla.1976).
Although we have serious reservations about the wife’s future ability to rehabilitate herself, this matter can be readdressed by the trial court upon proper motion by the wife after her experience has shown either success or failure, at or before the expiration of her rehabilitative alimony.
As to the amount of alimony awarded, we hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in awarding the wife such a paltry sum of money.
The evidence shows that the husband’s gross income is $906.05 biweekly. He is a supervisor at Avon Park Correctional Institution, and he is provided with housing, electricity, gas and yard maintenance. The wife has no regular income, although she occasionally earns money by helping with her sister’s housework. Having reviewed all of the evidence in the record as to the husband’s ability to pay and the wife’s financial needs, including a monthly visit to her psychiatrist costing $90.00, we conclude that there is a clear abuse of discretion in the amount of alimony awarded. We remand this case for the trial judge to hold another hearing and to award the wife no less than $400.00 per month.
Finally, we affirm the trial court’s award of $500.00 to the wife for partial attorney’s fees and costs. The wife presented no evidence on attorney’s fees at the hearing except the cost for expert testimony by the wife’s psychiatrist. The trial court received no other evidence as to services performed by the attorney or the value thereof, and, therefore, the award of $500.00 was proper. See Pearce v. Pearce, 363 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Nivens v. Nivens, 312 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
GRIMES and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Travieso v. Travieso, 474 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1985)…nable attorney’s fee. See Lee Engineering & Construction Co. v. Fellows, 209 So. 2d 454 (Fla.1968); Maass v. Christensen, 447 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Quarngesser v. Quarngesser, 177 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965). But see Prevatt v. Prevatt, 462 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Prior to this decision, the courts and the legal profession considered the giving of expert testimony in attorney fee matters to be a professional obligation. In Baruch v. Giblin, 122 Fla. 59, 164 So. 831 (1935), this Court stres…
-
McHANEY v. State, 513 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…allegations. The trial judge hearing this conflicting testimony concluded that no such request was made, and we may not substi [*254] tute our judgment for that of the finder of fact. Delgado v. Strong, 360 So. 2d 73 (Fla.1978); Prevatt v. Prevatt, 462 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). McHaney next contends that he did not waive his right to be present when the jury viewed the crime scene. We find no merit in this argument. The record reflects that McHaney was aware of the jury view and made no request to atte…
-
Lord v. Carter Lord, 566 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…r husband paid the former wife $7,500 for attorney’s fees during the dissolution. At the final hearing, however, the former wife presented absolutely no evidence concerning her entitlement to additional funds for attorney’s fees. Prevatt v. Prevatt, 462 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). This matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. SCHOONOVER, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. & William A. Cagle, 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1977)
- Strawgate v. Dorothea Chase Turner, 339 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1976)
- Nivens v. Nivens, 312 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Kinne Kohler Pearce v. Pearce, 363 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
- Wilson v. State, 363 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)