FARON RUSSELL FORD, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
DAVID COLEMAN, ET AL., APPELLEES
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Ford, injured as a passenger in a vehicle owned by Russo Communications and driven by Coleman, settled with the owner and insurer and executed a release discharging the owner and its agents. The court held that Coleman, as a permissive user of the vehicle, was an agent of the owner within the meaning of the release and was therefore discharged from liability.
The release exonerated Coleman because, as a permissive user of the owner's vehicle, he was the owner's agent within the meaning of the term 'agent' in the release, and therefore discharged from liability as a matter of law.
[1] A release discharging an automobile owner and its agents from liability may exonerate a permissive driver of the vehicle as the owner's agent.
[2] The dangerous instrumentality doctrine and the doctrine of respondeat superior are separate and independent legal concepts.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court construed the release as a contract and held as a matter of law that Coleman, as a permissive user of the vehicle, was the owner's agent at the time of the accident within the meaning of the term "agent" in the release”
Establishes the trial court's legal holding that a permissive driver qualifies as an agent under the release.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFord was injured as a passenger in an automobile owned by Russo Communications, Inc. and operated by Coleman. Ford settled with the vehicle owner and …
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COWART, Judge.
This case involves the judicial construction of a written release in favor of an automobile owner and the owner's “agents” and the question of whether the release exonerated the driver of the automobile as being the owner’s agent. Appellant Ford was injured while a passenger in an automobile owned by Russo Communications, Inc. and operated by appellee David Coleman. Appellant settled with the vehicle owner and its insurer and executed a release discharging from further liability Russo Communications, Inc., “its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors and administrators.” When later sued by appellant Ford the appellee Coleman pleaded the release as an affirmative defense alleging that he was an agent of Russo Communications, Inc. and hence, discharged from liability by the release. Disputed questions of fact as to alleged fraud in the procurement, and mutual mistake in the execution, of the release were tried to a jury (which found against appellant) but the trial court construed the release as a contract and held as a matter of law that Coleman, as a permissive user of the vehicle, was the owner’s agent at the time of the accident within the meaning of the term “agent” in the release. Appellant appeals that ruling.
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine has a much broader application than the doctrine of respondeat superior in agency law, and the two doctrines are separate and independent; nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida has often explained that at least part of the conceptual basis for the doctrine that a vehicle owner is liable for damages and injuries caused by the negligent operation of one in possession of the owner’s automobile with the owner’s express or implied permission, knowledge and consent is predicated upon the agency concept and that such possessor is the owner’s agent at least to the extent of properly controlling the automobile and preventing damage and injuries resulting from its negligent operation and in authorizing others to use the vehicle. See generally, Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla.1978); Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla.1970); Susco Car Rental System v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla.1959); Weber v. Porco, 100 So. 2d 146 (Fla.1958); May v. Palm Beach Chemical Company, 77 So. 2d 468 (Fla.1955).
Accordingly, the trial court’s construction of the release in this case so as to include the permissive driver Coleman as an agent of the vehicle owner is supported by Florida case law.
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, J., and POWELL, R.W., Associate Judge, concur.
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Sheen v. Archibald Lyon and Rose Lyon, 485 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1986)…yer, its agents and employees does not release one who was no longer employed at the time the release was executed. Lyon v. Sheen, 467 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The decision conflicts with a decision of another district court, Ford v. Coleman, 462 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), review denied, 475 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1985). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. This case involves two suits against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith and its ex-employee stockbroker, Sheen. The suits arose…1 / 2
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Roman v. Bogle, 113 So. 3d 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…rous instrumentality doctrine as it deems appropriate.” Id. at 1105 n. 1. However, in order to resolve the issue before us, it is not necessary to discuss those enactments where the Legislature has done so. . Appellee’s reliance on Ford v. Coleman, 462 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), is misplaced. In Ford, this court was confronted with a situation where a vehicle owned by a corporation was driven by an individual who claimed to be an agent of the corporation. The driver caused an accident and the injured pa…
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Hollybrook Golf & Tennis Club Condo., Inc. v. Shapiro, 481 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…e appellant, the lessor-owner of a golf cart, by reason of a release given to the lessee-operator of the cart that included the “agents and assigns” of the lessee-operator. This case presents the reverse of a similar issue raised in Ford v. Coleman, 462 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), where a release executed pursuant to a settlement with a vehicle owner which included the language “agents” was held to inure to the benefit of the vehicle operator. Conversely, on the record here, we do not believe that the tri…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miller v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)
- Susco CAR Rental Sys. OF Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959)
- Weber v. Porco, 100 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1958)
- Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970)
- MAY v. Palm Beach Chem. Co., Inc., 77 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1955)
- Castillo v. Bickley, 363 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1978)