FRANK A. BAILEY, AS A GENERAL PARTNER IN N-SITE ASSOCIATES, A FLORIDA GENERAL PARTNERSHIP; CUYAHOGA EQUIPMENT CORP.; MARVIN SILVERMAN, SAMUEL BERKE, JEROME S. MORRIS, HARVEY KAISER, HERBERT W. BRASH, CLIFFORD BRAGMAN, DONALD A. RITHOLZ, AND WILLIAM DACY, AS GENERAL PARTNERS OF 800 VENTURA ASSOCIATES, AN ILLINOIS GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, APPELLANTS, CROSS APPELLEES, CROSS APPELLANTS,
v.
LESLIE J. HARRINGTON, PAUL ROEPNACK, JOHN DEC, CHARLES B. MADDERA, ANDREW H. WARNER, CARL MAYES, JOHN W. PARTRIDGE, AND ARTHUR KORFAGE, AS TRUSTEES OF THE BROWARD COUNTY CARPENTER'S PENSION FUND, APPELLEES, CROSS APPELLANTS, CROSS APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court erred in striking a profit participation provision, refusing mortgage foreclosure, and finding usurious interest, as the loan exceeded $500,000 and the provision was authorized by statute.
Plaintiff lender sought mortgage foreclosure on a loan exceeding $500,000, which included a profit participation provision. The trial court denied for…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Interest Calculation cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
The amended final judgment under review is reversed on the cross appeal only, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to grant a mortgage foreclosure in the amount of the principal and interest due under the note, as prayed for in the complaint filed below by the plaintiff/cross appellant Leslie J. Harrington. We conclude that the trial court erred in striking the profit participation provision of the loan agreement herein, in refusing the requested mortgage foreclosure and in finding that the mortgage loan charged a usurious rate of interest. We reach this result based on the following, briefly stated, legal analysis.
The note in question charged an interest rate of 24.99% which was plainly not usurious as the amount of money loaned herein was in excess of $500,000. §§ 687.03(1), 687.071, Fla.Stat. (1983). The profit participation provision of the loan agreement did not, as the trial court found, charge any additional interest on the loan. It provided that the lender was entitled to share in 43% of the profits, if any, from the construction project which the loan financed. This payment cannot constitute additional interest on the loan as it was not payable at all if no profits were realized from the project. Indeed, no profits were realized as the project entirely failed and all agree that no payment whatever is due under the profit participation provision.
Moreover, this profit participation provision is expressly authorized by our usury statutes as not constituting additional interest, § 687.03(4), Fla. Stat. (1983), and has long been approved by well-established principles of usury law. Schwab v. Quitoni, 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
The main appeal of the defendant/appellant Yenom Associates Corp. is rendered moot by our ruling today; so is the first point in the main appeal of the defendant/appellant Frank A. Bailey. The remaining point raised by the defendant/appellant Bailey has no merit.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kraft v. Zelda Pincourt Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…ot usurious is that the money to be paid Mason could be characterized as a bonus to be received for participating in an uncertain transaction. A loan agreement is not usurious when payment depends upon a contingency. See, e.g., Bailey v. Harrington, 462 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 472 So. 2d 1180 (Fla.1985), and rev. denied sub nom., N-Site Associates v. Harrington, 472 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1985); Schwab v. Quitoni 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Here, when the loan was given, any talk of recovery w…
-
Oregrund Ltd. P'ship v. Sheive, 873 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…risk. Hurley v. Slingerland, 461 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Diversified Enterprises, Inc. v. West, 141 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). This principle has been statutorily validated when the venture exceeds $500,000. See Bailey v. Harrington, 462 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). There are four essential elements of a usurious transaction: (1) an express or implied loan; (2) a repayment requirement; (3) an agreement to pay interest in excess of the legal rate; and (4) a corrupt intent5 to take more than…1 / 2
-
Jodhi Valliappan v. Cruz, 917 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…zed no profits, the Valliappans were not obligated to. remit anything above $150,000. “A loan agreement is not usurious when payment depends upon a contingency.” Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Bailey v. Harrington, 462 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Schwab v. Quitoni, 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).1 Second, Cruz did not have the corrupt intent to collect interest at a usurious rate. “[U]sury is largely a matter of intent, and is not fully determined by the fact that the…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Schwab v. Quitoni, 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)