ROBERT P. MCDANIEL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE-CROSS APPELLANT,
v.
THE FULTON NATIONAL BANK OF ATLANTA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT-CROSS APPELLEE; JAN T. BARKSDALE, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PEOPLES FINANCIAL CORP. OF ALPHARETTA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT; JAMES R. BARRETT ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, V. VERNIE JONES FORD, INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
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The court held that the creditor was required to disclose the right to accelerate unearned finance charges as a default charge under the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z.
Three truth-in-lending cases were consolidated, where the central issue was whether a creditor must disclose the right to accelerate unearned finance …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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TUTTLE, Circuit Judge:
These three truth-in-lending eases commenced in three suits filed in the Northern District of Georgia, which having been considered by magistrates were then decided by three different district judges. In all cases, judgment was had in favor of the plaintiffs and against the respective defendants. The sole question in issue was whether the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(9) and Regulation Z, § 226.8(b)(4) required a creditor to disclose as a default charge the fact that the loan agreement gave him the contract right to accelerate and demand payment of the entire indebtedness, including unearned finance charges.
When these three cases were heard on appeal, this Court had decided another case, Martin v. Commercial Securities Co., 539 F. 2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the Court held that the right to accelerate and demand such unearned finance charges was not such a “default, delinquency, or similar charge.” Thus, this Court, considering itself bound by the Martin decision, reversed the judgments of the district court, stating that:
The established policy of this Court is to recognize the binding effect of a prior decision by another panel of the Court subject only to a reversal by the Court sitting en banc.
Thereupon a petition for rehearing en banc was filed and the Court by appropriate vote reheard the case en banc. The en banc opinion has now been published, and a petition for rehearing has been denied, 571 F. 2d 948, 576 F. 2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1978).
The en banc court, having reversed the holding in Martin and the panel decision in these three captioned cases relying on that decision, remanded the cases to the panel for final disposition.
The decision of this Court, sitting en banc, requires our affirmance of the three judgments in the district court.
The judgments are AFFIRMED.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit, Inc., 764 F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1985)
Authorities Cited
- Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co., Inc., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976)
- McDANIEL v. The Fulton Nat'l Bank OF Atlanta, 571 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1978)
- McDANIEL v. The Fulton Nat'l Bank OF Atlanta, 576 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1978)