ROBERT H. JONES AND LESLIE L. WELLMAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
KATE C. STEWART ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. | 1896-01-01
37 Fla. 369 Florida Supreme Court (1896) Caution
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for failure to join all parties affected by the joint decree. The court reaffirmed the cardinal rule that all parties to be affected by a judgment must be parties to the appeal and given an opportunity to be heard.

Holding

An appeal from a joint decree must include all parties whose interests would be affected by the judgment. Appellants' appeal must be dismissed because they failed to join Hattie A. Felt and David A. Felt, both of whom had joint or directly affected interests in the property that would be impacted by reversal.

Key Quotes

“It is the settled rule of this court that unless all the parties against whom a joint decree is rendered unite in an appeal, or the appeal be taken in the names of all with summons and severance, or equivalent proceedings as to those who refuse to join therein, the appeal will be dismissed.”

States the fundamental rule requiring all affected parties to join in appeals from joint decrees

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Facts & Procedural History

Jones and Wellman appealed a decree denying them interest in certain land. The decree also affected Hattie A. Felt, a joint defendant with a joint int…

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Topics
Opportunity To Be Heard Writ Of Error

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Opinion of the Court
Mabry, C. J.:

Mabry, C. J.:

It is the settled rule of this court that unless all the-parties against whom a joint decree is rendered unite in an appeal, or the appeal be taken in the names of all with summons and severance, or equivalent proceedings as to those who refuse to join therein, the appeal will be dismissed. This rule is based upon the-, cardinal doctrine in the administration of justice in all courts that all parties who are to be affected by the judgment of the court should be brought before it and given an opportunity to be heard.

This rule in chancery appeals obtains with as much force as in joint judgments at law where all parties against whom such judgments are rendered are required to join in the writ of érror. Whitlock vs. Willard, 18 Fla. 156; Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. vs. Buddington, 23 Fla. 514, 2 South. Rep. 885; Nash vs. Haycraft, 34 Fla. 449, 16 South. Rep. 324;. Witt vs. Baars, 36 Fla. 119, 18 South. Rep. 330, and Weston vs. Bonney, decided at the present term.

The Supreme Court of the United States has established the same rule, as shown by the following decisions cited by counsel for the motion here: Owings vs. Kincannon, 7 Pet. 399; Masterson vs. Herndon, 10 Wall, 416; Hampton vs. Rouse, 13 Wall. 187; Har dee vs. Wilson, 146 U. S. 179, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39; Inglehart vs. Stanbury, 151 U. S. 68, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237; Davis vs. Mercantile Trust Co., 152 U. S. 590, 14 South Rep. 693. There may be decrees in chancery rendered against several defendants where it is not necessary that all should join in' an appeal in order that the decree against those desiring to appeal may be reviewed. The interest of some may not be so joint as to be affected by a decree that may be made as to the interest of those appealing. In Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. vs. Buddington, supra, it was held that a party who may be aggrieved by a decree in his separate interests, or several parties who may be so aggrieved as to their united interests, may take, the former his separate appeal, and the latter their joint appeals, without joining other parties adjudged against by the same decree, but united in interest in the matter decreed, as to the party or parties appealing.

In the present case the decree is, in substance and form, joint as between appellants and Hattie A. Felt. If appellants have any interest in the land in question, she has a joint interest with them by virtue of the same deed relied on, and the decree that denied them ¿n interest in the property also adjudged that she had no interest therein. Hattie A. Felt is as much interested in the land according to the allegations of appellants’ answer as either of them. She was a joint defendant with appellants, and answered by guardian ad litem duly appointed, and the decree -adjudicated her interest in the property, as well as that of the other defendants.

Again, a reversal of the decree as to the interest of David A. Felt, and an adjudication that appellants and Hattie A. Felt are the joint owners in fee of the-land would affect the interest of the former. His interest is clearly in favor of the decree adjudging the-fee to be in him, and any modification of it would affect his interest.

Although we have no brief in opposition to the-motion to dismiss, we have felt an inclination not to-grant it if it could be avoided, on account of the delay in bringing it forward; but the rule is imperative that the rights and interests of parties should not be adjudicated in their absence, and without an opportunity to be heard. The present case comes within the rule, in our judgment, and hence the appeal must-be dismissed. Order to be entered accordingly.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Henry Vogt Mach. Co. v. Milton Land & Inv. Co., 74 Fla. 116 (Fla. 1917)
    …2] appeal, the complaining defendant may have service of summons to appear made upon such defendants, which gives the appellate court jurisdiction to make proper orders and decrees in the progress and disposition of the appeal. See Jones v. Stewart, 37 Fla. 369, 19 South. Rep. 657. The appeal herein is taken by only one of the many defendants in the court below. This appeal transfers the cause to the jurisdiction of this court and when duly recorded brings the appellee into this court by operation of the…
  • Wilson v. Duncan, 90 Fla. 112 (Fla. 1925)
    …not appeal from the final decree (Witt v. Baars, 36 Fla. 119, 18 South. Rep. 330), and the defendants, Wilson-Mason Company, had no right to take an appeal for the bank. This is not a joint decree against several defendants, as in Jones v. Stewart, 37 Fla. 369, 19 South. Rep. 657. The defendants, Lorenzo A. Wilson and W. M. Mason, Jr., had a right to appeal from the decree against them making the complainant below the appellee; and if the dismissal of the defendant bank from the cause was prejudicial or…
  • Berry v. Wm. S. Barnett, 79 Fla. 562 (Fla. 1920)
    …e it. But in the absence of the mortgagor defendants as parties to the appeal, the court cannot enter a decree affecting their interests that would be binding on them; and for this reason the appeal must be and is hereby dismissed. Jones v. Stewart, 37 Fla. 369, 19 South. Rep. 657; Megin v. Filor, 4 Fla. 203. The decree of affirmance is yacated and the appeal is dismissed. Browne, C. J., and Taylor, Ellis and West, J. J., concur.…

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