ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
ANTHONY ROBINSON AND LILLIE M. ROBINSON, DEFENDANTS, UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, GARNISHEE-DEFENDANT APPELLEE
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The court held that the "sue and be sued" clause in the Postal Service Reorganization Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity, permitting garnishment proceedings against the USPS.
Plaintiff initiated commercial garnishment proceedings against the USPS in state court, which were removed to federal court. The district court grante…
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This is a commercial garnishment case which raises the issue of whether the United States Postal Service (USPS), as the statutory successor to the Post Office Department,1 retained the Post Office Department’s sovereign immunity from state garnishment proceedings.
The garnishment proceedings in the instant case were begun in the District Court of the State of Louisiana against the USPS. The ease was removed to the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1970) and 39 U.S.C. § 409(a) (1970). The District Court granted Defendant’s motion to quash the writs of garnishment directed against the USPS and the Plaintiff appealed. Subsequently, the Defendant filed a motion to vacate the District Court’s judgment.
In view of the Defendant’s motion, we join the other Circuits2 and hold that the words “sue and be sued” in the Postal Service Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), constitute a waiver of immunity and permit garnishment proceedings against the USPS.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to vacate the District Court’s judgment is granted.
. Postal Reorganization Act, § 4(a) 39 U.S.C. § 201 note (1970).
. See Beneficial Finance Co. of New York, Inc. v. Dallas, 571 F. 2d 125 (2nd Cir. 1978); General Electric Credit Corporation v. Smith, 565 F. 2d 291 (4th Cir. 1977); Goodman’s Furniture Company v. United States Postal Service, 561 F. 2d 462 (3rd Cir. 1977); May Department Stores Co. v. Williamson, 549 F. 2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1977); Standard Oil v. Starks, 528 F. 2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Citator
Cited By
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Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512 (U.S. 1984)
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Ins. Co. OF N. Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1982)
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Emp. Dev. Dep't v. United States Postal Serv., 698 F.2d 1029 (9th Cir. 1983)
Authorities Cited
- Standard OIL Division v. Starks, 528 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975)
- The MAY Dep't Stores Co. v. Monroe Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1977)
- Goodman's Furniture Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 561 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1977)
- Beneficial Fin. Co. OF NEW York, Inc. v. Dallas, 571 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1978)
- Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Smith, 565 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1977)