CHERYL YATES SWEAT, APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA YATES, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM C. YATES, APPELLEE
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In this appeal concerning the validity of a deed, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a summary judgment that invalidated a deed executed by William Yates. The court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the deed had valid witnessing, precluding summary judgment.
The court held that Section 689.01, Florida Statutes does not require witnesses to subscribe in the presence of the grantor or each other, nor must they sign before delivery occurs. A deed is valid from the date of delivery, and recording is not essential to validity between the parties. The failure to record before death did not void the deed. Summary judgment was improper because evidence that two persons claimed to have been present at the signing created a genuine issue of fact regarding valid witnessing.
[1] A genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of a deed precludes summary judgment.
[2] A deed takes effect from the date of its delivery, not from the date of its recording.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 689.01, Florida Statutes, does not require that witnesses must subscribe in the presence of the grantor or in the presence of each other, nor does it require that the subscribing witnesses sign the document before delivery is accomplished.”
Establishes that statutory witnessing requirements are less stringent than the trial court assumed, allowing for the possibility of valid witnessing even though witnesses signed after the grantor entered the hospital.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliam Yates signed a deed on September 18, 1982, conveying property to himself and his daughter, Cheryl Yates Sweat, as joint tenants with right of …
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NIMMONS, Judge.
Appellant Sweat appeals from a summary judgment. We reverse the summary judgment because there is a genuine issue as to the validity of the deed in question. The facts are undisputed. On September 18, 1982, William G. Yates signed a deed to property owned by him. The deed purported to convey the property to Yates and his daughter, Cheryl Yates Sweat, as joint tenant with right of survivorship. Yates entered the hospital on September 19, 1982. The next day, September 20, 1982, two persons, who had not been witnesses to the signing of the deed, signed their names to the deed as witnesses.
Yates died on Saturday, September 25, 1982. Sweat recorded the deed on Monday, September 27, 1982. Thereafter, two persons said to have been present when Yates signed the deed added their names as witnesses and the deed was re-recorded on October 5, 1982. Sweat took possession and claimed ownership of the property.
On July 2, 1983, Marie Yates, as personal representative of the Estate of William Yates, filed a complaint seeking cancellation of the deed. Mrs. Yates moved for summary judgment on the basis that the deed was void as a matter of law because it was not executed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses as required by Section 689.01, Florida Statutes. In granting summary judgment, the trial court concluded that “the deed in question was not duly executed and delivered in the lifetime of the purported grantor and was, therefore, null and void and of no legal effect.” Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, we find that the record in this case does not demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to the validity of the deed.
Section 689.01, Florida Statutes, does not require that witnesses must subscribe in the presence of the grantor or in the presence of eaA other, nor does it require that the subscribing witnesses sign the document before delivery is accomplished. See Medina v. Orange County, 147 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962). Moreover, a deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice. The failure of Sweat to record the subject deed before the grantor died did not render the deed void. The recording statute has always been primarily intended to protect the rights of bona fide purchasers of property and creditors of property owners, rather than the immediate parties to the conveyance. Fong v. Batton, 214 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1968).
The only finding of the trial court that could possibly support the summary judgment was a finding that the deed was un-witnessed, but this finding is rebutted by the trial court’s additional finding that there were two persons “said to have been present at the time and place Yates signed the deed” who added their names as witnesses. Since there is some evidence that there were two witnesses to the signing of the deed, there exists a genuine issue as to the validity of the deed.
Accordingly, the summary judgment is Reversed and the case is Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOANOS and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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Fryer v. Dane Morgan, 714 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…hat an unrecorded deed does not affect its validity as between the parties and their privies. See Rabinow-itz v. Keefer, 100 Fla. 1723, 1729,132 So. 297, 299 (1931); Black v. Skinner Mfg. Co., 53 Fla. 1088, 43 So. 922, 922-23 (1907); Sweat v. Yates, 463 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Hensel v. Aurilio, 417 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). However, under the plain language of section 695.01(1), an unrecorded deed is not good or effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchasers f…
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Townsend v. Morton, 36 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…does not affect the title of the grantee); Fryer v. Morgan, 714 So. 2d 542, 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (“The law in Florida has always been that an unrecorded deed does not affect its validity as between the parties and their privies.”); Sweat v. Yates, 463 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (“[A] deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice.... The recording statute has always been primarily intended…
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Philippe v. Michael Weiner, M.D., 143 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…es not end here. We still must determine whether the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest, insurance, and taxes after the date the property was deeded to Weiner. The effective date of the Deed is February 24, 2010. See Sweat v. Yates, 463 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (“[A] deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or [*1089] those taking with notice.”)- Yet, Weiner alleged Philippe was liable to Weiner…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fong v. Batton, 214 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)
- Medina v. Orange Cnty. (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)