LEONA LANGER, APPELLANT,
v.
JEROME G. LANGER, APPELLEE
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Former wife's motion to modify or vacate a property settlement agreement incorporated into a final divorce judgment was properly dismissed because property settlement agreements cannot be modified once incorporated into final judgments, and any claim based on intrinsic fraud must be brought within one year.
Property settlement agreements incorporated into final judgments of dissolution of marriage are not subject to modification, and claims to vacate based on intrinsic fraud must be filed within one year of judgment entry.
[1] Property settlement agreements incorporated into final judgments of dissolution of marriage are not subject to modification under Florida law.
[2] Claims to vacate a judgment based on intrinsic fraud must be filed within one year after entry of the judgment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA property settlement agreement was incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered on June 11, 1975. The former wife filed a mo…
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HENDRY, Judge.
The former wife appeals from a final judgment of the trial court granting appellee’s motion to dismiss appellant’s motion for modification of the property settlement agreement or, in the alternative, motion to vacate or set aside the property settlement agreement pursuant to Rule I.540(b)(3), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The property settlement agreement was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, entered on June II, 1975.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court upon a holding that: 1) property settlement agreements are not subject to modification when the agreements are incorporated into final judgments of dissolution of marriage, Karch v. Karch, 445 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Farkas v. Farkas, 426 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Horne v. Horne, 417 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982), pet. for rev. denied, 429 So. 2d 6 (Fla.1983); Covin v. Covin, 403 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), and 2) appellant’s allegations in support of her motion to set aside the property settlement agreement (fraud, duress, coercion, and failure to provide full disclosure) form the basis for a claim of intrinsic fraud. Any petition to vacate a judgment on the grounds of intrinsic fraud must be filed within one year after entry of the judgment. De-Claire v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984); Daugharty v. Daugharty, 456 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Rule 1.540(b), Fla.R.Civ.P. Appellant’s motion to set aside or vacate the property settlement agreement was filed over seven years after the entry of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Braswell v. Braswell, 881 So. 2d 1193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…686, 687 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). A property settlement provision, however, is non-modifiable, regardless of the parties’ financial positions, when the agreements are incorporated into the final judgments of dissolution of marriage. See Langer v. Langer, 463 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Here, the default interest provision and equitable distribution provision are not subject to modification. In addition, the trial court stated that although it deemed the first $23 million to be in the nature of support for purpo…
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Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 655 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…d undue influence in obtaining a settlement from her. August, 350 So. 2d at 794. This court held that the husband’s conduct did not constitute “extrinsic fraud,” or “fraud on the court.” August, 350 So. 2d at 795. Additionally, in Danger v. Danger, 463 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), this court clearly stated that allegations of “fraud, duress, coercion, and failure to provide full disclosure form the basis for a claim of intrinsic fraud.” Danger, 463 So. 2d at 429; Susskind v. Susskind, 475 So. 2d 1276 (Fla.…
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Romero v. Aurora Romero, 959 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…. See Bane v. Bane. 775 So. 2d 938. 941 (Fla.2000). A trial court cannot modify the property division in a final judgment, as the trial court attempted to do here. See Braswell v. Braswell, 881 So. 2d 1193, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Langer v. Langer, 463 So. 2d 429, 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- DeCLAIRE v. Yohanan, 453 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1984)
- Farkas v. Farkas, 426 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- Karch v. Karch, 445 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Covin v. Covin, 403 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Daugharty v. Faye Eubanks Daugharty, 456 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Horne v. Horne, 417 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)