STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM SWINT, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed a trial court's order discharging a defendant based on violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule. The appellate court reversed, holding that the defendant's counsel affirmatively agreed to a trial date beyond the speedy trial period, thereby waiving the defendant's speedy trial rights.
The court held that defense counsel's affirmative statement 'August 22nd, we'll try him then' constituted an effective waiver of speedy trial rights. The waiver was valid because it went beyond mere silence or passive acquiescence, representing an affirmative agreement to the trial date beyond the speedy trial period.
[1] A defendant's speedy trial rights can be waived by defense counsel affirmatively selecting a trial date beyond the speedy trial period.
[2] An effective waiver of the speedy trial period requires a writing signed by proper person or counsel, or a stipulation announced to the court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An extension or waiver of the speedy trial period must be in writing, signed by proper person or counsel, or be "upon stipulation announced to the court" under Rule 3.191(d)(2), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1984).”
Establishes the legal requirements for a valid waiver of speedy trial rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSwint was arrested on January 31, 1984, and charged with grand theft and dealing in stolen property. At a pretrial conference on July 16, 1984, the tr…
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[*243] CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, the State of Florida, claims that the trial court erred in granting appellee William Swint’s motion for discharge, based on a violation of the 180-day speedy trial rule, Rule 3.191(a)(1), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. We agree and reverse.
Appellee was arrested January 31, 1984, and charged by information in February 1984, with grand theft and dealing in stolen property. At a pretrial conference on July 16, 1984, defense counsel announced that a trial date needed to be set. The following discussion ensued:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Mr. Pastian is ready to enter a plea and Mr. Swint would like a trial date.
THE COURT: Okay. Are those the only two?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Those are all, Judge. Mr. Jackson didn’t show up.
THE COURT: When are you going on vacation?
(THEREUPON, THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. AN OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSION WAS HELD ABOUT VACATION TIME.)
THE COURT: Let’s try him in August. How’s that? Who’s the State on this, Jeff Grate?
MR. SANDEFER: I think he normally does Wednesdays.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: August 22nd, we’ll try him then.
On August 1, 1984, appellee filed a motion for discharge which the trial court granted. On appeal, appellant argues that defense counsel acquiesced to the August 22nd trial date and thereby waived speedy trial. We agree with appellant on the basis of Robbins v. State, 370 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 769 (Fla.1980).
An extension or waiver of the speedy trial period must be in writing, signed by proper person or counsel, or be “upon stipulation announced to the court” under Rule 3.191(d)(2), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1984).
Mere silence of the defendant or defense counsel at the proceeding wherein defendant’s trial date is set beyond the speedy trial period is not an effective waiver. State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 369 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.1978). Nor is an off-the-record agreement by defense counsel to a trial date beyond the speedy trial period a valid waiver. In Saunders v. State, 436 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), defense counsel acquiesced to a trial date of January 11, 1982, which was beyond the speedy trial period, after the clerk of the court informed counsel that the trial judge had stated that no more cases would be heard in 1981. There was no transcript of that proceeding and the judge was not present. The court found that there was no effective waiver of speedy trial under Rule 3.191.
The case at bar is more closely analogous to Robbins than to Ansley and Saunders. In Robbins, the trial court held that defense counsel effectively waived speedy trial by stating to the trial court that “I’ll try the case whenever it’s set.” Here, defense counsel affirmatively selected a trial date beyond speedy trial. “August 22nd, we’ll try him then” goes beyond mere silence or passive acquiescence which was found to be an ineffective waiver of speedy trial in Ansley and Saunders.
Accordingly, based on Robbins, we reverse the decision of the trial court.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and OTT, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Rivas v. Honorable Henry L. Oppenborn, Jr., 605 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…ant or defense counsel at the proceeding wherein defendant’s trial date is set beyond the speedy trial period is not an effective waiver. State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.1978). State v. Swint, 464 So. 2d 242, 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See Stuart v. State, 360 So. 2d 406 (Fla.1978). Since it is agreed that the speedy trial time, including the fifteen-day window provided by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(3) has lapsed without trial, the absence…
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Smith v. State, 482 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…, 360 So. 2d at 411. See also State v. Morgan, 471 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), holding the speedy trial time under the rule was extended where the trial court inadvertently extended the time for trial and all parties “acquiesced”; State v. Swint, 464 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), finding that defendant waived speedy trial when counsel said, “August 22nd, we’ll try him then”; Robbins v. State, 370 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 381 So. 2d 769 (Fla.1980), stating that the defendant waived spe…
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Hajal v. State, 864 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…ced in a trial date beyond the speedy trial limit); Black v. State, 468 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (a state attorney’s “understanding” that a defense continuance was requested is insufficient evidence of a waiver of speedy trial); State v. Swint, 464 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (waiver of speedy trial cannot be inferred from defense silence or off-the-record agreement). We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in its determination that Petitioner had waived his right to a speedy trial. We must next…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ansley, 349 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Dettman v. Laurence Byron Reid, 370 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979)
- Robbins v. State, 370 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)
- Beneke v. Beneke, 436 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Hunter v. Dep't of Prof'l Reg., 436 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)