MARY E. LAUFFER, APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE,
v.
KELVIN L. AVERBUCH, APPELLEE/CROSS APPELLANT
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The appellate court reversed the trial court's modification of child support and visitation provisions in a dissolution of marriage case, finding no evidentiary basis for the changes, while affirming the termination of dependency proceedings and the order for social investigations.
A trial court's modification of child support and visitation in a dissolution judgment must be supported by evidence in the record, and a party cannot rely on matters outside the trial transcript to justify modification.
[1] A trial court's modification of child support and visitation provisions must be supported by evidence appearing in the trial transcript; matters not referenced in the tra…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband petitioned to modify the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, which had awarded the wife primary physical custody of the children. T…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse in part and affirm in part a final judgment of modification. The modification petition of the husband was tried before the court on August 16, 1983. Upon review of the trial transcript, we find no proper evidentiary or legal basis for the trial court’s modification of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, which modification, while leaving the former wife with primary physical custody of the parties’ children, substantially modified the provisions for child support and visitation. We reject the former husband’s claim that there may be matters that the trial court properly considered in entering the modification that do not appear in the appellate record. We do so because we find no reference to such matters in the trial transcript and also because we believe it to be the responsibility of the former husband to seek supplementation of the record if he believes it necessary to resolve the issues raised on appeal.
The only operative portion of the final judgment of modification that we leave in place is that provision terminating the dependency proceedings. We do not believe the former wife has standing to challenge the trial court’s action in that respect. Moreover, we also believe the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s termination action in any case. We also leave intact the trial court’s order directing further social investigations into the parties’ respective home situations.
ANSTEAD, HARRY LEE and HURLEY, DANIEL T.K., Associate Judges, concur. LETTS, GAVIN K., Associate Judge, dissents without opinion.
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Hadley v. COX, 470 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…is upon which to modify the final decree. Further, the husband did not testify that these claimed adverse effects of Kimberly’s visits occurred after the final judgment was entered. He carried the burden of proof on both issues. Lauffer v. Averbuch, 464 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Johnston v. Boram, 386 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Hackley. Because we do not think the record established a potentially harmful or detrimental situation to the child2 arising after the final judgment, there exists no justi…