WARREN GREGORY FARROW, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1985-03-07
No. 84-1127
COBB, C.J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur.
464 So. 2d 689 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Farrow appeals his escape sentence, arguing the trial court erred by using separate sentencesheets for multiple offenses rather than a single scoresheet, and by imposing a consecutive rather than concurrent sentence. The court affirmed, holding that any escape sentence must run consecutively to prior sentences under Florida law, and that the trial court's sentencing procedure was harmless error.


Holding

The trial court's use of separate sentencesheets was harmless error because the imposed sentences fell within the correct presumptive range under a single scoresheet, and the defendant's counsel agreed to the procedure. More significantly, section 944.40 mandates that escape sentences run consecutively to any prior sentence, and this specific statute controls over the general sentencing statute allowing concurrent sentences.


Headnotes

[1] A sentence for escape must run consecutively to any former sentence imposed upon the prisoner.

[2] A special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.

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Key Quotes

“the punishment of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecutively to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner”

Establishes the statutory requirement that escape sentences must run consecutively to prior sentences

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Facts & Procedural History

Farrow was serving a fifty-year sentence in North Carolina for two burglaries when he was extradited to Florida to face charges of burglary and sexual…

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Opinion of the Court
SHARP, Judge.

SHARP, Judge.

Farrow appeals from his sentence imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines, Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.701, for the crime of escape. § 944.40, Fla.Stat. (1983). He argues the trial court erred in failing to use a single scoresheet for all the offenses for which Farrow was then being sentenced, rather than separate ones for each offense. Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(1). This appears to us to be harmless error since, in this case, the sentences received by appellant were within the correct presumptive sentence range had only one scoresheet been used. In any event, Farrow’s counsel agreed to this sentencing procedure.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated that he wished to make the escape sentence run concurrently with the North Carolina sentences appellant was currently serving if he had the discretion to do so.1 However, the court did not specify in its written judgment whether the sentence was to run concurrently or consecutively. Appellant argues that the trial judge should have imposed a concurrent sentence.

We think the trial court was correct in imposing a consecutive sentence.2 Section 944.40, provides, in pertinent part, “the punishment of imprisonment imposed under this section shall run consecutively to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner.” Construing a prior statute containing similar wording, the Florida Supreme Court ruled:

We construe the quoted provision to mean that any sentence for escape must run consecutively to any other sentence or sentences to which the offender is subject at the time of the escape. The obvious intent of the Legislature was to prescribe a penalty which would be added to all penalties previously imposed as a deterrent to a prisoner inclined to break jail.3

Tirko v. Wainwright, 178 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla.1965); see also White v. State, 240 So. 2d 150 (Fla.1970).

This statute controls over any apparent conflict with section 921.16, Florida Statutes (1983). That statute provides, in part, “a county court or circuit court of this state may direct that the sentence imposed by such court be served concurrently with the sentence imposed by a court of another state or of the United States.” The latter is a general sentencing statute which does not deal with the crime of escape specifically. A well-settled rule of statutory construction is that “a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms.” Adams v. Culver, 111 So. 2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959); Pedroso v. State, 450 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Therefore, the judgment and sentence appealed from are

AFFIRMED.

COBB, C.J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur. . Farrow was serving fifty years in North Carolina for two burglaries, and was extradited to Florida to stand trial on charges of burglary and sexual battery. He escaped from an airplane in which he was being transported when it touched down in Seminole County.

. Section 921.16(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provides, in pertinent part, "sentences of imprisonment for offenses not charged in the same ... information ... shall be served consecutively unless the court directs that two or more sentences be served concurrently.”

.The former statute read that the punishment of imprisonment “shall be in addition to any former sentence imposed upon any prisoner convicted hereunder.”


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Citator

Cited By

  • Gallagher v. State, 476 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)
    …dingly, we reverse the defendant’s judgments and sentences and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. UPCHURCH, J. and LEE, ROBERT E., JR., Associate Judge, concur. . Compare Farrow v. State, 464 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), where the defendant, relying upon Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(1), argued the trial court erred by failing to use a single scoresheet for all offenses for which he was then being sentenced. Affirming the defendant…
  • Richardson v. State, 472 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    …281] Finally, although failure to use a single seoresheet for all offenses rather than separate scoresheets may be harmless error where the sentence imposed is within the presumptive sentence range had only one seoresheet been used, Farrow v. State, 464 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), we find that the use of two scoresheets in this case was not harmless error because they resulted in a sentence (48 months) which was beyond the recommended sentence range (12-30 months) had the court correctly utilized the drug…
  • Jarrell v. State, 576 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …. Should this issue arise again on remand, we note that mandatory consecutive sentencing has been held proper under the escape statute, section 944.40, Florida Statutes (1983). See Rease v. State, 488 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Farrow v. State, 464 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Likewise, mandatory consecutive sentencing is proper under section 944.48, Florida Statutes (1987). Reversed and remanded. CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.…

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