MICHAEL ROBERT TRIOLA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Triola appealed from a denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion challenging his conviction for involuntary sexual battery. The court affirmed, holding that Triola waived his primary argument by failing to raise it on direct appeal and that his ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed to meet the applicable legal standards.
Triola waived his argument that the judge's absence violated his right to a fair trial because he could have and should have raised this theory on his direct appeal. His claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel do not meet the standards under Knight v. State and Strickland v. Washington. Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be pursued through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not under Rule 3.850.
[1] A claim that a trial judge's temporary absence during the rereading of testimony denied a fair trial is waived if not raised on direct appeal.
[2] A collateral attack on a conviction, even if based on a constitutional claim, may be waived by failure to raise the issue on direct appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This is so because he could have and should have raised it on his plenary appeal.”
Establishes the waiver doctrine barring Triola from raising on postconviction appeal an argument that could have been raised on direct appeal
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTriola was convicted of involuntary sexual battery. During trial, the victim remained in the jury's presence while her testimony was being reread, and…
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DANAHY, Judge.
Appellant appeals from an order denying his request pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 for postconviction relief from his judgment and sentence for the crime of involuntary sexual battery. We affirm.
On his plenary appeal, appellant asserted that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the trial judge allowed the victim to remain in the jury’s presence during rereading of her testimony while the trial judge absented himself temporarily.
This court rejected that argument. Triola v. State, 443 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
On this appeal, appellant’s first issue focuses on that same event and again argues that he was denied a fair trial, but propounds a different theory — not that the witness was present during the re-reading of the testimony, but that the trial judge was absent. Appellant is precluded from making this argument now. This is so because he could have and should have raised it on his plenary appeal. Johnson v. Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207 (Fla.1985), and cases cited therein; Jones v. State, 446 So. 2d 1059 (Fla.1984); McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla.1983), and cases cited therein; Hitchcock v. State, 432 So. 2d 42 (Fla.1983), and cases cited therein; Armstrong v. State, 429 So. 2d 287 (Fla.1983), and cases cited therein; Palmes v. State, 425 So. 2d 4 (Fla.1983); Alvord v. State, 396 So. 2d 184 (Fla.1981); Ashley v. State, 350 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Even though the basis of appellant’s collateral attack is alleged to be one of constitutional magnitude, we find that he has waived that argument by his failure to assert it on his plenary appeal. Armstrong; Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), affirmed, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla.1978); Nova v. State, 439 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Kilpatrick v. State, 422 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Roth v. State, 385 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
In his second issue appellant alleges ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsels. Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is insufficient and does not meet the criteria set forth under Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla.1981), and Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Downs v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.1984); Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2d 533 (Fla.1984); Armstrong. Moreover, any collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Knight; White v. State, 456 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
AFFIRMED.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Blackwelder v. State, 489 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…uld find it distinguishable from the instant case. In the first place, Jones was decided on a direct appeal; whereas, here, the point was not raised on appeal but first appeared in a motion for postconviction relief. As we stated in Triola v. State, 464 So. 2d 1312, 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985): Even though the basis of appellant’s collateral attack is alleged to be one of constitutional magnitude, we find that he has waived that argument by his failure to assert it on his plenary appeal. Moreover, unlike the cir…
Authorities Cited (19 total)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984)
- Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981)
- Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1978)
- Downs v. State, 453 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1984)
- McCRAE v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1983)
- Johnson v. Louie L. Wainwright, 463 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1985)
- Jackson v. State, 452 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1984)
- Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Sampson Armstrong v. State, 429 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1983)
- Hitchcock v. State, 432 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1983)