MCCOY RESTAURANTS, INC., APPELLANT,

v.

CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA; GREATER ORLANDO AVIATION AUTHORITY; DELTA AIRLINES, INC.; EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.; BRANIFF AIRLINES, INC.; PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.; NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC.; OZARK AIRLINES, INC.; REPUBLIC AIRLINES, INC.; U.S. AIR, INC.; AIR FLORIDA, INC.; AND UNITED AIRLINES, INC., APPELLEES

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

DAUKSCH and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, JR., JJ., concur. SHARP, J., concurs in part; dissents in part.

SHARP, Judge,

concurring in part; dissenting in part.

I agree that the trial court properly dismissed Counts I and IV of the complaint because appellant failed to sufficiently allege standing as a taxpayer to challenge the airline agreements involved in this case,1 and appellant failed to allege a cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship in Count II.

I think appellant sufficiently pleaded grounds to challenge the agreements under the Sunshine Law in Count III. § 286.011, Fla.Stat. (1988). The Aviation Authority is a public body to which the Sunshine Law appears applicable. § 286.011(1); Wood v. Marston, 442 So. 2d 934 (Fla.1983); Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1974). No special standing allegations are necessary for a citizen to bring a Sunshine Law case against a public body. See, e.g., Neu v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 462 So. 2d 821 (Fla.1985). It was, therefore, erroneous to dispose of this count upon challenge by a motion to dismiss.

. Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla.1981); Compare Fornes v. North Broward Hospital District, 455 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) with Godheim v. City of Tampa, 426 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).