STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN THOMAS FADDEN, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals the trial court's dismissal of a criminal information charging Fadden with fraudulently failing to redeliver a hired vehicle. The court reverses, holding that when the State files a traverse creating a disputed material fact, the motion to dismiss must be denied and the case submitted to a fact-finder rather than decided on the motion.
The court held that when an information charges a crime and the State's traverse creates a disputed material factual issue regarding an essential element of the offense or a legally sufficient affirmative defense, the motion to dismiss must be denied and the case submitted to a fact-finder. Intent, being a state of mind, is not properly determined on a motion to dismiss.
[1] A motion to dismiss an information under Rule 3.190(c)(4) should be denied when the State files a traverse that creates a disputed material factual issue regarding an ess…
[2] A defendant's intent to commit a crime is a state of mind rarely susceptible of direct proof and is not properly determined on a motion to dismiss.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when the information charges a crime and the State creates a disputed material factual issue, either as to some ultimate fact constituting an essential constituent element of the criminal offense charged or as to some fact essential to the establishment of a legally sufficient affirmative defense, the (c)(4) motion should be denied and the cause submitted to the trier of the facts for determination of the truth as to the disputed material fact”
Establishes the core holding that disputed material facts must go to the fact-finder, not be resolved on a motion to dismiss
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State charged Fadden with willfully and fraudulently failing to redeliver a hired vehicle in violation of Florida law. Fadden moved to dismiss, cl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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COWART, Judge.
This case involves an order dismissing an information under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).
The State filed an information charging the defendant with willfully and fraudulently failing to redeliver a hired vehicle in violation of section 817.52(3), Florida Statutes. The defendant filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) alleging that he rented the vehicle in question not as an individual but as agent for a corporation, which corporation, not the defendant, had the duty to, but failed, to redeliver the hired vehicle.
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(d) the State filed a sworn traverse denying that the defendant entered into the vehicle rental agreement in question only as agent for the corporation and alleged that the defendant, not the corporation, agreed to return the vehicle to its owner under the vehicle rental agreement.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the complaint. The State appeals.
We reverse.
The information in question adequately charged a crime.1 The defendant’s (c)(4) motion was proper and pertinent because if, as the defendant swore, the vehicle owner dealt only with the defendant as an agent for a corporation and under the vehicle rental agreement the corporation and not the defendant agreed, and had the duty, to redeliver the hired vehicle, then only the corporation, and not the defendant, could have failed to redeliver the hired vehicle as agreed and only the corporation, not the defendant, could have violated the statute.
Thus the defendant asserted facts which if true constituted a legally sufficient affirmative defense. Likewise, the State’s traverse was proper and pertinent because it denied an essential material element in the affirmative defense asserted by the defendant.
However, when the information charges a crime and the State creates a disputed material factual issue, either as to some ultimate fact constituting an essential constituent element of the criminal offense charged or as to some fact essential to the establishment of a legally sufficient affirmative defense, the (c)(4) motion should be denied and the cause submitted to the trier of the facts for determination of the truth as to the disputed material fact.2 Additionally, an accused’s intent to commit a particular crime, being a state of mind, is rarely, if ever, susceptible of direct proof, and is not properly determined on a motion to dismiss. See State v. Gaines, 431 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); State v. J.T.S. and G.R.W., 373 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
See also State v. Carroll, 404 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
The order granting the motion to dismiss the information in this case is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED.
COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur. . See State v. Pugh, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
. See generally State v. Patel, 453 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); State v. Shull, 390 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State v. McKee, 386 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); State v. Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Beatty, 504 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…ith the appellant that the existence of disputed material facts in this case prevents the granting of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4). State v. Lewis, 463 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); State v. Fadden, 466 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Appellee had been charged with battery on a law enforcement officer. He argues as a defense that the officer was not.performing a lawful duty when the battery took place. It is undisputed that appellee struck the officer; whet…
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State v. Miller, 159 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…d). In this matter, we hold the State’s traverse provides material factual allegations that meet the minimum requirements of a prima facie case with respect to the charge. See State v. Kalogeropolous, 758 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla.2000); State v. Fadden, 466 So. 2d 1093, 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). “[W]here the State’s traverse creates a dispute as to the material facts in a case, an automatic denial of the motion to dismiss must follow.” State v. Taylor, 16 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (citing State v. Elliot…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- Ellis v. State, 346 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- State v. Upton, 392 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. J. T. S. and G. R. W., 373 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- State v. Giesy, 243 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971)
- Brown v. Broward Cnty. Bd. OF Comm'rs & Allstate Ins. Co., 431 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- State v. Dalpathbhai N. Patel, 453 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Sands v. State, 404 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- State v. Pugh, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- In re the Est. of Philip Siegel, 350 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)
- Green v. State, 390 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)