MONROE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
NEW PORT LARGO, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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Monroe County appealed a trial court judgment denying its request for a constructive trust over property titled to New Port Largo, Inc. The property had been granted by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund in 1968 as submerged land. The appellate court affirmed, finding the county failed to meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence and was barred by equitable estoppel due to its 15-year delay in asserting its claimed rights.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of the constructive trust claim, holding that the county failed to establish its entitlement to relief by clear and convincing evidence and that its action was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel due to the substantial delay and reliance by New Port Largo.
[1] A claim for imposition of a constructive trust must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
[2] Unexplained delay in asserting a claim to property can be a compelling indication that no enforceable right existed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the county failed to make any assertion whatever of its alleged right to the property, much less bring a legal action to establish that claim, until some fifteen years later in 1983. This unexplained delay is itself a compelling indication that no enforceable right in fact existed in the first place.”
Establishes that the court viewed the 15-year delay as powerful evidence against the existence of an enforceable right to the property.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1968, the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund granted an unrestricted deed to submerged land to New Port Largo's predecessor. The county alle…
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SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
After an extensive non-jury trial conducted pursuant to our reversal of a summary judgment for the appellee in Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc., 441 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the lower court again entered judgment in its favor denying the appellant county’s claim for the imposition of a constructive trust upon property titled in New Port Largo as de-raigned from an unrestricted deed to the then-submerged land granted by the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund in 1968. The county appeals. We affirm.
Based upon the lower court’s resolution of disputed issues of fact, see Laufer v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), no error has been shown in the determination below that the county had not, by the clear and convincing evidence required, Steinhardt v. Steinkardt, 445 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), pet. for review denied, 456 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1984); Brown v. Vining, 334 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), established its entitlement to the relief sought. Parramore v. Hampton, 55 Fla. 672, 45 So. 992 (1908); Turturro v. Schmier, 374 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Frambach v. Dunihue, 419 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). We note that although the county relies entirely upon negotiations which occurred prior to the issuance of the deed, in which it argues that the appellee’s predecessor had made a binding promise to the trustees that it would construct an airport on the property and then convey it to the county, the county failed to make any assertion whatever of its alleged right to the property, much less bring a legal action to establish that claim, until some fifteen years later in 1983. This unexplained delay is itself a compelling indication that no enforceable right in fact existed in the first place. Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), and cases cited.
Furthermore, the record shows that during that lengthy period New Port Largo’s predecessor expended some $400,000 in dredging and filling the parcel to which Monroe County contributed nothing; paid taxes billed by the county itself; and prepared and recorded a plat which the county formally accepted — all before New Port Largo itself, in reliance upon the record title and the plat, paid over $3,000,000 for property which included the parcel in question. These facts fully support the alternative conclusion of the trial court that the county’s action was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Odom v. Deltona Cory., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla.1976); see Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736 (Fla.1950); The Florida Companies v. Orange County, 411 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).1
We have carefully examined the evidentiary points raised by the appellant and find either no error, no prejudice, see Bessman v. State, 259 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Delano Hotel, Inc. v. Gold, 126 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), or both.
Affirmed.
FERGUSON, J., concurs.
JORGENSON, J., concurs in the result.
. We find it unnecessary to determine whether, as the lower court also found, that laches applies as well.
As an aside, however, although the parties have contested the question of whether sec. 95.-231, Fla.Stat. (1981) (20 years) is the analogous statute of limitations for determining an unreasonable delay under the laches doctrine, but see Lasater v. Lasater, 279 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 286 So. 2d 205 (Fla.1973); Martin v. Wilson, 115 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), we point out that the issue may not be determinative in the light of sec. 95.11(6), Fla. Stat. (1981) (laches automatically applicable when action brought beyond statute of limitations but may be barred even when it is brought within it). See cases collected at note 42, 30A CJ.S. Equity § 131 (1965).
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Child v. Child, 474 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…d by the parties. The result to this effect is made even more clear if — applying the rule that the parties’ own conduct under a contract may provide the best indication of their intent in entering into it, see Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc., 467 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) — we add the fact that Ms. Child accepted the $5,000 bond as the correct distribution and, although she did contest several other areas of alleged non-compliance, did not com…
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NEW Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty., 985 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1993)…activities do not constitute a continuing violation, then the doctrine does not apply, irrespective of the fact that the plaintiffs’ harm from the defendants['] initial violation may continue. Id. at 1516. . Monroe County v. New Port Largo, Inc., 467 So. 2d 757 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985). . In finding that NPL’s takings claims have a four-year statute of limitations, the district court applied Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). See New Port Largo, 706 F.Supp. at 1514. In…
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New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty., 706 F. Supp. 1507 (S.D. Fla. 1988)…nt entered against the county. 441 So.2d 173. In March of 1984, Judge Knuck conducted a non-jury trial on the merits and found for the defendant New Port Largo. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed final judgment on the merits in April, 1985. 467 So.2d 757. Subsequently, in January of 1986, Judge Lester granted New Port Largo a final summary judgment on its petition for certiorari. On July 7, 1987, the plaintiffs filed this complaint in the United States District Court. The plaintiffs seek a varie…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (17 total)
- Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1950)
- Laufer v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Odom v. The Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1976)
- Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Martin v. Wilson, 115 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- THE Fla. Cos. v. Orange Cnty., 411 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Parramore v. Hampton, 55 Fla. 672 (Fla. 1908)
- Steinhardt v. Steinhardt, 445 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Ceballos v. State, 441 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Turturro v. Joseph Schmier ad litem of the Ests. of Morris Siegel & Nina Siegel, 374 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)