FURY IMPORTS, INC., A NEW YORK CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
SHAKESPEARE COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
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The court denied the application for rehearing, finding that the newly cited case did not alter the analysis of when the statute of limitations accrues.
The court considered an application for rehearing based on a newly reported case, Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp. The appli…
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PER CURIAM:
The application for rehearing directs our attention to Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Manufacturing Corp., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 428 N.Y.S.2d 628, 406 N.E. 2d 445 (1980), a decision apparently reported after the opinion in this case was prepared, and urges that the Guard-Life opinion establishes a rule of New York law that would require a different analysis from the one made in our opinion.
It is unnecessary to set forth all of the facts and issues in Guard-Life. The court there considered a claim for tortious interference with contract rights, but did not deal with the question of when the statute of limitations on such a claim commences. Although it implies, apparently contrary to indications in some of the New York cases cited in our opinion, that New York does not recognize a cause of action for interference with contractual relations not constituting inducement to breach, as distinguished from a cause of action for inducing contractual breach, it does so under a rubric that apparently embraces both concepts by adopting this definition of the tort from the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
intentionally interfering with a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another . . .
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977).
If we apply this concept to the present case, we come to the same result. The cause of action for “intentionally interfering with a contract” (sometimes called tor-tious inducement to breach of contract in the prior New York cases, decided before the Second Restatement was adopted in 1977) accrues only when damage is suffered. A change of name alters neither the fragrance of the rose nór the time when a cause of action accrues for a tort whose name alone has been changed. For these reasons, the application for rehearing is DENIED.