STEPHEN R. PALMER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Palmer was convicted of cocaine trafficking after officers, during a consensual encounter at an Amtrak station, obtained his permission to search his tote bag and found packages containing cocaine. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial encounter was a mere contact requiring no reasonable suspicion, Palmer's consent was voluntary, and the officers were justified in opening the packages based on probable cause and the scope of the consent.
The court held that the encounter was a mere contact not constituting a seizure and requiring no founded suspicion; Palmer's consent to search the tote bag was freely and voluntarily given; and officers were constitutionally justified in opening the packages on two alternative grounds: (1) probable cause to believe narcotics were present based on the packages' distinctive appearance, and (2) the consent to search the tote bag extended to the packages themselves.
[1] A consensual encounter with law enforcement officers does not require a prior founded suspicion of unlawful activity.
[2] Consent to search a tote bag is considered freely and voluntarily given when there is no evidence of unlawful restraint.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the encounter between Palmer and the officers was a mere contact which did not involve a constitutional "seizure" of his person, and therefore did not require the existence of a prior founded suspicion of unlawful activity”
Establishes that the initial police-citizen encounter was permissible under the Fourth Amendment without reasonable suspicion
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceNarcotics officers approached Palmer at the Miami Amtrak station. Palmer voluntarily agreed to speak with them and gave permission to search his tote …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Scope Of Consent To Search cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
After he was approached by narcotics officers in the Miami Amtrak station, Palmer voluntarily agreed to speak with them and then gave them permission to “look into” his tote bag. Inside, they found several packages wrapped in brown paper, each six inches long and two inches wide. They squeezed one package and found it contained a “malleable” substance whereupon Palmer was asked what was inside. Upon his reply that it was a present from a friend, the officers opened the packages and found cocaine. The trial court denied Palmer’s motion to suppress the contraband and he has taken this appeal from his conviction for trafficking entered pursuant to a nolo plea which reserved the right to challenge that ruling. We affirm.
In the present state of the law, it is clear that the encounter between Palmer and the officers was a mere contact which did not involve a constitutional “seizure” of his person, and therefore did not require the existence of a prior founded suspicion of unlawful activity — one which in this case did not exist. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Florida v. Rodriguez, 461 U.S. 940, 103 S.Ct. 2115, 77 L.Ed.2d 1298 (1983); Login v. State, 394 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). There was ample evidence, in turn, to sustain the trial court’s finding that Palmer’s thus-untainted-by-unlawful-restraint consent to search the tote bag was freely and voluntarily given. Martin v. State, 411 So. 2d 169 (Fla.1982); Alzate v. State, 466 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
This brings us to the only challenging issue in the case: whether the officers were constitutionally justified in opening the packages and seizing the cocaine.
We conclude on two alternative grounds that they were.
First, when, pursuant to the consent, the police discovered the distinctively wrapped, shaped, and sized packages, there was, as they testified and as the trial court specifically and correctly held, probable cause to believe that narcotics were present. P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla.1984); Council v. State, 442 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
On that basis the officers were thereafter permitted to seize and examine the packages as incident to the arrest of Palmer on that charge. See Flanagan v. State, 440 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 450 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1984) (officer authorized to seize contraband observed in plain view upon consensual entry into premises); McGee v. State, 614 P. 2d 800 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967, 101 S.Ct. 1485, 67 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981) (officer authorized to seize gun after consensual view of firearm revealed that gun was contraband); W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 n. 75.2 (Supp.1985).
This is true even though the actual arrest was formally effected after the search. Thomas v. State, 395 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); State v. Abislaiman, 437 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 449 So. 2d 264 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 123, 83 L.Ed.2d 65 (1984).
Second, the initial consent to search the tote bW is properly regarded as extending to the packages themselves, particularly in the light of the fact that, unlike, for example, Goldberg v. State, 407 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Major v. State, 389 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for review denied, 408 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 1981), Palmer did not restrict, withdraw or limit his consent in any way, even when directly questioned about the packages’ contents. State v. Price, 363 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d 470 (Fla.1979) (consent to search vehicle extended to examination of jacket lying between seats); see United States v. Covello, 657 F. 2d 151 (7th Cir.1981); cases collected at W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 n. 55 (Supp.1985); cf. State v. Wargin, 418 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).1
Affirmed.
. Wargin is cited only for its discussion of general consent principles. We do not endorse its broad conclusions "that the holding in [United States v.] Ross [, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) ] applies to consent searches and that consent to search luggage includes the authority to search closed containers within the luggage which may conceal the object of the search.” 418 So. 2d at 1263.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (30 total)
-
State v. Avery, 531 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)…Bustamonte; Jacobson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1282 (Fla.1985); Martin v. State, 411 So. 2d 169 (Fla.1982); Denehy v. State, 400 So. 2d 1216 (Fla.1980); Rosa v. State, 508 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 515 So. 2d 230 (Fla.1987); Palmer v. State, 467 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Grant, 392 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 402 So. 2d 610 (Fla.1981). A person’s consent to a search is not per se involuntary because obtained by law enforcement officers on board a commercial carrier such as…
-
Cross v. State, 560 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1990)…is way on “hundreds of occasions.” Once the detectives found the taped, baseball-shaped object, in light of their many years of experience in narcotics work, they had probable cause to believe that Cross was carrying contraband. See Palmer v. State, 467 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); State v. Ellison, 455 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); see also P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla.1984) (in determining whether object constitutes evidence of crime, court considers totality of circumstances, in light of the off…
-
State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…iefcase. In Wargin, the fourth district decided, in a conclusory fashion and without analysis, that the holding in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) applies to consent cases. We disagree. See Palmer v. State, 467 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (citing Wargin for general consent principles, but specifically refusing to endorse the broad conclusion that Ross applies to consent searches). In Ross, the United States Supreme Court held that [t]he scope of a warrantless sea…
Previewing 3 of 30 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (20 total)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1983)
- United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (U.S. 1982)
- P.L.R. v. State, 455 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1984)
- Thomas v. State, 395 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Login v. State, 394 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Castelli v. United States, 450 U.S. 967 (U.S. 1981)
- Mathews v. Hannah, 450 U.S. 967 (U.S. 1981)
- Major v. State, 389 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Joe Council v. State, 442 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Goldberg v. State, 407 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)