DAVID ALLEN DAVIDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1985-02-22
No. 84-2743
GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
468 So. 2d 263 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

David Allen Davidson appealed from a denial of his post-conviction relief motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The court reversed the trial court's denial as to three of four allegations (ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawfully induced guilty plea, and illegal split sentence) but affirmed as to the denial of right to appeal allegation, remanding for further proceedings.


Holding

The court reversed the trial court's denial as to the ineffective assistance and unlawfully induced plea allegations because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing or attach refuting record materials; reversed as to the illegal split sentence allegation because the sentence violated Villery; and affirmed as to the denial of right to appeal allegation because such claims cannot be raised via Rule 3.850 motion.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must either conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach record portions refuting allegations in a post-conviction relief motion if those allegations, if true,…

[2] A split sentence of ten years imprisonment followed by twenty years probation is illegal.

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Key Quotes

“the trial court, however, failed to either conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach portions of the record which would refute those allegations”

Establishes the procedural defect in denying the motion regarding ineffective assistance and unlawfully induced plea claims

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Facts & Procedural History

Davidson was sentenced to ten years in prison followed by twenty years probation pursuant to a plea bargain. He filed a Rule 3.850 motion raising four…

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Opinion of the Court
LEHAN, Judge.

LEHAN, Judge.

Defendant appeals from a denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief. The motion contained four alleged grounds for relief. Two of those grounds — that he had ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced and made without a full understanding of the charges against him — would entitle appellant to relief if they were true.

The trial court, however, failed to either conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach portions of the record which would refute those allegations.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion as it pertained to those two allegations and remand the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court may again either summarily deny the motion as to those allegations and attach to its order those portions of the record which conclusively show appellant is not entitled to relief or hold an evidentiary hearing and then rule on the grounds alleged. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850. See also Jones v. State, 421 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Van Bever v. State, 405 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

Another allegation in defendant’s motion was that his sentence was a split sentence which was illegal pursuant to Villery v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1981).

Section 921.187(7), Florida Statutes (1983), is not applicable, and defendant is correct that his sentence of ten years in prison followed by twenty years probation is an illegal split sentence.

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion as it pertains to this allegation and remand for imposition of a legal sentence. Upon remand the court can either impose a sentence of less than one year imprisonment followed by a term of probation not exceeding the term of probation previously imposed or impose a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding the total prior sentence imposed. See Villery at 1112; Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1983).

The record indicates that the original sentence was imposed pursuant to a plea bargain.

Therefore, if the trial court chooses to impose a longer prison sentence than previously imposed, the defendant should have the option to withdraw his guilty plea. See Forbert.

However, that option of the defendant should be subordinate to the option of the state to accept the plea with the sentence reduced to a legal term under Villery within the parameters of the plea bargain, because the state might not be able to effectively try defendant after the passage of time since the original sentencing. See Forbert. See also Jolly v. State, 392 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

Defendant’s final allegation was that he was denied the right to appeal. Denial of the right to appeal cannot be raised by a rule 3.850 motion. Simmons v. State, 364 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). In any event, defendant only alleged that he desired to appeal from the sentence, and the sentencing error complained of (under Villery, which was decided some years after defendant’s sentencing) is to be corrected as explained above.

The denial of defendant’s motion is affirmed as to the allegation concerning denial of his right to appeal, but is reversed as to the other three allegations and remanded for proceedings explained above in this opinion.

GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Watkins v. State, 622 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …plea and be subject to trial and the opportunity to negotiate a new plea. See Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1983); Arnett v. State, 598 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Morris v. State, 620 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Davidson v. State, 468 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); [*1151] Jolly v. State, 392 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Based on our disposition of the above point, it is unnecessary to reach appellant’s remaining issues, i.e., nonconformity in the written sentence and oral pronouncement,…
  • Alonzo v. Morris, 620 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
    …agreement. The proper remedy in this case is to remand this case to the trial court with instructions to allow the state to accept the plea with the sentence imposed without the habitual violent felony offender status pursuant to Davidson v. State, 468 So. 2d 263, 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); or allow Morris to withdraw his plea of guilty and be subject to trial and the opportunity to negotiate a new plea. See Forbert v. State, 437 So. 2d 1079 (Fla.1983). Reversed and remanded with directions. CAMPBELL, A.C.J…
  • Williams v. State, 469 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
    …e sentenced in violation of the plea agreement, if true, might constitute a substantial omission by defense counsel. Bradfield v. State, 466 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Cf. Ginwright v. State, 466 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Davidson v. State, 468 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Further, appellant’s allegations that he was sentenced in violation of the plea agreement and that he was illegally sentenced for robbery and grand larceny in addition to first degree murder, if true, would entitle him to relief.…

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