STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM C. GRAHAM, III, APPELLEE
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The State of Florida appealed the dismissal of a false imprisonment charge against William C. Graham, III. The trial court dismissed the information for failing to allege a specific purpose or intent, but the appellate court reversed, holding that false imprisonment is a general intent crime that does not require such allegations.
False imprisonment is a general intent crime, not a specific intent crime, and therefore an information charging false imprisonment need not allege a specific purpose or intent. An information that contains all material elements of the false imprisonment statute and refers to the statute by number is generally sufficient.
[1] False imprisonment is a general intent crime, not requiring the allegation of a specific intent or purpose in the charging instrument.
[2] An information charging false imprisonment is sufficient if it tracks the language of the statute and refers to the statute by number.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The false imprisonment statute, on the other hand, is a general intent statute, and therefore it is not necessary to allege a specific intent or purpose in an information charging a violation of that statute.”
Establishes the core holding that false imprisonment is a general intent crime
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe State filed an information charging Graham with false imprisonment, alleging that he forcibly, by threat, or secretly confined, abducted, imprison…
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SCHOONOVER, Judge.
The appellant, State of Florida, appeals from an order dismissing an information charging the appellee, William C. Graham, III, with the offense of false imprisonment. We reverse.
The state filed an information which alleged in pertinent part that appellee did forcibly, by threat, or secretly confine, abduct, imprison, or restrain one Sharon Gray against her will. The information also set forth section 787.02, Florida Statutes (1983), as the applicable statute number. The trial court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the information on the ground that false imprisonment is a specific intent crime and the information failed to allege the purpose for which the crime had been committed.
The false imprisonment statute provides in part as follows:
787.02 False imprisonment.—
(l)(a) “False imprisonment” means forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning or restraining another person without lawful authority and against his will with any purpose other than those referred to in s. 787.01.
The information was dismissed because it failed to allege a specific purpose other than those referred to in section 787.-01, the kidnapping statute. The kidnapping statute prohibits virtually the same behavior as the false imprisonment statute, except it sets forth four specific intents, one of which must be present to constitute a violation of the statute. The kidnapping statute is a specific intent statute because it prohibits an act when accompanied by some intent other than the intent to do the act itself or the intent to cause the natural and necessary consequences of the act. Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
The false imprisonment statute, on the other hand, is a general intent statute, and therefore it is not necessary to allege a specific intent or purpose in an information charging a violation of that statute. The statute is designed to protect freedom from restraint of movement, and one who unlawfully obstructs, or deprives another of, this freedom is liable for that interference no matter what his motives or purposes are. See Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 335 N.E. 2d 310, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975). The last line of the false imprisonment statute merely states that it encompasses all unlawful restraints effected without the specific intents enumerated in section 787.01. Contra Rauso v. State, 425 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
The information contained all of the material elements of the false imprisonment statute and referred to the statute by number. Where an information refers to a statute and tracks its language, it is generally held sufficient. State v. DiGuillio, 413 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), petition for review denied, 419 So. 2d 1196 (1982). The trial court therefore erred in dismissing the information.
We, accordingly, reverse and remand for proceedings consistent herewith.
SCHEB, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Proko v. State, 566 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…t “an intent (other than section 787.01(a) motives) must be alleged in the accusatory pleading and proven at trial beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a person of false imprisonment.” The Second District Court of Appeal in State v. Graham, 468 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1985), and State v. Brown, 466 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 475 So. 2d 693 (Fla.1985), held that the false imprisonment statute is a general intent statute, and, therefore, it is n…
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Gloster v. State, 603 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…dingly, are considering that charge by itself and not as a necessarily lesser included offense of kidnapping. Prior to the supreme court’s holding in Sanborn, this court also held that false imprisonment was a general intent crime. State v. Graham, 468 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA), pet. for review denied by 475 So. 2d 694 (Fla.1985). In Graham, we held the kidnapping statute prohibits virtually the same behavior as the false imprisonment statute, except that it sets forth four specific intents, one of which must…
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State v. Brown, 466 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…ion 787.02, Florida Statutes. The trial court dismissed the information for its failure to allege that the appellee’s unlawful restraint of the victim was committed with a specific intent. The state has appealed. We recently held in State v. Graham, 468 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), that false imprisonment is a crime requiring only general intent and that there is no necessity to assert a specific purpose or intent in an information charging a violation of section 787.02. Accordingly, we reverse and remand…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Smith v. Louie L. Wainwright, 425 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 423 U.S. 929 (U.S. 1975)
- Winkleman v. Blyth & Co., Inc., 423 U.S. 929 (U.S. 1975)
- State v. DiGUILLIO, 413 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)