CLAUDE M. SHANKLE, APPELLANT,
v.
VIP LOUNGE, INC., ETC., ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 5th DCA | 1985-05-16
No. 84-673
COBB, C.J., concurs., COWART, J., dissents without opinion.
468 So. 2d 548 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Shankle appeals a ruling that an insurance policy's liability exclusion for property in the insured's 'care, custody or control' barred coverage for his band equipment damaged in a fire at a lounge where he performed. The court reversed, holding that mere physical presence on the insured's premises does not establish the requisite possessory control needed to trigger the exclusion.


Holding

The exclusion does not apply because merely placing property on the insured's premises does not constitute the 'care, custody or control' contemplated by the exclusion. The exclusion requires possessory control by the insured over the property, not merely proprietary control or physical location on the premises. The insurer bears the burden of proving non-coverage and failed to present evidence that We Can Do exercised dominion over Shankle's equipment.


Headnotes

[1] An "care, custody or control" exclusion in a liability insurance policy applies when the insured has possessory control over the property, not merely proprietary control.

[2] The burden is on the insurer to prove that property damage falls within a "care, custody or control" exclusion in the policy.

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Key Quotes

“The overwhelming number of jurisdictions hold that the exclusion envisions possessory control over the property, not proprietary control.”

Establishes the critical distinction between types of control required to trigger the exclusion

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Facts & Procedural History

Shankle contracted with We Can Do, Inc. to provide nightly musical entertainment at its lounge (Kowboy Korral) and routinely left his band equipment t…

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Opinion of the Court
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.

Claude Shankle appeals from a final order determining that a liability insurance policy carried by appellee, We Can Do, Inc., did not cover fire damage to his band instruments. Shankle contracted with We Can Do to provide nightly musical entertainment at its lounge known as the Kowboy Korral in Osceola County. His musical equipment was routinely left in the lounge overnight. On July 1, 1982, a fire occurred at the lounge and the equipment was damaged.

We Can Do had a policy of insurance from North East Insurance Company which provided fire coverage on the building and contents and liability coverage for both bodily injury and property damage. Shankle sought to recover under the liability coverage for property damage, contending that such damage was caused by the negligence of We Can Do. An exclusion in the liability portion of the policy provided that:

This insurance does not apply:
* * * * *

(K) to property damage to ...

* * * * *

(3) property in the care, custody or control of the insured or as to which the insured is for any purpose exercising physical control....

The trial court ruled that this exclusion precluded coverage for Shankle’s band equipment because it was in the “care, custody or control” of We Can Do, Inc. We disagree and reverse.

According to Appleman, whether a “care, custody or control” provision in a policy applies is a factual question and its resolution depends on many circumstances including the nature of the property, its location and what the insured is doing with or to it. 7A Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 4493.03 (1979). See also Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Mattox, 173 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965).

The overwhelming number of jurisdictions hold that the exclusion envisions possessory control over the property, not proprietary control. 8 ALR 4th 563,570 Exclusion Clause — Insureds Property (1981). Florida follows this rule and holds that where the insured has possessory control of the property, the exclusion applies. Phoenix of Hartford v. Holloway Corp., 268 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). See also Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Fields, 181 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965); Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Mattox.

Here, no testimony was taken and the court arrived at its decision denying coverage from the pleadings and a single affidavit executed by Shankle. The affidavit stated, in essence, that Shankle had a contract to provide music at the lounge, that there was no agreement for We Can Do to exercise any care, custody or control over his equipment, and that he did not intend for any person other than band members to exercise any duty or function or have any dominion over the equipment.

There is absolutely no evidence in the record that We Can Do “could do” anything with the equipment. There were no facts established on which the court could conclude that the equipment was under the care, custody or control of We Can Do. It does not follow that simply because equipment is left on the premises, the requisite elements of care, custody or control are established.

The burden is on the insurer to prove non-coverage once the insured has shown a loss from causes within the policy’s terms. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Emerald Fisheries, Inc., 388 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); U.S. Liability Ins. Co. v. Bove, 347 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See Ideal Mutual Ins. Co. v. C.D.I. Const, Inc., 640 F. 2d 654 (5th Cir.1981) (applying Florida law). Upon loss from a covered peril, North East had the burden of adducing evidence that Shankle’s equipment was in the “care, custody, or control” of its insured, We Can Do, Inc. It did not carry its burden. At best, all it showed was that the equipment was located on We Can Do’s premises overnight. The insurer should have adduced evidence that We Can Do was entitled to or did exercise some dominion over the equipment. It did not and Shankle’s affidavit, the only evidence on this question, indicates otherwise. In sum, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determi nation that the equipment was in the “care, custody or control” of the insured.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

COBB, C.J., concurs.

COWART, J., dissents without opinion.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Flamingo Self Storage, LLC v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 43 So. 3d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)
    …tody or control of the lessor. Application of the “care, custody or control” exclusion is a factual question which requires an analysis of whether the property at issue was within the possesso-ry control of the insured. Shankle v. VIP Lounge, Inc., 468 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see also Phoenix of Hartford v. Holloway Corp., 268 So. 2d 195, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). As such an analysis cannot be made on a motion for judgment on the pleadings; the order dismissing the complaint must be reversed. Re…
  • …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Shankle v. VIP Lounge, Inc., 468 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). COBB, C.J., UPCHURCH, J„ and VANN, H.R., Associate Judge, concur.…

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