HARVEY BROWN, ET UX., ET AL., PETITIONERS,
v.
CADILLAC MOTOR CAR DIVISION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a plaintiff cannot recover damages for psychological trauma or mental distress from simple negligence without a demonstrable physical injury. Mr. Brown, who suffered no physical injuries but claimed psychological trauma after striking and killing his mother due to a defective car accelerator, was barred from recovery.
Psychological trauma must cause a demonstrable physical injury such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or similar objectively discernible physical impairment before a cause of action may exist. There is no cause of action for psychological trauma alone when resulting from simple negligence.
[1] A cause of action for psychological trauma resulting from simple negligence requires a demonstrable physical injury, such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or sim…
[2] Psychological trauma alone, without resulting physical injury, does not give rise to a cause of action for negligence.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that such psychological trauma must cause a demonstrable physical injury such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or similar objectively discernible physical impairment before a cause of action may exist.”
The core holding establishing the requirement for physical injury even in cases of severe psychological trauma
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrown was driving a Cadillac automobile when he struck and killed his mother who had just exited the vehicle. The accident was caused by a defectively…
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McDONALD, Justice.
The Third District Court of Appeal has certified this cause as a case of great public importance. Cadillac Motor Car Division, General Motors Corp. v. Brown, 428 So. 2d 301, 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Brown was the successful plaintiff in an action against General Motors. While driving a Cadillac automobile he struck and killed his mother who had just alighted from the car. The evidence failed to show that Brown, himself, suffered any physical trauma. Brown’s judgment, and the derivative claim of his wife, was predicated upon his psychological trauma which resulted from his striking and killing his mother. General Motors was found to be at fault because of a defectively designed accelerator pedal. The district court of appeal, noting that Florida retains the impact rule, vacated the Browns’ judgment. The wrongful death judgment for the mother was undisturbed.
We are thus presented the question of whether a person who suffers no physical injuries in an accident has a cause of action for mental distress or psychic injury caused by the tortious event. We hold that such psychological trauma must cause a demonstrable physical injury such as death, paralysis, muscular impairment, or similar objectively discernible physical impairment before a cause of action may exist. We hold that there is no cause of action for psychological trauma alone when resulting from simple negligence.*
In a parallel case, Champion v. Gray, No. 62,830 (Fla. Mar. 7, 1985), we modified, in some limited situations, the requirement of an impact as a basis for a cause of action in negligence. We did not and do not, however, abolish the requirment that a discernible and demonstrable physical injury must flow from the accident before a cause of action exists.
Mr. Brown presented expert testimony at trial on the issue of a psychiatric disability, but failed to show a direct physical injury or any physical injury resulting from his mental distress. Mr. Brown cannot meet the requirements of Champion and has no recognizable cause of action. The decision of the district court vacating the Browns’ judgments is approved.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., OVERTON, ALDERMAN, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. ADKINS, J., concurs specially with an opinion.
*
This ruling does not disturb any prior decisions allowing such damages in intentional tort cases. Some district courts recognize such damages in outrageous conduct cases. This Court, however, has not ruled on that issue.
ADKINS, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur for the reasons which I expressed in my special concurrence in Champion v. Gray, No. 62,830 (Fla. Mar. 7, 1985).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (44 total)
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Arthur W. Kush, M.D. v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992)…r the Champion doctrine we decreed that a physical injury must manifest itself from the psychic trauma and the party must have a sensory perception of the incident causing the injury to a close family member. In Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Division, 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla.1985), we, adhering to the impact doctrine, rejected a claim of psychic damages because the Champion criteria were not met. This case goes much further than Champion and allows grief damage even when that grief does not cause a physical injury.…
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Gracey v. Eaker, 837 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2002)…ysical injuries were allegedly due to physical fright suffered when an automobile struck her house could not recover for those injuries because she had failed to show the requisite physical impact. Similarly, in Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Division, 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla.1985), we found that the driver of a defective automobile that struck and killed the driver’s mother had no cause of action for his mental distress because he sustained no physical injury. R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362-6…
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Walton D. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985)…uate to support a claim; nonphysical injuries must accompany and flow from direct trauma before recovery can be claimed for them in a negligence action. . In a collateral case issued this day, Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., General Motors Corp., 468 So. 2d 903, we held that Brown’s judgment must be vacated because his psychic trauma was not manifested by physical injury and no cause of action lies for psychic trauma alone. . Those jurisdictions that do not have the impact rule differ in the damages recov…1 / 2
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cadillac Motor CAR Division v. Brown, 428 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)