BRENDA PONTON, APPELLANT,
v.
LEE SCARFONE, D/B/A ARCHITECT LEE SCARFONE ASSOCIATES, APPELLEE
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A former employee appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging wrongful termination, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress following her rejection of her employer's sexual advances. The Florida appellate court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Florida recognizes no common law exception to at-will employment and that the employer's conduct, while condemnable, did not rise to the level of outrageous conduct required for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The court held that Florida does not recognize a common law exception to at-will employment doctrine, that the employer's sexual solicitations did not constitute an unlawful invasion of privacy, and that while the conduct was condemnable, it did not meet the threshold of being 'so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency' required for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
[1] The common law doctrine of employment at will is not subject to judicial modification.
[2] Allegations of unwanted sexual advances by an employer do not, as a matter of law, constitute an invasion of privacy.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Muller v. Stromberg-Carlson Corporation, 427 So.2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), lays to rest in this district the notion that the common law doctrine of 'employment at will' is susceptible of judicial modification.”
Establishes that Florida courts will not judicially modify at-will employment doctrine
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBrenda Ponton was a former employee of architect Lee Scarfone. Scarfone allegedly made utterances designed to induce Ponton to engage in a sexual liai…
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FRANK, Judge.
The appellant, Brenda Ponton, appeals from an order dismissing her complaint with prejudice. Ponton, a former employee of Scarfone, contends that her complaint alleged cognizable causes of action based upon wrongful termination from employment, the invasion of her privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Muller v. Stromberg-Carlson Corporation, 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), lays to rest in this district the notion that the common law doctrine of “employment at will” is susceptible of judicial modification. Notwithstanding the special concurrences by Justices Overton and Adkins in Smith v. Piezo Technology and Professional Administrators, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983), a majority of the supreme court does not appear inclined to overturn the common law concept. We decline the invitation to depart from Muller. The appellant’s claims associated with the “invasion of privacy” and “intentional infliction of emotional distress” we find meritless.
The appellant contends that Scar-fone’s utterances, designed to induce her to join with him in a sexual liaison, constituted a tortious incursion upon her privacy. The appellant over extends the value of the decisions relied upon in fashioning such contention, i.e., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975); Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla.1971); Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla.1964); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); Springer v. Greer, 341 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Conyers v. Glenn, 243 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Tucker v. American Employers’ Insurance Company, 171 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). The foregoing authorities fall short of the mark in convincing us that the words attributed to Scarfone come within that zone of conduct permitting a determination that Ponton’s right of privacy was unlawfully invaded.
During the pendency of this matter before us, our supreme court published its decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1985). Contrary to the view expressed by this court in Gmuer v. Garner, 426 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), Florida “recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” At 278. Determining the boundaries of that conduct which give meaning to the tort, however, is not without some difficulty. The threshold test to be followed in assessing behavior claimed to constitute the “intentional infliction of emotional distress” is whether such behavior is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” In applying that standard, it is manifest that the subjective response of the person who is the target of the actor’s conduct is not to' control the question of whether the tort occurred. Rather, an evaluation of the claimed misconduct must be undertaken to determine, as objectively as is possible, whether it is “atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. That burden falls to the judiciary — it is a matter of law, not a question of fact. Id. The deportment described in the pleaded facts with which we are concerned, condemnable by civilized social standards, does not ascend, or perhaps descend, to a level permitting us to say that the benchmarks enunciated in Metropolitan have been met.
Finally, we find wholly unpersuasive the appellant’s view that we can extract a “public policy” from Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (1983), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., to serve as a basis for a common law cause of action where a female’s rejection of sexual advances is the motivation underlying her termination from employment.
Affirmed.
OTT, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
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W.R. Grace & Co. v. Geodata Servs., Inc., 547 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 1989)…rofessional Administrators, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.1983); Harbour Square Development Corp. v. Miller, 517 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988); Ochab v. Morrison, Inc., d/b/a Ruby Tuesday and Keith Grubb, 517 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Muller v. Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). 526 So. 2d at 930. The law of written contracts, including the statute of frauds, would…
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Williams v. City OF Minneola, 575 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)…tation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’ Outrageousness and Recklessness. Outrageousness is the threshold test for recovery. Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla.1985). The prerequisite of extreme behavior, beyond all bounds of decency, atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community, has been discussed in numerous cases, including those in which Dist…
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State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Compupay, Inc., 654 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…tiffs person has been touched in an undesired or offensive manner. Stoddard; Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F.Supp. 1536 (S.D.Fla.1992) (employee prevails on invasion of privacy claim against employer who groped and fondled her). Compare Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA) (employer’s utterances designed to induce employee into sexual liaison are insufficient to come within zone of conduct constituting unlawful invasion of employees right of privacy), review denied, 478 So. 2d 54 (Fla.1985); Steele v. Of…
Previewing 3 of 52 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (U.S. 1965)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCARSON, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985)
- Zelma Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198 (Fla. 1944)
- Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof'l Administrators, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983)
- Alva Gene Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971)
- Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964)
- Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975)
- Cyndie E. Springer v. Greer, 341 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
- Mr. Jones v. Mr. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)