IN RE THE FORFEITURE OF ONE 1981 CHEVROLET EL CAMINO VIN # CCW80K3BD422125 LICENSE # DDP 148 (FLORIDA)
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's decision declaring Florida's vehicle forfeiture statute unconstitutional. The trial court had granted the vehicle owner's motion to return her seized automobile based on due process concerns, but the appellate court held that due process does not require a pre-seizure hearing for property used as an instrument of crime.
No. The court held that due process does not require a pre-seizure hearing for property used as an instrument of crime, and that the North Georgia Finishing line of cases does not apply to forfeiture statutes. Section 932.703(1) is constitutional, and the trial court erred in declaring it unconstitutional.
[1] Due process does not require a hearing prior to the seizure of property used as an instrument of crime, when such seizure is authorized by statute.
[2] A statute providing for the seizure of property used as an instrument of crime is not unconstitutional on due process grounds.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Certainly due process does not afford greater protection for property than it does for personal liberty. Due process does not entitle an individual to a hearing prior to arrest based upon probable cause. Similarly, due process does not entitle a person, who has used his property as an instrument of crime, to a hearing prior to seizure pursuant to statutory authority.”
Establishes the court's core holding that due process does not require pre-seizure hearings for property used as an instrument of crime
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA vehicle was seized in a forfeiture proceeding. The alleged owner made an ore tenus motion requesting return of her automobile, stating she had no ot…
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[*1094] DELL, Judge.
At an unreported forfeiture proceeding, the alleged owner of the vehicle made an ore tenus motion requesting the court to return her automobile because she had no other means of transportation. The trial court granted the motion and, according to appellant, sua sponte declared section 932.-703(1), Florida Statutes (1983), unconstitutional.1 The order entered by the trial court stated that section 932.703(1) violated the due process rights of the vehicle owner based on North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975), and declared the statute unconstitutional. However, the line of cases culminating with North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. do not apply to the forfeiture statute. See United States v. One 1973 Volvo, 377 F.Supp. 810 (W.D.Tex.1974); United States v. One 1967 Porsche, 492 F. 2d 893 (9th Cir.1974).
Certainly due process does not afford greater protection for property than it does for personal liberty. Due process does not entitle an individual to a hearing prior to arrest based upon probable cause. Similarly, due process does not entitle a person, who has used his property as an instrument of crime, to a hearing prior to seizure pursuant to statutory authority. To hold that due process requires a prior hearing in this situation would be to ignore the delicate process of adjustment entrusted to us by the Constitution. The interests of the government and the well being of society demand that the officers of the law be able to seize property used as an instrument of crime in violation of a statute providing for seizure. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); United States v. Arias, 453 F. 2d 641 (9th Cir.1972); Lockett v. United States, 390 F. 2d 168 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 877, 89 S.Ct. 175, 21 L.Ed.2d 149 (1968); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F. 2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807, 83 S.Ct. 1696, 10 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1963).
United States v. One 1967 Porsche, 492 F. 2d at 895.
We reverse the trial court’s order declaring section 932.703(1) unconstitutional.
REVERSED.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN, J., concur. . Appellee, the vehicle owner, has not filed a brief and has not challenged this statement.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (U.S. 1925)
- N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (U.S. 1975)
- Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1963)
- Lockett v. United States, 390 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1968)
- Walker v. United States, 374 U.S. 807 (U.S. 1963)
- Silverstein v. United States, 374 U.S. 807 (U.S. 1963)
- Reeves v. Utah, 393 U.S. 877 (U.S. 1968)
- Boone v. Moylan, 393 U.S. 877 (U.S. 1968)
- United States v. Arias, 453 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1972)
- United States v. ONE 1967 Porsche, 492 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1974)