JAMES EDWARD SCHMIDT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a grand theft sentencing where the trial court departed from sentencing guidelines without reducing its reasons to writing. The decision reaffirms the requirement for strict adherence to Florida's sentencing guidelines procedures, including written justification for any departure from the presumptive sentence.
The trial court erred in departing from sentencing guidelines without written reasons for the departure. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing consistent with strict adherence to the sentencing guidelines procedures.
[1] A trial court must reduce its reasons for departing from sentencing guidelines more than one cell to writing.
[2] The absence of a sentencing guideline scoresheet is relevant to the sentencing procedure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we would much prefer strict adherence to the purely mechanical features of the guidelines sentencing process, since the alternative is the needless amassing of yet another body of law if we should be required, on a case-by-case basis, to decide when compliance with various steps in the process might be irrelevant”
Establishes the court's preference for strict compliance with sentencing guidelines procedures to avoid case-by-case judicial refinements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSchmidt was convicted of grand theft and sentenced by the trial court. While on probation for grand theft, he committed uttering a forged instrument a…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in departing from the sentencing guidelines more than one cell (guidelines range) without reducing its reasons for departure to writing when sentencing him for his grand theft conviction. We agree and vacate and remand for resentencing consistent with this court’s holding in Harris v. State, 465 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); and Jackson v. State, 454 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Pursuant to Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(vi), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, we certify conflict with Fleming v. State, 456 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Burke v. State, 456 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); and Harvey v. State, 450 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
As to the state’s contention that the absence of a sentencing guideline scoresheet is irrelevant to the sentencing procedure, we disagree. See, Jackson v. State, supra; and Rasul v. State, 465 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), and cases therein cited. Here, unlike the circumstances in Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the trial court was not specifically informed of the presumptive sentence for the offense for which the defendant was being sentenced.
The trial court here was informed of the presumptive sentence for uttering a forged instrument,1 and we may presume that the judge understood the presumptive sentence for grand theft would be the same.
However, we would much prefer strict adherence to the purely mechanical features of the guidelines sentencing process, since the alternative is the needless amassing of yet another body of law if we should be required, on a case-by-case basis, to decide when compliance with various steps in the process might be irrelevant, and when material to the outcome, and therefore reversible error. Somewhat the same considerations would tend to underline the advantages of separate, written reasons for departure, as called for by the guidelines, since (besides facilitating appellate review) the deliberate act of specifically reducing these reasons to writing should tend to insure emphasis upon sound and acceptable reasons, and elimination of questionable or unsupportable reasons, which in turn would help to reduce the number of needless refinements, distinctions and qualifications added to the law on this subject by the appellate courts. We therefore decline the state’s suggestion that we eliminate as “senseless make-work” the requirement, which we insisted be followed in Jackson v. State, supra, of stating written reasons for departure.
REVERSED and REMANDED for re-sentencing.
ERVIN, C.J., and SMITH and NIM-MONS, JJ., concur. . While on probation for grand theft, appellant committed another felony, uttering a forged instrument. When he was sentenced on the uttering charge, a guidelines scoresheet was prepared for that offense.
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Vance v. State, 475 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…probation; and he had committed a prior misdemeanor. . We do not reach this issue in this case, but note a conflict between the district courts of appeal on its resolution. See Harris v. State, 465 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Schmidt v. State, 468 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Odea v. State, 463 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Jackson v. State, 454 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); contra, Boehmer v. State, 472 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Hernandez v. State, 465 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); State…
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Enrico Ehrenshaft v. State, 478 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…, even though separately transcribed and placed in the record, does not meet the requirements of a written statement under State v. Jackson, 478 So. 2d 1054 (Fla.1985). See also Edwins v. State, 475 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Schmidt v. State, 468 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Oden v. State, 463 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Johnson v. State, 462 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) Jackson v. State, 454 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In addition, we conclude that in this case, the sentencing court may n…
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Edwins v. State, 475 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…asons for exceeding the presumptive sentence appear in writing as that requirement has been interpreted by this court in Jackson v. State, 454 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), Johnson v. State, 462 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and Schmidt v. State, 468 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). These cases require that the judge prepare a contemporaneous written statement, rather than an oral statement to be transcribed later at the time of sentencing. See, e.g., Jackson v. State at 692, footnote two. Accordingly, the…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jackson v. State, 454 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Harvey v. State, 450 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Davis v. State, 461 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Burke v. State, 456 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Fleming v. State, 456 So. 2d 1300 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Harris v. State, 465 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
- Natal Rasul v. State, 465 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)