JULIUS FISKE, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWIN L. SHELTON, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1985-05-29
No. 84-1892
SCHOONOVER and FRANK, JJ., concur.
469 So. 2d 248 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

Fiske and Shelton, general partners in a limited partnership, disputed their obligations regarding a $300,000 loan from Citizens National Bank. Shelton paid $27,114.67 in interest on the loan but refused to continue payments. The court affirmed a summary judgment for Shelton on an unjust enrichment theory, finding Fiske estopped from claiming the entire loan was solely his obligation after he received additional partnership shares for the full $600,000 advance.


Holding

The court affirmed the summary judgment for Shelton on an unjust enrichment theory. Fiske was estopped from claiming that the $300,000 advance was made solely on his behalf after he accepted additional partnership shares representing the entire $600,000 advance. Consequently, Shelton could recover the $27,114.67 in interest payments he made.


Headnotes

[1] Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment.

[2] A party who accepts the benefits of a transaction may be estopped from later challenging its validity.

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Key Quotes

“The phrase "unjust enrichment" is used in law to characterize the result or effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account therefor.”

Establishes the legal definition and basis for unjust enrichment doctrine applied in this case

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Facts & Procedural History

Fiske and Shelton were two of three general partners who each purchased partnership shares at $50,000 each. The partnership needed additional funds fo…

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Opinion of the Court
GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.

GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment of $27,114.67.

Fiske and Shelton were two of three general partners in a limited partnership. The partnership shares were sold at $50,- 000 each. Fiske had purchased six shares, and Shelton had purchased nine shares. Thereafter, the partnership needed additional funds to close the purchase of some real estate.

According to Fiske, he and Shelton each agreed to advance the partnership an additional $300,000. Fiske borrowed $300,000 from First National Bank and loaned it to the partnership. Fiske says that Shelton was unable to obtain as favorable an interest rate from his bank, Citizens National Bank, because he was not in a position to put up as much collateral. Fiske agreed to put up collateral for Shelton’s loan so that a better interest rate could be obtained. However, the transaction was finally concluded by Fiske borrowing the additional $300,000 from Citizens National Bank in his own name.

When Fiske received statements from Citizens National Bank showing that the quarterly interest was due, he passed them on to Shelton. Shelton made two interest payments totalling $27,114.67. He declined to make further interest payments as they came due. Fiske then paid off the Citizens National Bank loan in its entirety. In order to protect his investment, Fiske arranged for the partnership to issue him further shares representing the additional $600,000 he had paid to the partnership.

According to Shelton, Fiske had agreed to personally obtain the entire $600,000 needed by the partnership. He said he made the two interest payments on the Citizens National Bank loan as an accommodation to Fiske. When Fiske refused to reimburse him, Shelton sued him for the payments. The court entered a summary judgment for Shelton.

Genuine issues of material fact cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977). Therefore, if the question before us was whether Fiske obtained the Citizens National Bank loan on behalf of Shelton, we would be compelled to reverse. However, it is significant to note that Shelton prevailed below on a theory of unjust enrichment. According to 66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3 (1973):

The phrase “unjust enrichment” is used in law to characterize the result or effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account therefor. It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly.

When Shelton refused to make further interest payments, Fiske could have asserted a claim against him for breach of contract. Instead, Fiske arranged for the receipt of additional partnership shares equivalent to the entire $600,000 advance. As a consequence he is now estopped to claim that $300,000 of the advance was originally made for the benefit of Shelton. Cf. Lipkin v. Bonita Garden Apartments, Inc., 122 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 125 So. 2d 878 (Fla.1960) (acceptance of the benefits of a lease estopped tenants from contending that the lease was invalid). At the present time, Shelton has paid out $27,114.67 with nothing to show for it. Consequently, the court correctly held that he could recover this sum from Fiske on the basis of unjust enrichment.

Affirmed.

SCHOONOVER and FRANK, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Ruggio v. Vining, 755 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
    …d 271, 272 (Fla.1986) (defendant waived speedy trial by requesting continuance); Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Arvidson, 604 So. 2d 854, 857-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (party to lawsuit waived right to jury trial in pretrial statement); Fiske v. Shelton, 469 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (first partner who elected not to sue second partner for breach of contract but instead elected to receive additional partnership shares was estopped from seeking further reimbursement from second partner in lawsuit); Lipkin v. Bo…

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