WESLEY R. PRENTICE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant Wesley Prentice appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a confession and his sentences for seven armed robberies, one burglary, and one grand theft. The court affirmed the denial of the suppression motion and the sentences imposed under the sentencing guidelines, but remanded for correction of concurrent sentence credit for time served.
The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because there was probable cause to arrest appellant and his statements were made before custody, thus no Miranda violation occurred. The trial court properly imposed consecutive mandatory minimum sentences of three years for each armed robbery under the sentencing guidelines. However, the trial court erred in failing to credit appellant on concurrent sentences for time served, and the sentences should be corrected to reflect they are guideline sentences.
[1] A confession is admissible when made prior to arrest and after probable cause for arrest exists.
[2] A mandatory sentence for an offense takes precedence over a recommended sentence that is less than the mandatory sentence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“there was probable cause to arrest appellant, and that any statements made by him were made prior to the time he was taken into custody. Thus, there was no violation of his rights pursuant to Miranda.”
Establishes that the court found no Miranda violation because statements preceded custody despite probable cause existing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged with seven separate counts of armed robbery, one count of burglary, and one count of grand theft, all occurring prior to October…
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CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellant, Wesley R. Prentice, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his sentences on seven counts of armed robbery, one count of burglary, and one count of grand theft.
Appellant was charged in seven separate informations with separate and distinct offenses of armed robbery. Another information charged one count of burglary and one count of grand theft. All of the offenses occurred prior to October 1, 1983, but sentencing took place thereafter. Appellant filed a motion to suppress his confession to his involvement in the robberies which was denied. Upon review of the evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress since there was probable cause to arrest appellant, and that any statements made by him were made prior to the time he was taken into custody.
Thus, there was no violation of his rights pursuant to Miranda. We, therefore, direct our attention to appellant’s second point on appeal concerning alleged sentencing errors.
Here, appellant was sentenced to four separate and distinct armed robberies, each carrying a minimum mandatory sentence of three years. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(9) provides that where a recommended sentence is less than the mandatory sentence for an offense having a mandatory penalty, the mandatory sentence takes precedent.
The trial court was acting within the provisions of rule 3.701 when he imposed consecutive sentences of three years for each armed robbery. He was not required to enter a written statement setting' forth clear and convincing reasons for his sentence since the sentence was not a departure from that allowed by rule 3.701. We, therefore, affirm the judgments and sentences of the trial court.
We note, however, that each sentence reflects that it is “not a guideline sentence.” Since appellant had elected to be sentenced pursuant to the guidelines, and the court had so acknowledged, on remand, the sentences should be corrected to so reflect.
Finally, the trial court did err in failing to credit appellant on the concurrent sentences for time served. When a defendant is sentenced on multiple charges to concurrent sentences, he is entitled to be given credit on each concurrent sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition of the charges. When a defendant receives jail time credit on one sentence which is to run concurrently with another sentence, the other sentence should also reflect credit for time served. Martin v. State, 452 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Blackwell v. State, 449 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Contra Shepard v. State, 459 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); Green v. State, 450 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Amlotte v. State, 435 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Affirmed and remanded for treatment consistent herewith.
RYDER, C.J., and PRANK, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Thorne v. State, 496 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…imposed for the robberies involving the use of a firearm. Where, as here, the recommended guideline sentence is less than the minimum mandatory sentence, the minimum mandatory sentence takes precedence. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)(9); Prentice v. State, 469 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Furthermore, the court’s imposition of three consecutive minimum mandatory sentences was consistent with State v. Thomas, 487 So. 2d 1043 (Fla.1986), because each robbery was a separate and distinct offense involving a separate a…
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Fannin v. State, 751 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…Florida courts did not consider such a sentence to be a departure because Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(9), which is part of the guidelines, authorized it. See, e.g., Mazza v. State, 499 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Prentice v. State, 469 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Lightfoot v. State, 459 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (consecutive minimum mandatories for separate offenses). In Harden v. State, 595 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), which we decided post -Branam but which involved crimes the de…
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Mazza v. State, 499 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…ntence takes precedence. The trial judge was not required to enter a written statement setting forth clear and convincing reasons for the defendant’s sentence since the sentence was not a departure from that allowed by rule 3.701. Prentice v. State, 469 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). However, we note that the written sentence does not specify that the three-year term is a mandatory minimum under section 775.087. Accordingly, we reverse with directions that the sentence be amended to reflect that the defenda…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Martin v. State, 452 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Hunter v. State, 435 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Buford A. Green v. State, 450 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)
- Shepard v. State, 459 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
- Blackwell v. State, 449 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)