RUFUS WILSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that consent to search is valid even if the suspect is unaware of their right to refuse, and the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress is presumed correct.
[1] A voluntary consent to search waives the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
[2] Knowledge of the right to refuse a warrantless search is a factor, but not a legal requirement, for valid consent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant consented to a search of his business premises after police received an informant's tip about stolen property. Appellant later moved to supp…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, which denial he specifically reserved the right to appeal when he entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of grand theft. Appellant contends that the evidence seized by the Jacksonville police cannot be used against him because his consent to a search of his business premises was not freely and voluntarily given, thereby rendering the search illegal. We disagree.
The officer who conducted the search, Detective Usry, testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he and Detective Adams went to appellant’s diner to check out an informant’s report that appellant had purchased a stolen microwave and was using it on the premises. Both Usry and appellant testified that when Usry asked to look around, appellant responded in the affirmative. Appellant contends that this search was illegal because he did not know he had the right to refuse the search and only consented because he thought he had no choice.
The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment may be waived by voluntary consent to search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). That consent must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22, 27 (Fla.1975). Although knowledge of the right to refuse a search without a warrant is a factor to be considered in evaluating the evidence, there is no legal requirement that a suspect be informed of that right. Schneckloth, supra, at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047; Bailey, supra, at 27.
The trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to this court with a presumption of correctness. We should interpret the evidence and all reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain the trial court’s ruling. McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla.1978). In so doing, we conclude that the trial court was correct in denying appellant’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
MILLS and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Elsleger v. State, 503 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)…cedent police misconduct a consent to search need be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence. See also, State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); compare Palacios v. State, 434 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), with Wilson v. State, 470 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the present case the court did not find any antecedent police misconduct, erroneously assuming that clear and convincing proof is the usual standard with regard to consent determinations. This does not accord with the Suprem…
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State v. Blan, 489 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…cedent police misconduct a consent to search need be shown only by a preponderance of the evidence. See also, State v. Fuksman, 468 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); compare Palacios v. State, 434 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), with Wilson v. State, 470 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). In the present case the court did not find any antecedent police misconduct, errone [*866] ously assuming that clear and convincing proof is the usual standard with regard to consent determinations. This does not accord with th…
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Acosta v. State, 519 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…her the consent obtained was freely and voluntarily given, there is no per se requirement that a defendant must be informed of such right. Id., 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d at 863; Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d at 27; Wilson v. State, 470 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). As applied to the particular circumstances at bar, however, we consider that the failure of the interrogating officer to advise the defendant of his right to refuse to give consent to a search compels reversal of the order d…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973)
- McNAMARA v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1978)
- Bailey v. State, 319 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1975)