STEPHEN KUEHN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
MARIAN E. ORLOSKY, FORMERLY MARIAN E. KUEHN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the appellate court reversed and remanded a trial court's award of an $11,715 special equity to the wife in bank accounts, bonds, and stock brokerage accounts, finding the record did not establish the wife's right to such an equity in the brokerage account.
The court reversed and remanded, holding that the record did not establish a right in the wife to a special equity in the brokerage account and that it was unclear whether the award was intended as lump sum alimony. The trial court on remand should reconsider the overall distribution scheme to do justice and equity.
[1] A trial court's award of a special equity to a spouse in a brokerage account may be reversed if the record does not establish the spouse's right to such an award.
[2] When a trial court's award of a special equity is reversed, the court may reconsider the entire scheme of asset distribution on remand to ensure justice and equity.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the record does not appear to establish a right in the wife to a special equity in that brokerage account”
Establishes the basis for reversing the trial court's award—the record lacked sufficient factual support for the wife's special equity claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court awarded the wife a $11,715 special equity in what it referred to as 'the previously existing bank accounts, bonds, and stock brokerage…
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PER CURIAM.
In this dissolution of marriage case the husband raises various contentions as to the award of attorney’s fees and distributions of property to the wife.
On cross-appeal the wife contends that the attorney’s fee award to her was too low.
We reverse and remand. We find no merit in the parties’ contentions except for the husband’s contention relative to the award of an $11,715 special equity to the wife in what the trial court referred to as “the previously existing bank accounts, bonds, and stock brokerage accounts.” The record indicates that there was a joint bank account, but all or part of the stock and bond brokerage account apparently was in the husband’s name although the record supports no definite conclusion in that regard. Also, the record does not appear to establish a right in the wife to a special equity in that brokerage account. See Bassett v. Bassett, 459 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Lang v. Lang, 459 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Tyler v. Tyler, 427 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Bolton v. Bolton, 421 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
Whether or not the award could have been intended as lump sum alimony is not entirely clear. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fla.1980).
Further, there is no indication as to what portion of the foregoing figure designated by the trial court as the wife’s special equity was with reference to that brokerage account.
Although neither party appealed from other provisions of the supplemental final judgment which provided for the distribution of assets, all provisions of the final judgment should be considered as parts of one overall scheme. Therefore, on remand the trial court may exercise its discretion to modify that overall scheme as may be necessary to do justice and equity.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
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Keller v. Keller, 521 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)…n, 413 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). However, since all the items of distribution are interrelated, on remand the trial court may in [*277] its discretion revisit this award. See Rico v. Rico, 487 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Kuehn v. Orlosky, 470 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We find the appellant’s remaining point on appeal without merit. In summary, we affirm the final judgment of dissolution, with the exception of the award of appellant’s interest in the Cocoa restaurant and the Mercedes, which we…
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Blue Satanonchai v. Amparo Satanonchai, 522 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)…ey’s fees to the appellee-wife. However, in light of our reversal on the award of lump sum alimony, on remand the trial court may reconsider the amount and duration of the award for rehabilitative alimony. Rico, 487 So. 2d at 1162; Kuehn v. Orlosky, 470 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (on remand court may modify other provisions of final judgment to do justice and equity to overall scheme). Additionally, the court should award the wife exclusive use and possession of the home until the children reach majority…
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Osborne v. Osborne, 604 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…band has suggested, an award of exclusive possession of the marital home to the wife, as the custodial parent, until the children reach the age of majority. See Satanonchai v. Satanonchai, 522 So. 2d 1030 [*861] (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Kuehn v. Orlosky, 470 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. HALL, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., and MCDONALD, RANDALL, G., Associate Judge, concur. . This amount is not governed by the…
Authorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Tyler v. Tyler, 427 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Bolton v. Bolton, 421 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Lang v. Lang, 459 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Bassett v. Bassett, 459 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)