KEITH FINLAYSON, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
BROWARD COUNTY, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1985-05-01
No. 84-1406
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WALDEN, J„ concur.
471 So. 2d 67 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

EMTs employed by Broward County sued claiming they were improperly classified as receiving straight-time pay despite working significantly more than 40 hours per week. The court reversed summary judgment, holding that the County's Administrative Order 419 required overtime compensation for hours worked beyond 40 hours per week.


Holding

The court held that EMTs are entitled to overtime compensation under Administrative Order 419. Of the 56 hours worked weekly, 16 hours constitute overtime work beyond the 40-hour threshold and must be compensated at time-and-a-half rates. The County's argument that all 56 hours were straight-time hours is invalid as a matter of law.


Headnotes

[1] An employee is entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked beyond the normal hours of any scheduled work week.

[2] When interpreting administrative orders, courts should avoid interpretations that render parts of the order meaningless.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Of the 56 hours worked, 16 were actually overtime. Therefore, the argument fails.”

The court's rejection of the County's core argument that all 56 hours could be classified as straight-time hours.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Broward County emergency medical technicians worked 24-hour shifts every third day, totaling approximately 112 hours per two-week pay period (56 hours…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
CARLISLE, JAMES T.,

Associate Judge.

Plaintiff Finlayson appeals the summary judgment entered against her in this class action suit.

Broward County Civil Service Workers, including emergency medical technicians (EMT), were paid in accordance with the County Civil Service Rules and Regulations. The typical EMT is paid bi-weekly, working a 24 hour shift every third day. The EMT works five such shifts in any given two week period, for a total of 120 hours per period. During the 24 hour shift, 8 hours are designated as “sleep time.” However, the EMT is on duty and on call during these times and cannot leave work and often is too busy to sleep. The County admits that the EMTs actually work just over 56 hours per period.

EMTs are not paid overtime, although other County civil service personnel receive overtime for all hours worked over 40 hours per period. Although the EMTs actually work 112 hours per each two week time period, they are required to write “80 hours” on their time sheets in order to accommodate the County’s computer system, which is geared to a 40 hour work week.

Various divisions of the Broward County government had, from as early as 1975, expressed concern over the apparent inequity involved in the EMTs pay arrangement. In 1979 the County issued Administrative Order No: 419, which was designed to “ensure pay policy application consistency.”

Order No: 419 provides as follows:

Since the County now has employees working three, four, five and six regular 40 hour work weeks, all persons will be paid the same proportionate dollars for time off.

Overtime is work beyond the normal hours of any scheduled work week. After 40 hours actually worked, employee will be paid at the rate of time and one-half.

For those employees working a 37V2 hour week and recording a two and one half (2V2) hour time adjustment the following rule applied for work in excess of 37V2 hours and not exceeding 40 hours:

This time is recorded as additional regular time on the payroll voucher form — In the column headed as “ACTUAL.” It will be paid at the regular pay rate. All regular employees, when approved to do so, will earn premium (time and one half) overtime for the excess over their total scheduled hours which includes any time adjustment as referenced above.

The County argued the EMTs were properly paid. Their reasoning is as follows:

A.Finlayson’s annual salary is $13,207.

B. Although she has to write in “40 hours” per week, she really works 56 hours per week.

C. All 56 of these hours are straight time hours — none of them are overtime hours.

D. Therefore, Finlayson’s “true” hourly wage is $13,207 divided by 2,920 (56.16 hours per week multiplied by 52 weeks), which comes to 4.5231 per hour, straight time.

This argument cannot possibly work without its third premise (“C”). However, the validity of that premise is the chief issue on appeal. Appellee cannot simply cite it as though it were true. In fact, the premise is false. Of the 56 hours worked, 16 were actually overtime. Therefore, the argument fails.

The County drafted Order No: 419. Any ambiguities in a contract should be construed against the drafting party. See, e.g., American Agronomics v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).

Order No: 419 was a part of the Code of Broward County. Therefore, established rules of statutory construction are applicable. For example, when interpreting a statute, courts should avoid interpretations which would render part of the statute meaningless, Cilento v. State, 377 So. 2d 663 (Fla.1979).

The operative portion of Order No: 419 reads:

Overtime is work beyond the normal hours of any scheduled work week. After I/O hours actually worked, employee will be paid at the rate of time and one-half. [Emphasis supplied.]

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.

ANSTEAD, C.J., and WALDEN, J„ concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Broward Cnty. v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990)
    …summary judgment in favor of the county; however, on appeal, the district court reversed, holding that the EMTs were entitled to proceed on their claim for overtime for those hours worked in excess of a forty-hour-week. Finlayson v. Broward County, 471 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). On remand, the parties agreed that the matter would proceed before the jury on the following special verdict question: [*1213] Did the annual salary received by each member of the Class constitute payment for forty (40) hours pe…
  • Kraft v. Zelda Pincourt Mason, 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …ocally confirms that the agreement was drafted by one of the borrowers and so should be construed against them and in favor of the lender. See Home Savings of America, F.A. v. Roehner, 491 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Finlayson v. Broward County, 471 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). On this point, then, the case must be remanded to the trial court for calculations of an award to Mason consistent with this opinion. [*686] CONCLUSION Because this court holds that the trial court correctly found the contract…
  • PAZ v. Fid. Nat'l Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …ed the circumstances giving rise to the violation by agreeing to pay the damages due because ascribing such a meaning would render the first portion of the statute requiring damages to be paid within 60 days meaningless. Finlayson v. Broward County, 471 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)(“[W]hen interpreting a statute, courts should avoid interpretations which would render part of the statute meaningless.”); Fleischman v. Department of Professional Regulation, 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123. (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)(“Every…

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw