JOSEPH DAVID ROUSAN, APPELLANT,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the sua sponte action of the sentencing court in deleting the special parole term was sufficient under Bifulco, and the petition for habeas corpus was properly denied.
Appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and was sentenced with a special parole term. The sentencing court later corrected the sen…
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PER CURIAM.
On March 4, 1977, the appellant, Joseph David Rousan, pleaded guilty of conspiracy to illegally distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Thereafter the remaining three substantive counts of the four count indictment were dismissed and appellant was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) to a term of twelve years imprisonment to be followed by a special parole term of five years.
On December 3, 1980, the sentencing court,1 on its own motion pursuant to Fed. Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 35, ordered the sentence corrected by elimination of the special parole term.
On December 9, 1980, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, in which he contended that under Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980), his entire sentence was void. The petition was denied and Rousan appealed.
The question presented in Bifulco was “whether § 406 [21 U.S.C. § 846], which states the penalty for conspiracy as ‘imprisonment or fine or both,’ but limits maximum punishment by reference to the penalty provisions of the substantive target offense, authorized the imposition of a special parole term when that sanction is included within the penalty provisions of the target offense.”
447 U.S. at 385, 100 S.Ct. at 2251. The Court held it did not. The sua sponte action of the sentencing court in deleting the special parole term of five years from appellant’s sentence is all that was required under Bifulco and appellant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was properly denied. See United States v. Diaz, 655 F. 2d 580 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Bland, 653 F. 2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Noble, 653 F. 2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Anderson, 652 F. 2d 10 (9th Cir. 1980).
Affirmed.
. The Honorable H. Kenneth Wangelin, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
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United States v. McNEESE, 901 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1990)
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United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
Authorities Cited
- Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (U.S. 1980)
- United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1981)
- United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981)
- United States v. Noble, 653 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1981)
- United States v. Anderson, 652 F.2d 10 (9th Cir. 1980)