DALE WHEELER, PETITIONER,
v.
THE HONORABLE G. ROBERT BARRON, CIRCUIT JUDGE, FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Dale Wheeler petitioned for a writ of prohibition to halt his retrial, claiming the speedy trial period had expired after the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a district court's decision reversing his convictions and remanding for new trial. The court held that a 90-day speedy trial extension under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(g) becomes effective upon the Supreme Court's disposition, giving the state 90 days from receipt of the mandate to bring petitioner to trial.
The court held that where the speedy trial period is extended to cover the pendency of Supreme Court review, the 90-day extension in current Rule 3.191(g) becomes effective upon disposition by the Supreme Court, giving the state 90 days from receipt of the Supreme Court's mandate to bring the petitioner to trial.
[1] A speedy trial period extended to cover the pendency of supreme court review becomes subject to a 90-day extension upon disposition of the cause by that court.
[2] The state is permitted 90 days from the date of receipt by the trial court of the supreme court's mandate to bring a defendant to trial following a speedy trial extension…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that where, as here, the speedy trial period is extended for a period covering the pendency of review by the supreme court, the 90-day extension in the current Rule 3.191(g) becomes effective upon disposition of the cause by that court.”
States the controlling legal principle that a new 90-day speedy trial extension is triggered by the Supreme Court's disposition, not the moment of decision.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWheeler's convictions were reversed by the First District Court of Appeal, and he was remanded for new trial. The state sought review in the Florida S…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, who is scheduled for retrial on several felony convictions, seeks a writ of prohibition on the ground that the speedy trial period has expired.
After this court reversed petitioner’s convictions, and remanded for new trial,1 the state sought review in the supreme court. The state also moved the trial court for an extension of the speedy trial period until disposition of the supreme court proceed ings. The motion was granted by an order stating that
... the Speedy Trial timeJn the above-styled cause is extended until such time as the Supreme Court of Florida denies certiorari jurisdiction or until said Court issues its decision in this case.
The supreme court decision affirming our reversal was issued on April 25, 1985,2 and petitioner maintains that the extension of the speedy trial time expired on that date.
Petitioner relies on State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971 (Fla.1980), and Nelson v. State, 414 So. 2d 505 (Fla.1982). Neither of these cases is controlling. Both were decided under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 as it existed pri-or to the January 1, 1981, amendments. Jenkins involved a delay in the initial trial due to an interlocutory appeal by the state. At that time, Rule 3.191(g) did not provide a 90-day speedy trial extension after disposition of an interlocutory appeal. Therefore, the court held it was necessary for the state to secure further extensions when its appeal resulted in a delay beyond the extension date initially granted by the trial court. In Nelson, the court merely affirmed the trial court’s authority to extend the speedy trial time when the state seeks supreme court review of a district court decision.
We hold that where, as here, the speedy trial period is extended for a period covering the pendency of review by the supreme court, the 90-day extension in the current Rule 3.191(g) becomes effective upon disposition of the cause by that court. Therefore, the state is permitted 90 days from the date of receipt by the trial court of the supreme court’s mandate in which to bring petitioner to trial.
Petition for writ of prohibition denied.
BOOTH, SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . Wheeler v. State, 425 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
. State v. Wheeler, 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985).
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Hochstrasser v. Hon. David A. Demers, 491 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…ninety days after the conclusion of all appellate proceedings to bring appellant to trial. Rule 3.191(g) reads as follows: However, the reference to appeals in this subsection does not encompass petitions for extraordinary writs. Wheeler v. Barron, 471 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1st DCA), petition for review dismissed, 476 So. 2d 676 (Fla.1985); State v. Dante, 467 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for review denied, 479 So. 2d 118 (Fla.1985); State v. Barreiro, 460 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). In order to toll the…
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Buhler v. State, 247 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
Authorities Cited
- State v. Jenkins, 389 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. Wheeler, 468 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 1985)
- Nelson v. State, 414 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1982)
- Wheeler v. State, 425 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)