THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
JUAN LAPPIN, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1985-06-18
No. 84-964
Before BASKIN, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
471 So. 2d 182 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 5 cases

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Synopsis

The State of Florida appealed a trial court's dismissal of an aggravated assault charge on double jeopardy grounds after the defendant was convicted of reckless driving arising from the same incident. The appellate court reversed, holding that reckless driving and aggravated assault are distinct crimes with different statutory elements, and therefore both charges may be prosecuted despite arising from the same act.


Holding

The court held that reckless driving and aggravated assault are distinct crimes because they do not share common statutory elements. Under the Blockburger test, when each offense has at least one element that the other lacks, they constitute separate crimes, and double jeopardy principles do not prohibit prosecution of both charges even though they arise from the same factual event.


Headnotes

[1] Double jeopardy analysis must be based on the statutory elements of the offenses, not the charging document or proof.

[2] If each offense has at least one element that the other lacks, the offenses constitute separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes, even if they arise from the same act.

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Key Quotes

“If each offense has at least one element that the other lacks, the offenses constitute separate crimes even though they may arise from the same act or factual event.”

Establishes the controlling legal standard for determining whether offenses are distinct under double jeopardy analysis.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lappin attempted to strike two police officers with his motor vehicle. He was charged with both reckless driving and aggravated assault on a police of…

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Opinion of the Court
BASKIN, Judge.

BASKIN, Judge.

The state charged Lappin with reckless driving and aggravated assault on a police officer as a result of an incident in which Lappin attempted to strike two police officers with his motor vehicle. Following his conviction in county court on the reckless driving count, Lappin filed a motion to dismiss the aggravated assault charge on double jeopardy grounds. The court granted the motion and dismissed the assault charge. The state appeals, arguing that the charged offenses are distinct crimes with different elements and that the prosecution of both charges is proper. We agree.

The Florida Supreme Court, applying the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), states that in deciding double jeopardy questions, the court must base its decision on the statutory elements of the offenses rather than the charging document or proof. State v. Baker, 456 So. 2d 419 (Fla.1984); State v. Gibson, 452 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1984); State v. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927 (Fla.1984). If each offense has at least one element that the other lacks, the offenses constitute separate crimes even though they may arise from the same act or factual event. Baker, 456 So. 2d 419; Gibson; § 775.021(4), Fla.Stat. (1983). Because reckless driving, § 316.192, Fla.Stat. (1983),1 and aggravated assault, § 784.021, Fla.Stat. (1983),2 do not have common statutory elements, they are distinct and separate crimes. Thus, even though both charges arise from the same act, double jeopardy principles present no impediment to Lappin’s prosecution for both offenses.

For these reasons, we reverse the lower court’s dismissal of the aggravated assault charge and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

. Section 316.192(1), Fla.Stat. (1983), defines the prohibited elements of reckless driving as including:

1. driving a vehicle

2. in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property

. Section 784.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1983), includes in the elements of aggravated assault:

1. assault

2. a. with a deadly weapon without intent to kill or b. with an intent to commit a felony.

Assault is defined in section 784.011, Fla.Stat. (1983), as an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Anderson v. State, 247 So. 3d 680 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
  • State v. Godwin, 632 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …nses have different elements according to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, [*229] 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The offenses of reckless driving and aggravated assault each contain an element that the other does not. State v. Lappin, 471 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Therefore, even though the aggravated assault charges and the reckless driving charge arose from the same act, there was no double jeopardy violation in charging the appellant with aggravated assault after he pled guilty to reckl…

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