IGNACIO DE ARMAS, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
MARIA DEL CARMEN DE ARMAS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In a marriage dissolution appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's child support award as an abuse of discretion because it consumed 80% of the former husband's net income, and reversed an award giving the former wife an interest in property owned by the former husband's father in which he had no interest. The court affirmed the award of costs to the former wife.
The court held that the child support award was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed because it exceeded the former husband's financial ability to pay. The award of a one-quarter interest in the duplex was reversed entirely because the former husband had no property interest in property owned by a non-party and the trial court lacked authority to award an interest in such property. The award of costs to the former wife was affirmed as having a reasonable basis in the record, provided it is later set in an amount within the former husband's ability to pay.
[1] A child support award constitutes an abuse of discretion when it exceeds the obligor's financial ability to respond, leaving the obligor with insufficient funds for basic…
[2] A trial court lacks authority to award an interest in property owned by a non-party to the action, absent a basis to set aside prior conveyances to vest the party with an…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the child support award of $100 per week for each of the two minor children born of the marriage constitutes an abuse of discretion because it exceeds the financial ability of the former husband to respond to such an award”
Establishes the court's holding that the child support award was an abuse of discretion due to the former husband's inability to pay
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIgnacio de Armas, Jr., and Maria del Carmen de Armas were parties to a marriage dissolution action involving two minor children. The trial court award…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Child Support Award cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Ignacio de Armas, Jr., the former husband in a marriage dissolution action, appeals the final judgment of marriage dissolution entered herein. Maria del Carmen de Armas, the former wife, has filed no brief contesting this appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
First, it is plain that the child support award of $100 per week for each of the two minor children born of the marriage constitutes an abuse of discretion because it exceeds the financial ability of the former husband to respond to such an award. Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the former wife, the evidence below establishes that this award represents 80% of the former husband’s net income, leaving him with approximately $50 a week to live on. The former wife, on the other hand, is employed and has a net income of nearly $180 a week which is roughly comparable to the former husband’s net income of nearly $250 a week; neither party has any savings or liquid assets. No reasonable person, we think, could have imposed such an onerous child support award on the former husband under these circumstances; it is arbitrary, grossly unfair to the former husband, and must be reversed. Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Nicholson v. Nicholson, 372 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Second, the trial court erred in awarding the former wife a one-quarter interest in a certain duplex, valued at $18,-000-, which is owned entirely by the former husband’s father. It is plain that the trial court had no authority to make this award as the subject duplex is held by a non-party to this action, the former husband has no property interest in the duplex, and no basis was pled or proven to set aside any prior conveyances so as to vest the former husband with an interest in the duplex. The award in question must therefore be reversed in its entirety. Good v. Good, 458 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Burgess v. Burgess, 411 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Feldman v. Feldman, 390 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
Finally, we conclude that the decision to award costs in this action to the former wife must be affirmed. There was a reasonable basis in the record for making such a decision providing it is later set in an amount within the former husband’s ability to pay. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
The final judgment under review is (1) reversed as to the child support award and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to set a new child support award in an amount which is commensurate with the former husband’s ability to pay; (2) reversed as to the award of the one-quarter interest in the duplex valued at $18,000; and (3) affirmed in all other respects, including the decision to award costs to the former wife.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, 116 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…et income is the relevant benchmark”) (citing Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1202 (Fla.1980); Lambertini v. Lambertini, 817 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Gandul v. Gandul, 696 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); de Armas v. de Armas, 471 So. 2d 185, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)). Here, the only mention in the final judgment of Mr. Kingsbury’s income, and [*475] thus his ability to pay alimo…
-
Vega v. Vega, 877 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…the husband’s net income of $6,281, which is 64 percent of the husband’s net income. We reverse the awards as excessive. See Gandul v. Gandul, 696 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (70 percent of net [*883] income excessive); de Armas v. de Armas, 471 So. 2d 185, 185-86 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (80 percent of net income excessive); Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107, 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (60 percent of net income excessive), see also Lambertini v. Lambertini, 817 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Gomez v. Gomez, 659…
-
Starling v. Starling, 491 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)…husband does not have the ability to meet the financial obligation imposed upon him. To expect the husband to exist on $32 a week is simply unreasonable. See DeHart; and also Messal v. Messal, 424 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); deArmas v. deArmas, 471 So. 2d 185 (Fla.3d DCA 1985); and Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla.3d DCA 1980). In urging affirmance, the wife relies heavily on the trial court’s finding in the original final judgment of dissolution that the husband was “grossly underemployed.” She cites t…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980)
- Blum v. Blum, 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Feldman v. Zena K. Feldman, 390 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Nicholson v. Glynn C. Nicholson, 372 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Parham v. Parham, 385 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Good v. Good, 458 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)
- Borst v. Borst, 458 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
- Burgess v. Foster F. Burgess, 411 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)