DAVID W. RIPPLE AND KENNETH M. WILLIAMS, PETITIONERS,
v.
THOMAS R. PACKARD, RESPONDENT
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Ripple and Packard entered into a joint venture agreement with an arbitration clause involving three real estate parcels. After the parties agreed to an arbitration award providing for asset sale and giving Ripple a right of first refusal, Packard sought to vacate the award alleging fraud. The trial court granted the motion to vacate, but the appellate court reversed, holding that an order vacating an arbitration award without directing rehearing before the arbitrator violates the essential requirements of law.
An order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing before the arbitration panel constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law and is reviewable. The trial court must either enforce the remaining portion of the agreed arbitration award or remand to the arbitrator for further proceedings.
[1] An order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law.
[2] An order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing by an arbitration panel is not appealable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing is a departure from the essential requirements of law.”
Establishes the legal standard for reviewability of arbitration award vacation orders and identifies the defect in the trial court's order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRipple and Packard entered into a written joint venture agreement for three Dade County real estate parcels that included an arbitration clause. After…
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JORGENSON, Judge.
David W. Ripple and Thomas R. Packard entered into a written joint venture agree ment involving three parcels of real estate located in Dade County, Florida. Their joint venture agreement included an arbitration clause. The predictable falling-out occurred, and Packard brought an action in the circuit court seeking enforcement of the terms of the agreement and invoking the arbitration clause.
The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration. Subsequently, the parties agreed to the conditions of an arbitration award which provided for the sale of all joint venture assets, the method and manner by which the real property would be sold, and the division of the proceeds. The agreed award also contained a provision conferring upon Ripple a right of first refusal for ten days on any bona fide written offer for each of the parcels involved. Two of the parcels have been sold to Ripple pursuant to those provisions; only lot 7 remains and is at issue.
Ripple sought to close on lot 7 and, finding Packard reluctant, moved to compel compliance with the award. Packard countered with a motion to' vacate the award, alleging in substance that the award had been procured by fraud. Following a hearing on the issues raised, the trial court granted Packard’s motion to set aside the agreed arbitration award.
As a threshold issue, Packard argues that this court is without jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order.
We disagree. See Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So. 2d 286, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
An order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing is a departure from the essential requirements of law. See § 682.20(e), Fla.Stat. (1983); see also Corner v. Freedman, 175 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (trial court order vacating arbitration award and directing rehearing by arbitration panel not appealable).
The rehearing contemplated by the statute is before the arbitration panel and not, as Packard suggests; further proceedings by the trial court. See Garner. We, accordingly, grant certiorari, quash the order under review, and remand to the trial court with directions either to enforce the remaining one-third of the agreed arbitration award or, in the alternative, to remand to the arbiter for further proceedings.
Certiorari granted; order quashed; cause remanded with directions.
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Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 719 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…” that appellant was an “occasional tenant,” a term we are not familiar with. Nevertheless, that finding did not give the arbitrator jurisdiction where the arbitrator also determined that appellant had vacated the apartment. . In Ripple v. Packard, 471 So. 2d 1293, 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), the third district held that it was error for a circuit court to vacate an arbitration award without directing a rehearing where the parties had agreed to submit all disputes to arbitration in their contract. Ripple is inap…
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Fridman v. Citicorp Real Est., Inc., 596 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…awarding fees for the arbitration, the next inquiry is what the circuit court should have done following that finding. It is error for a circuit court to enter an order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing. Ripple v. Packard, 471 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). The circuit court in this case should have ordered the arbitrators to rehear the matter in accordance with the provisions set forth in section 682.-13(3), Florida Statutes (1989).1 Upon receipt of the arbitration award after reh…
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Loewenstein, Inc. v. Draheim, 914 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…Ruffin v. Kingswood, E. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 719 So. 2d 951, 953 n. 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). It is error for a circuit court to enter an order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing by the arbitration panel. See Ripple v. Packard, 471 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Fridman v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 596 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), overruled on other grounds by Tumberry Assocs. v. Service Station Aid, Inc., 651 So. 2d 1173 (Fla.1995); see also § 682.13(3), 682.20(1)(e), Fla. St…
Authorities Cited
- VIC Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)
- Ga. Indus. Realty Co. v. Duval Connecting R.R. Co., 175 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965)