IN THE INTEREST OF T.T., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
T.T., a juvenile, appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services nearly two years after his adjudication as a delinquent. The court affirms, holding that the commitment does not violate constitutional rights because it is for an indeterminate period not exceeding his nineteenth birthday and does not exceed the maximum period of commitment computed from the adjudication date.
The court affirmed the commitment order, holding that the deferred commitment does not violate T.T.'s constitutional rights because it is for an indeterminate period not to exceed his nineteenth birthday and does not exceed the maximum period of commitment computed from the adjudication date.
[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to impose a sentence within five years of adjudicating a defendant guilty, provided the sentence does not exceed the maximum punishment…
[2] A juvenile commitment order to a department for an indeterminate period not to exceed the juvenile's nineteenth birthday is permissible if it does not exceed the maximum…
Previewing 2 of 2 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In criminal cases, the trial court is without authority in most instances to defer imposition of sentence indefinitely after adjudicating a defendant guilty... But the trial court retains jurisdiction to subsequently impose a sentence within five years.”
Establishes the legal framework for deferred sentencing in criminal cases that the court applies by analogy to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1982, T.T., then 15 years old, was adjudicated delinquent on charges including tampering with evidence, two counts of assault, and cannabis possess…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Indeterminate Commitment cases and more on FLexlaw
MILLS, Judge.
T.T., a juvenile, appeals from an order committing him to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). He contends the juvenile court erred in committing him almost two years after entering the adjudication of delinquency. We affirm.
In 1982, then 15-year-old T.T. was charged in a petition of delinquency with one count of tampering with evidence, two counts of assault, and one count of possession of less than 20 grams of cannabis. The juvenile court adjudicated him a delinquent as to all counts on 24 August 1982. At that time, the court imposed consecutive commitments to HRS on the latter three counts, but deferred further disposition on the evidence tampering count.
In 1983, T.T. was recommitted for violating community control. In 1984, he again violated community control. This time the court did not recommit him, but continued community control. A petition alleging a third violation of community control was filed shortly thereafter on 29 June 1984.
On 5 July 1984, after a hearing, the court ordered T.T. committed to HRS based on the 1982 adjudication of delinquency for tampering with evidence. It is from this order that T.T. appeals.
In criminal cases, the trial court is without authority in most instances to defer imposition of sentence indefinitely after adjudicating a defendant guilty. Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), cert. discharged, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1959). But the trial court retains jurisdiction to subsequently impose a sentence within five years. Section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1983). Such sentence may not exceed the period of maximum punishment computed from the date guilt was adjudicated. See, Shieder v. State, 430 So. 2d 537, n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), and cases cited therein.
We need not decide whether the juvenile court is likewise without authority to defer further disposition after adjudicating a juvenile guilty of a delinquent act because the commitment subsequently imposed was, as required by Section 39.-11(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), for an indeterminate period not to exceed T.T.’s nineteenth birthday. Such commitment does not exceed the maximum period of commitment computed from the date T.T. was adjudicated guilty of the delinquent act, and therefore does not violate his constitutional rights.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Manatee Mobley Baker v. State, 530 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…hereon is limited to a period of no more than five years following adjudication, see § 775.14, Fla.Stat., but any ”[s]uch sentence may not exceed the maximum punishment computed from the date guilt was adjudicated.” In the Interest of T.T. v. State, 472 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).…
-
In the Interest of A.N.J. v. State, 554 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)…ner in which separate adjudications of delinquency are handled. In fact, it may well be that the silence of Chapter 39 on this question is attributable to the commonplace nature of consecutive commitments. In In the Inter [*534] est of IT. v. State, 472 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), the appellant was given consecutive commitments to HRS on each of three counts. The propriety of this sentence was not challenged in IT. and the appeal in that case did not deal with the question. Similarly, in T.L.J. v. State,…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Mussa C. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959)
- Mussa C. Bateh v. State, 101 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958)
- Shieder v. State, 430 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)