TOM P. LINQUIST, APPELLANT,
v.
MARK H. BOYD AND SHARON BOYD, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
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In this negligence case arising from an automobile-motorcycle accident, the appellate court reversed a partial summary judgment on liability entered against the defendant Linquist, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding comparative negligence that precluded summary judgment.
The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was comparatively negligent by traveling at excessive speed for existing weather conditions and failing to keep a proper lookout, which precluded summary judgment on the issue of liability.
[1] A genuine issue of material fact regarding comparative negligence arises when a plaintiff travels at an excessive rate of speed for existing weather conditions and fails…
[2] A partial summary judgment on liability is inappropriate when a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the plaintiff's comparative negligence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The evidence is undisputed that the defendant Linquist was negligent in driving his automobile into a street intersection, in an effort to make a right-hand turn, because he failed to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff Mark Boyd”
Establishes that Linquist's liability for failing to yield was clear and undisputed
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant Linquist negligently drove his automobile into a street intersection to make a right-hand turn without yielding the right-of-way to plaintif…
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PER CURIAM.
The defendant Tom P. Linquist appeals a partial summary judgment on liability entered below in favor of the plaintiffs Mark and Sharon Boyd in a negligence action arising out of an automobile/motorcycle accident. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The evidence is undisputed that the defendant Linquist was negligent in driving his automobile into a street intersection, in an effort to make a right-hand turn, because he failed to yield the right-of-way to the plaintiff Mark Boyd who was operating a motorcycle on a through street. The accident occurred in the intersection when the plaintiff Boyd drove, without braking, directly into the driver’s side of the defendant’s automobile. By his own estimate, the plaintiff Boyd was travelling a little over 30 mph in a 40 mph zone during a driving rainstorm which he described as a “wall” of water. His actual speed may have been even faster in view of the fact that the defendant Linquist’s automobile was “totalled” as a result of the accident. Under these circumstances, we think that a genuine issue of material fact arose as to whether the plaintiff Boyd was comparatively negligent in this accident by travelling at an excessive rate of speed for existing weather conditions and in failing to keep a proper lookout. A partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liability was therefore inappropriate. See Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29, 30-31 (Fla.1977); U.S. Fire Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., 362 So. 2d 414, 416-17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
The partial summary judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
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Bravo v. Chapkis, 549 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…es of the cars were placed in the record and the pattern of damage1 visible from the pictures lends support to Halyard’s theory, which is at least sufficient create a material fact issue as to liability and comparative negligence. Lindquist v. Boyd, 473 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Hosbein v. Silverstein, 358 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978). Further, Trooper Davis admitted his report was less than conclusive, as it was done in bad weather conditions, and after considerabl…
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Authorities Cited
- Wills v. Sears, 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977)
- U. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. & Phillip Hurlock, 362 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)