RUBY LOUISE SIMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
NATHANIEL ELI SIMPSON, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1985-08-06
No. 84-2807
Before NESBITT, FERGUSON and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
473 So. 2d 299 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Holding

The dissolution of marriage action terminated upon the wife's death and was properly dismissed.


Headnotes

[1] A dissolution of marriage action terminates upon the death of a party.

[2] The division of a deceased spouse's property is a matter for a probate action, not a dissolution proceeding.

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Facts & Procedural History

A wife filed for dissolution of marriage, alleging her husband threatened her and their children. Before a restraining order was finalized, the husban…

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Opinion of the Court
FERGUSON, Judge.

FERGUSON, Judge.

This action commenced in the trial court on the complaint by the wife for dissolution of marriage wherein she alleged that her husband owned several guns and had threatened to kill her and her three children, two of a prior marriage. A motion for restraining order was granted orally but before it was reduced to writing, the wife was killed by the husband. For reasons not developed in the record, the husband was not prosecuted.

The wife’s attorney petitioned the court to divide the marital property so as to award the wife’s share to her children, contending that the husband should not be permitted to acquire a survivor’s interest in the wife’s property.1 The motion was denied and the case dismissed.

We agree with the trial court that the action for dissolution of marriage terminated with the death of the wife and was properly dismissed. See Sahler v. Sakler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So. 2d 105 (1944); Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA) (rehearing en banc), appeal dismissed, 419 So. 2d 1198 (Fla.1982). The division of the wife’s property should be the subject of a separate probate action brought by a substituted party.

For the same reason the dissolution action was dismissed this appeal is also

DISMISSED.

. Appellant relies on section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1983) which provides that a tenant by the entirety who unlawfully and intentionally kills or procures the death of another tenant by the entirety effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent’s property and the killer has no rights by survivorship. Appellant also relies on section 732.802(5) for her contention that even in the absence of a conviction of murder, section 732.802(2) will apply so long as the killing is proved, by the greater weight of the evidence in a civil action, to be unlawful and intentional. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla.1951), also relied upon by appellant, states the common law principle codified by section 732.802(2).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Georgiana Doerschuck v. Doerschuck, 481 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
    …onsideration as a petition for certiorari. There is no question that a trial judge has no option but to terminate a dissolution action upon the death of one of the parties. Messana v. Messana, 421 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Simpson v. Simpson, 473 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA), appeal dismissed, 419 So. 2d 1198 (Fla.1982); Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So. 2d 105 (1944). Thus, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the action. Sullivan v. Givens,…
  • MacLEOD v. Hoff, 654 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
    …re entry of a final judgment of dissolution, the trial court is thereafter deprived of jurisdiction to enter a final judgment. Berkenfield v. Jacobs, 83 So. 2d 265 (Fla.1955); Johnson v. Feeney, 507 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Simpson v. Simpson, 473 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Messana v. Messana, 421 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); McKendree v. McKendree, 139 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). The trial court’s jurisdiction expires because death, by oper…
  • Marlowe v. Brown, 944 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
    …missed the case upon the wife’s motion. See Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So. 2d. 105, 106-07 (1944); Messana v. Messana, [*1040] 421 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Mac-Leod v. Hoff, 654 So. 2d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Simpson v. Simpson, 473 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Because the husband died before the entry of a final judgment of dissolution, this case is unlike those-which hold that after the entry of a final judgment, a trial court retai…

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