ERNEST DANIELS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ernest Daniels was convicted of manslaughter (a lesser offense than the charged second-degree murder) and received a sentence enhanced based on firearm use under Florida Statute § 775.087. The appellate court reversed the enhanced sentence and remanded for resentencing because the jury verdict for manslaughter did not include a specific finding regarding firearm use, violating the requirement established in State v. Overfelt.
A trial court cannot enhance a sentence for firearm use without a specific jury finding that the defendant used a firearm in committing the offense. Since the manslaughter conviction did not include such a finding and manslaughter can be committed without a firearm, the sentencing enhancement violated the requirements of State v. Overfelt.
[1] A sentence enhancement for firearm use requires a jury finding that the defendant used a firearm, either through a guilty verdict on a firearm-related offense or a specif…
[2] A jury verdict of guilty for manslaughter does not, by itself, satisfy the requirement for a jury finding of firearm use necessary for sentence enhancement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“before a trial court may enhance a defendant's sentence or apply the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm, the jury must make a finding that the defendant committed the crime while using a firearm either by finding him guilty of a crime which involves a firearm or by answering a specific question of a special verdict form so indicating.”
Establishes the constitutional requirement from State v. Overfelt that jury findings regarding firearm use are necessary for sentence enhancement
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was charged with second-degree murder involving a handgun. At trial, the jury convicted him of the lesser offense of manslaughter instead. T…
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WALDEN, Judge.
Appellant was charged with second degree murder. Upon trial by jury he was convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter. A number of points on appeal have been asserted. We have assessed them in light of the record and appellate presentment and find, with the exception of the sentencing procedure, that no reversible error has been demonstrated.
It appears that the trial court enhanced the sentence from a second degree felony to a first degree felony pursuant to Section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1988), which provides that a sentence can be enhanced when the defendant carries, displays, uses, threatens, or attempts to use a firearm in the commission of the offense.
We reverse the sentence and remand with instructions to delete the enhancement and resentence appellant accordingly. Appellant must be present for such resentencing since the trial court has a discretion under the guidelines in sentencing for a second degree felony. We mandate this reversal upon authority of State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla.1984), wherein the Supreme Court of Florida stated:
The district court held, and we agree, “that before a trial court may enhance a defendant’s sentence or apply the mandatory minimum sentence for use of a firearm, the jury must make a finding that the defendant committed the crime while using a firearm either by finding him guilty of a crime which involves a firearm or by answering a specific question of a special verdict form so indicating.”
Id. at 1387.
Although the information charged appellant with murder in the second degree by using a handgun, and although the proofs manifestly reflected that the victim was killed by a firearm, the jury verdict which found appellant guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter made no mention of a firearm. Moreover, the definition of manslaughter does not include reference to a firearm. In other words, a person may commit manslaughter without necessarily using a firearm. And so, we are of the opinion that the requirements of State v. Overfelt, supra, were not met.
We reverse and remand for resentencing in accordance herewith.
Reversed and Remanded.
HURLEY and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
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Franklin v. State, 541 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)…these facts, taken together, are sufficient to reach the conclusion that appellant was charged with a felony for which the use of a weapon was an essential element. See Griffin v. State, 509 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). See e.g., Daniels v. State, 473 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Bell v. State, 394 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Whitehead v. State, 446 So. 2d 194, 198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). Because it is improper under section 775.-087(1) to enhance a sentence for use of a weapon if one of the essential…
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Cobas-Torres v. State, 502 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…ion of the offense; thus, the verdict cannot support the trial court’s reclassification. State v. Smith, 462 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.1985); State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 483 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); Daniels v. State, 473 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Lopez v. State, 470 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Streeter v. State, 416 So. 2d 1203,1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). We therefore reverse the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an appropriate judgment and for resentenc…
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Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n & Louie L. Wainwright v. Berry, 474 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…[*840] PER CURIAM. We reverse the order granting Leon E. Berry’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Jones, 473 So. 2d 722 (Pla. 4th DCA 1985). This decision is without prejudice to Berry’s right to apply to the trial court for writ of mandamus or other appropriate relief. Reversed. ANSTEAD and WALDEN, JJ., and SMITH, FREDRICKA, Associate Judge concur.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Overfelt, 457 So. 2d 1385 (Fla. 1984)