GEORGIA E. WARNHOFF, APPELLANT,
v.
FRANK A. WARNHOFF, APPELLEE
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Georgia Warnhoff appealed an order denying her motion to hold her former husband Frank in contempt for failing to pay her half of his profit sharing plan following their divorce. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial, finding the judgment was not sufficiently clear and definite to support a contempt order, and that the profit sharing plan was properly included as the husband's separate property under the term "pension."
The trial court properly denied the contempt motion because the husband did not violate any clear and definite provision of the final judgment; the provisions were ambiguous with two possible interpretations. Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the profit sharing plan was included within the husband's separate property, as "pension" encompasses both pension and profit sharing plans that are components of a single retirement plan.
[1] A party should not be held in contempt for violating an order that is not clear and definite, so as to make the party aware of its command and direction.
[2] Indirect criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully violated a court order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“One may not be held in contempt of court for violation of an order or a provision of a judgment which is not clear and definite so as to make the party aware of its command and direction.”
Establishes the legal standard that a contempt order requires a clear and definite provision; this was the basis for affirming the trial court's denial of the contempt motion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceUpon dissolution of marriage, the trial court ordered an equal division of the parties' assets, with specific items listed in Exhibits A and B as sepa…
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PER CURIAM.
Georgia Warnhoff appeals from an order denying her motion to punish her former husband, Frank Warnhoff, for contempt of court.
At the time of the dissolution of marriage the parties requested the court to make an equitable distribution of their assets. The court ordered that all of the assets of the parties be divided equally except that appellant would receive as her separate property the items listed in Exhibit A, and that appellee would receive as his separate property the items listed in Exhibit B.
Exhibit B includes the “pension from Saturday Corporation” (appellee’s employer). Appellant moved to hold appellee in contempt for his failure to pay her one-half of the proceeds from the profit sharing plan, claiming that Exhibit B did not list the profit sharing plan as appellee’s separate property and therefore she was entitled to one-half. The court found that the “final judgment and amended final judgment were intended to include as husband’s individual property his profit sharing plan as well as his pension plan_”
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to punish appellee for contempt of court. We disagree.
First, the trial court properly denied the motion for contempt because appellee did not violate any clear and definite provision of the final judgment. In Lawrence v. Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) this court stated:
One may not be held in contempt of court for violation of an order or a provision of a judgment which is not clear and definite so as to make the party aware of its command and direction. Kranis v. Kranis, 313 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Courts should be explicit and precise in their commands and should only then be strict in exacting compliance. Hettinger v. McMahon, 164 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964).
Id. at 280.
We agree with the trial court's statement that the judgment appeared to have two possible interpretations. Therefore the provisions of the final judgment did not constitute a sufficiently clear and definite command to appellee to support an order of contempt.
Next, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that appel-lee’s separate property included the profit sharing plan. Exhibit B listed “pension from Saturday Corporation” as one of the items of appellee’s separate property. “Pension” is defined in Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary as a “fixed sum paid regularly to a person ... a gratuity granted (as by a government) as a favor or a reward ... one paid under given conditions to a person following his retirement from service....”
The evidence presented established that the pension and profit sharing plans were components of one retirement plan for the Saturday Corporation. Since pension means payment following retirement from service, and the retirement payment from the Saturday Corporation included payments from a pension plan as well as a profit sharing plan, we determine that the profit sharing plan comes within the definition of pension. Thus the trial court properly found that the final judgment of dissolution included the profit sharing plan as appellee’s separate property.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
LETTS and DELL, JJ., and COOK, JACK H., Associate Judge, concur.
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Bell v. Bell, 587 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…The trial court agreed. Because we find that the property settlement agreement provisions pertinent here are susceptible of two possible interpretations (and for other reasons) we affirm denial of the motion for contempt. See Warnhoff v. Warnhoff, 474 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). The three sections at issue are separately enumerated as “child support,” “medical expenses,” and “educational expenses.” Section six, on child support, explains that the parties will share support and maintenance from their sa…
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Lubin v. Schumer, 593 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…command and direction, as applied to a given circumstance ...,” Kranis v. Kranis, 313 So. 2d 135, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), that portion of the order must be reversed. E.g., Miranda v. Miranda, 566 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Warnhoff v. Warnhoff, 474 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Seaboard Systems Railroad, Inc. v. Clemente, 467 So. 2d 348, 358 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Loury v. Loury, 431 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Second, the trial court ordered…
Authorities Cited
- Lawrence v. Lawrence, 384 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Rosalind Kranis v. Kranis, 313 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Frank Hettinger et ux. v. McMAHON, 164 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)