ANGELA WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Angela Williams appealed a special probation condition requiring her to purchase stolen property she attempted to steal. The Florida First District Court of Appeal affirmed the condition, clarifying that while rehabilitative costs may be imposed as probation conditions, they cannot be so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation, and must be tailored to the defendant's financial circumstances.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the purchase condition. While special probation conditions cannot be so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation, the $145 purchase requirement was not punitive under Williams's specific financial circumstances, as she was employed and willing to repay the merchants.
[1] A special condition of probation cannot be imposed if it is so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation.
[2] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by requiring a defendant to purchase recovered stolen property as a rehabilitative condition of probation when the defendant i…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A special condition of probation cannot be imposed if it is so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation.”
Establishes the legal standard governing whether special probation conditions are valid
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams pleaded guilty to two counts of grand theft and one count of petit theft. She was sentenced to three years of probation with a condition of n…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal challenging a special condition of probation. More specifically, the issue presented is whether the trial court erred in requiring, as a condition of probation, that the defendant purchase the property she attempted to steal.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant was adjudicated guilty of two counts of grand theft and one count of petit theft. Defendant was sentenced to a three-year probation period. Incarceration for nine months was a condition of that probation. Additionally, as a rehabilitative step and not a restitution measure, Williams was required to purchase the recovered stolen property. This court, in Walker v. State, 461 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), held that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a similar special condition of probation, and reversed and remanded that case for resentencing. The affirming of the trial court’s probation order in the case at bar merits a clarification of the holding in Walker. Walker does not prohibit the use of rehabilitative costs as a condition of probation pursuant to Section 948.03(4), Florida Statutes (1983); however, the trial judge does not possess unbridled discretion in imposing such a condition. A special condition of probation cannot be imposed if it is so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation. Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
The defendant in Walker was a 20-year-old, unemployed mother of one with a total monthly income of $178 in welfare assistance. The imposition of the special condition of probation, under the specific financial circumstances in Walker, was an abuse of discretion since the condition was so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation. The rehabilitative costs imposed in the case at bar are clearly not punitive under the specific financial circumstances of this defendant. At the sentencing hearing, Williams informed the trial court judge that she was employed and that she would repay the merchants involved for the stolen items. In that context, to require the defendant to pay $145 to the respective merchants was not an abuse of discretion. Under those circumstances, the purchase condition was properly within the trial court’s discretion.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, C.J., and MILLS and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Spano v. State, 60 So. 3d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011)…3); see Zeigler v. State, 647 So. 2d 272, 273-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The rationale behind these limitations is that “[a] special condition of probation cannot be imposed if it is so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation.” Williams v. State, 474 So. 2d 1260, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (citing Kominsky, 330 So. 2d at 801-02). [*1110] If at least one of the Rodriguez conditions exists, then a special condition of probation may be upheld. “While the [sentencing] judge need not make a finding, a special cond…
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Williams v. State, 182 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…(“The trial court has broad discretion in imposing conditions of probation, but to be valid, the condition must be ‘reasonably related to rehabilitation.’ ” (quoting Stephens v. State, 659 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995))); Williams v. State, 474 So. 2d 1260, 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“A special condition of probation cannot be imposed if it is so punitive as to be unrelated to rehabilitation.” (citing Kominshy v. State, 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976))). The parameters .of “relatedness,” and what i…
Authorities Cited
- Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Moye v. Bayou Grande Villa Ass'n, Inc., 461 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)
- Nettie Walker v. State, 461 So. 2d 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)