DIXIE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
PAUL E. BEAUDETTE, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 5th DCA | 1985-09-05
No. 84-1636
DAUKSCH, J., and BOARDMAN, E.F., Associate Judge, concur.
474 So. 2d 1264 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1985) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

Dixie Insurance Company challenges a trial court order finding that its auto insurance policy provided coverage for an accident involving the insured's spouse driving a vehicle titled solely in the spouse's name. The court reversed, holding that the policy clearly excluded coverage for vehicles owned by the insured or spouse that were not listed in the policy declarations.


Holding

The policy did not provide coverage because the automobile driven at the time of the accident was neither a vehicle shown in the declarations nor a temporary substitute vehicle, since it was owned by the insured's spouse. Although the spouse was encompassed within the definition of 'you' under the policy, the temporary substitute clause excluded coverage for vehicles owned by either the insured or spouse that were not declared.


Headnotes

[1] An insurance policy's definition of "covered auto" as a non-owned vehicle used as a temporary substitute for a listed vehicle does not provide coverage for a vehicle owne…

[2] When the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, it must be accorded its natural meaning.

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Key Quotes

“The temporary or substitute vehicle clause clearly excluded coverage under this policy for an accident occurring while the insured or a spouse drove an automobile owned by either of them, which was not shown on the declaration page.”

Establishes the core holding that vehicles owned by insured or spouse are excluded from temporary substitute coverage

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Facts & Procedural History

Heather Madden obtained a Dixie auto insurance policy covering her vehicle from March 29, 1980 to March 29, 1981. On May 30, 1980, she married Paul Be…

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Opinion of the Court
SHARP, Judge.

[*1265] SHARP, Judge.

Dixie Insurance Company (Dixie) challenges a trial court’s order finding that an insurance policy issued by Dixie to appellee (Madden) provided coverage for an automobile accident in which she was involved. We grant review and quash the order.1

The facts are not in dispute. Heather Madden obtained an insurance policy with Dixie covering her automobile for the period of March 29, 1980 to March 29, 1981. On May 30, 1980, she married Paul Beau-dette. On June 20, 1980, she was involved in an accident. At the time of the accident, Madden was driving a car titled solely in Beaudette’s name which had been owned by him for nine and one-half years.

Madden sought coverage from Dixie,2 claiming that Beaudette’s automobile was a “covered auto” within the meaning of the policy. It defined “covered auto” as any auto or trailer you do not own while used as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. (Emphasis supplied).

It also defined “covered auto” as “any vehicle shown in the Declarations,” and it is clear that the only vehicle shown in the declarations was the one owned by Madden.

The trial court found that Madden’s car was “out of normal use because of its breakdown and or [sic] unreliable operative condition.” There is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding and we do not disturb it on appeal. However, that finding is not determinative of this case.

The policy defined “you” and “your” as referring “to the ‘named insured’ shown in the Declarations and the spouse, if a resident of the same household.” Therefore, Beaudette was encompassed within the meaning of “you” in the policy clause. The temporary or substitute vehicle clause clearly excluded coverage under this policy for an accident occurring while the insured or a spouse drove an automobile owned by either of them, which was not shown on the declaration page.

The essential concern of the law of contract is to give effect to the intentions of the parties. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Rood Investments, Inc., 410 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). When the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous it must be accorded its natural meaning. Sanz v. Reserve Insurance Company of Chicago, Illinois, 172 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1965); Rood Investments, Inc. The policy provisions in this case are not ambiguous and they must be given full effect. There was coverage for a “covered auto” or one not owned by the insured, while being used as a temporary substitute. The automobile Madden was driving at the time of the accident was not covered because it was neither a vehicle shown in the declarations nor did it qualify as a temporary substitute vehicle since it was owned by the insured’s spouse. Therefore, Dixie’s policy did not provide coverage in the instant case. See Boyd v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 256 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1971); Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. Fonseca, 358 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3rd DCA), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 711 (Fla.1978).3

REVIEW GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED.

DAUKSCH, J., and BOARDMAN, E.F., Associate Judge, concur. .Orders determining insurance policy coverage are non-appealable, non-final orders. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bruns, 443 So. 2d 959 (Fla.1984); Fla. R.App.P. 9.130. However, we choose to treat this as a petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c). See Sunshine Dodge, Inc. v. Ketchem, 445 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).

. Beaudette’s automobile was not insured.

. The two cases relied on by Madden, Newbern Distrib. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 124 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960) and Home Indem. Co. v. Alday, 213 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), do not address the same issue raised in this case.


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Citator

Cited By

  • …DAUKSCH, Judge. This is an appeal from an order determining insurance policy coverage, which we have elected to treat as a petition for a writ of certiorari. Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c). Dixie Insurance Co. v. Beaudette, 474 So. 2d 1264, 1265 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). We quash the appealed order. Walter Garrison (“Garrison”) was killed on August 15, 1986 while driving a Kawasaki jet ski during the “Ski Pirates” water ski show at Sea World of Florida (“Sea World”). Garrison was an…
  • Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Godur, 476 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 390 So. 2d 325 (Fla.1980), we are bound to give effect to what we think are the clear terms of the insurance contract before us. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bartoszewicz, 404 So. 2d 1053 (Fla.1981); Dixie Ins. Co. v. Beaudette, 474 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Torres v. Southeastern Aviation (California), Inc., 472 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), and cases cited. Because Ms. Godur was thus not insured by Continental, it follows from the principles already enunciated that it is entitled…
  • Canal Ins. Co. v. Reed, 653 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
    …nd in subsequent cases decided by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Quarles, 560 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Sechler, 478 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Dixie Ins. Co. v. Beaudette, 474 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). We note conflict with these Fifth District eases and adhere to the reasoning of the supreme court and its policy preference not to allow piecemeal review. Granting certiorari in a case such as this would create an exception that…

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