SEABOARD SYSTEM RAILROAD, INC., A VIRGINIA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
RUBY EMOGENE PEEPLES, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GRADY ERNEST PEEPLES, DECEASED, APPELLEE
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Seaboard System Railroad appeals a $775,000 wrongful death judgment, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial because the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and allegedly driven by sympathy and passion. The appellate court affirms, finding no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's denial of the motion for new trial.
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for new trial. The jury could have reasonably concluded that any negligence on the part of the decedent was not a proximate contributing cause of the accident, and an allegedly excessive verdict to the personal representative does not compel the conclusion that the jury erred on the issue of contributory negligence.
[1] A trial judge's denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[2] A jury's finding of negligence may be upheld even if the decedent was contributorily negligent, if the decedent's negligence was not a proximate contributing cause of the…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the jury could have concluded that any negligence on his part was not a proximate contributing cause of the accident”
Establishes that the jury had legal authority to reject the contributory negligence argument despite evidence of some lack of care by the decedent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe decedent, Grady Ernest Peeples, was killed in a railroad crossing accident involving Seaboard System Railroad. A jury awarded $750,000 to the wido…
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GRIMES, Acting Chief Judge.
Seaboard appeals from a $775,000 judgment entered against it in a wrongful death action.1 The decedent was killed in a railroad crossing accident.
Seaboard does not contend that there was no evidence upon which the jury could have found it negligent. Rather, it argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to order a new trial because the verdict was “against the manifest weight of the evidence and reflects that it was given under the influence of sympathy, passion, prejudice, mistake or other unlawful cause.” As grounds Seaboard argues that (1) the undisputed evidence shows that the decedent was, at least to some extent, contributorily negligent, and (2) the award of $25,000 to the personal representative, which was more than ten times greater than the maximum amount of estate damages submitted by the plaintiffs expert witness, demonstrates that the verdict was the product of a runaway jury. There is no assertion that the $750,000 verdict for the widow was excessive.
The standard for review of the denial of a motion for new trial is whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion. Jones v. Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc., 342 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). On this record, we cannot say that he did. While the evidence strongly suggests some lack of care on the part of the decedent, the jury could have concluded that any negligence on his part was not a proximate contributing cause of the accident. See Mosca v. Middleton, 342 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 983 (Fla.1977). The fact that the jury may have awarded an excessive verdict to the personal representative does not require the conclusion that it erred in passing upon the issue of contributory negligence.2 Since we also reject Seaboard’s remaining point on appeal, the judgment is affirmed.
SCHEB and OTT, JJ., concur. . The jury awarded the decedent’s widow $750,-000 and his personal representative $25,000.
. In its brief, Seaboard states, "Again, we do not urge reversal for excessiveness of the verdict but simply assert that this award to the estate, which clearly is not supported by plaintiffs own evidence, is another example which shows that this verdict is in direct contravention of the manifest weight of the evidence.” Consequently, we do not specifically pass on whether or not the verdict for the personal representative was excessive.
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Miami-Dade Cnty. & Sergeant Patricia Sedano v. Ahmed Asad, 78 So. 3d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…use of discretion. See Southwin, Inc. v. Verde, 806 So. 2d 586, 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“The standard of review for the denial of a motion for new trial is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion.”); Seaboard Sys. R.R., Inc. v. Peeples, 475 So. 2d 916, 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“The standard for review of the denial of a motion for new trial is whether or not the trial judge abused his discretion.”). THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED WITH THEIR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jones v. Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc., 342 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Margo A. Mosca v. Middleton, 342 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)